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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN 3PEAT BRITAIN
AHB RUSSIA.
18TO -
«Sentimentality has no influence over the interests of 
nations, and from etart to finish the interests of Ruasl* 
and of England are opposed... Politically and commercially 
Hus-sia and England are rlvr,is who must ever s+.riv« for the 
mastery; and if this ootwtry seeKs to hold her own and 
avoid the debacle which is belnrr prepared for her, she 
must profit by the less on a of the past and consider her 
position." - Alexis Krauase. "Russia in Asia." pp.308-9
Harabures: "That island ef England breeds very valiant 
creatures; their mastiffs are of unmatenable 
courage."
Orleans: "Foolish cur a I thaii run winking into the mouth 
of a misslan be^ sind have thalr heads crushed 
HKe rotten apples. You may well say that's a 
v-Uisnt flea that dare eat his breaKfast on the lip of a lioii."
ShaKespeare. Kin^ HenryV. 
Act.III. So.VII.
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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN
AND RUSSIA. 1870 - 1809.
INTRODUCTION. 
three last decays of the Nineteenth Century found
tto relations tetwean Britain and Russia based on far less 
felloitoua foundations than those underlying the entente whioh 
exists between the two ?o\intTi3S today. The Crimean war had 
left a llnr^-rinp- hatred and mutual mistrust between n-.rj.tl ah er 
and Slav, iiV;lch prrslpted. t^mughout the rest of the century, 
an i even beyond. Thas tin* m^ves of each Power on th^ politioal 
.oh^asboard tetwoer/ 1870 an t>3 opening of tm Twentieth Century 
ware sieved by tlB otVer rlth a cueptoicv;:, eye cr.nd r,«:?vous
British and Puasian interests oa^e lr-to con f Hot In 
dir-tiriot spheres, ra:rpnctiv^iy ^'rhracirg -suvo^** aiid the 
Uast^rn oiios^lon; secondly,  'she central Aal?n Question and 
t^e oi'icroaoh i^n^G or. India; ^nd lastly, the Far Eastern Question, 
and the a ci arable fov »a pla-w in the s^.tn* In china. As each 
forms a distinct stoTm-oentre in the story of the unhappy
relations between Britain and. Russia, t ^ey will be treated 
separately; and conveniently so, for it is noticeable that 
Russia, being thwarted after pushing matters as far as possible 
In one centre, often turned he^ attention viporously to another.
Extremes meet; and the Briton forms a strikingly 
interesting contrast with the Russian. ihe Briton hails from 
a land of ^.lld insular climate, essentially adapted for 
maritime enterprise. Ho holds oversea possessions, ana Is 
gO" r 3rned by ^emoaratlc institutions. The Russian, on ths other 
h~;nd, is born +,o endure th« ri pours of a continental climate, 
of a land stinted by >Tat.n»e of sufficient sea-coast to allow of 
any e-raat oversea activity. His dominions form one vast land 
ErrlT'6, stretching from the Baltic to the Bering seas, ana he is 
t:ni,p:ht to p,lve ob*l*?an^e to a Btronr:; autocrntl^ government. 
Parallels h-'iv-c been formed between Russia and Britain in the 
WO^IH f ana porr-g and the Hellenic States - ^specially 
- in the ancient w^ltf. Ror."c .ind Russia used soldiers, 
d makers and proconsuls ?.s expansive apnnts, ^MT^ the 
aralen of A then p. ar-i ^TJtain followed In the weK-; of sailors 
_i)j" traders.
Although mutual opposition forma the key-note of the 
d^allnrrs between the two Powers durinr the period und'?r 
,c r-"n^?.deration, Punsla and Britain never actu,?..My croBsedjswords;
nevertheless relations were more than onoe almost strained to 
that point.
The reversal of their relationship, whloh began i 
1907 and has hitherto continued, forms a happy contrast and 
feli3itous sequel to the st^ry of strife, v/hi?n marKss 
Piisslan dealings from 1870 to 1899.
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IT-OPE AND THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION.
"A reolprooally sincere understanding b 
Russia and Britain will be always possible if - and for 
as,lon{? as - Russia does not strive to gain possession of 
Constantinople." (*•'
Europe has never been without an "Eastern Question" of 
some kincL or other. For its eastern regions, being near the 
junction of Miree continents, ana thereby affected, by the ebb 
an',? flow of r??lal migrations, form the most inflaw^ble part 
of Europe. "East is East and West is west," but wherever a 
division exists between the two, there must of ne?esolty be a 
wide debatable pie?e of land in ^ioh there will be interaction 
~.T» conflict, pn.iitlosl, social, and religious. As long as t> is 
land Is indubitably held by a great Power, the Eastern Question 
of Europe IB temporarily solved. But when th« hold of such a 
P'Ter on this la<H is weakened either by internal de^ay or 
external pressure, ^r both, the Eastern Question Is re-opened. 
The oroble??! also arises, when the land beoor-isa a bor ? of 
between two expansive Powers.
The "Eastern Question* of Anolent Greece constituted
(1) Bismarck, Rafleotions. vol.1, p.390.
a sear oh for a settlement of GreeK and Persian olalras In ion a. 
That of Rome had to do with the Parthian Inroads on the eastern 
confines of her Empire. Mediaeval Europe too, had her 
"Eastern Question* concerning the en or oa oilmen ts upon the 
tottering Empire of the E8,st. This was fought out on precisely 
the same terrain as that which ^cncerned the "Eastern Question* 
of Modern Europe.
On tha final overthrow or the Eastern Empire in 1453, 
a race waa «*t^blirth*<l in south-gaatex'/i Bur'ope wnloh temporarily 
Beutied the Eastern Question in the main, by sheer predominance 
in military power. But the Turkish Empire itself was also 
destined to become the disturbing factor and apple of discord in 
the Eastern Question of tne Nineteenth Century. While Turkey 
held a strong hand on the south-eastern corner of Europe, 
affaire in the Hilkans* on the surface, demanded little or no 
interference irons external Powers. ?Tor is it likely that such 
a risfcy experiment which offered little hope of any compensation, 
would have appeared sufficiently palatable and iravltlng to them. 
The Ottoman occupation of south-Eastern Burope has, however, 
almost entirely been n military ono, ar=d TurKey, even at her
*
worst, has displayed no negligible prowess in the science of 
war, which, the siege of Plevna, for examp^, win attsat.
By the end of the Bl#ht«ent-Js Century, rlalbl- signs of 
deoay showed that the TurKish Empire would become the "sioK man
of Europe," and, it was hoped, would finally come to an end to 
give pla^e to a worthier. "Where the oaroase Is, there are the 
eagles gathered together;" and already the Russian and Austrian 
eagles were hovering above, eager to seize upon those parts 
whioh the TurK could no longer hold. Already towards the end 
of the Eighteenth Century, Catherine II of Russia and Joseph II 
of Austria, formed a projected partition of Turkey. But the 
"sick man" was destined yet to live and perplex the Eir opean 
Powers with the Eastern Question ror over a century and a half. 
Scientific EI em Inform us that t.he Rim is only able to maintain 
Its heat and light giving powers, because it contracts. AS 
with oir great li^l^ary, pr, it appears vlth Turkey, who has only
ipre of her ic1?.lt,-.r-y jtrflnTth. V- f ' storing
fSiyf ji r V, •Jf* * *>V7*i "f ,"5 <r»-.r "* '•" V* -^ O ^ '.. T" •% *3 ri"t '""t "^ 'I dVlftr? ,31*1. Tier li -.'. '> k : '. (. J '''.,'.', >' -v .i. ,i •-• :*'<->>'•• ! f ;*»7 UJ. - vJ.-^ JL tSliCSU..
prin>ortlo.ia31y mn-^ cc-ap.l3.^ ry tr-- liitrv^imtf. on of -'-"MT1 
^tr-hrrbinff; qiiesflo^s, c'C•-.<.•*rnIn<•; tha r;£ voj-r^* U-i,-', 0 s* t 1.-^ various 
r.^Iksr. peopl^e TTltMn ',;ha P^n.l«i8ula --t^-jlf, M&r^c*j>lJy during 
Mi? la* 4;^ rap?-, o^ th3 pa?1 •:>'•• ^aid^r '^Tifild^vp.tla"^ o^f»r this 
play j.r. ijj'>r^at: irigly inipcjjrt.ant part.
T"i^ SaAty^n ^.u^->-( inn of tl'^j " Tjr.otv3^it.h Certify mainly
ljr*iC3, b"*ieir -Jii^l ?tla*'i atiojecte* and Ihe Siatea aro^ic. them. 
Ths Turlts -iid rovir »woeternised" HKe their mf.^.My Scythian
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neighbour of tne north, and v.ith a faithful adherence to the 
worst Islamic traditions, had oppressed her Christian subjects 
often with unttterable cruelty and fanatic ferocity. Taxation 
was "farmed," being nothing more than s system of organised 
robbery. Magistrates, judges, ana government servarts of 
every degree plundered At will for their own p^raonal benefit. 
Every post, hiRh or low, had been purchased by itn holder, whose 
single aim in discharging its duties was to errich himself at 
tr6 3xpa> ?e of tlioe-s ov*?r *Y>w he had gairec? &uthorltr- 
Christianity toe TS,-; a clis^ovnt to s ni/bji?t r-f thr, T crte, for 
t*? -vlcI^nc-M of a CV-TI btian a^i'i^nt £. TiirK was net received ir>
s ?ourt rf .Taw. ;*i oiT-.^li? 1 :. t reason •//?:. 3 thereby furbished to
juouitfy .;ny r.>x^r-nal - ^rTto^l^^ ujxn r;-:: Fort^ ii^ \li-^ interests 
c-:' c-:.il3^ia^-l ty. V^e ut'jr IT :-ar^C'lu/ •-'f i,hs ^^-';^ t^- govern, 
c'.JU':l-?u 7;! rh t ;•« _'v\C't i-u^ !; i.l:a/ nelth-cji- i-J.'.r'^e -.iOY- ^xlow others 
•;c i-.rcprcv 1 ; h;..V'v .;j->"i~ rl^My j'.i&xl jfi^i ir; L^rx'oi^.i;^. from
, to l:-?r near^sw r:- : ig:-l. ,ui»a, li.Lftsid and.
Au^-ii, ?io >..-; 4t n^ .;ivry vi^all/ aiT^ouSC: oy j. rl^h-, 6v»lution of 
1'he "astora Qu^3lio:» f has r-iilar. t'B duty of ii:t.3r r erence. But 
It In i)i t->iQ j-jTi -.•r-yclyri -iij-i'; ulhei1 raolora, iia-.>jiy, ti;*i 
ro,jp.jo'»ivo as^iA'iiior.c. of nua&lj: an^ Austria i.-i tna Balicans, 
h.r.vi ada&ci to ths -^aiipluxxty o 1 tlia Eastern O.ue^.tioii; and 
especially those of the former. Austria, apart nom a desire
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for a little territorial extension on the Balkan littoral of 
the Adriatic and a wish to checkmate Pusiian influence in the 
Peninsula, is well occupied with the troubles of her own 
conglomerate Empire, without venturing raur»h further afield. 
Russia, on the other hand, has special aspirations in the 
Balkans both fro~ a racial point of view and from a more 
narrowly national standpoint, in addition to the religious 
aspect as stated above.
As the head of the great Slav family of nations, 
Russia took upon herself the task of emancipating her weaker 
brethren from the Turkish yoke, in order to take them under her 
own immediate care. This racial aspiration in itself was quite 
a worthy duty to undertake, but it was at the savne time 
accompanied and fired by another national aspiration of Russia. 
This was to obtain a port washed by warm waters, which was 
suitable fop greater coneroial activities than t^ose she 
already possessed. It has been the geographical misfortune 
of Russia that she has lacked, in proportion with her size, 
much coastline that is ice-free throughout the year. Hence is 
seen the desir3 of her rapidly growing population to gain 
greater access to warmer waters. such seas attainable by 
Russia, are the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Pacific, 
of whi^h the first only concerns the present section of this 
survey.
To one port pp.r excellence, has Russia for ages
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looked with an eye of desire, namely, Constantinople and the 
Turkish sea-b^ard. A prophecy of extreme antiquity foretells 
tin ultimate accomplishment of her p-orpoaes; but wher>, or by 
whom it was first uttered, no man kno-s. Bight centuries ago 
it might be read upon an equestrian statue, then very old, whioh 
had been brought to Constantinople from Antioch. In Russia a 
powerful national sentiment regards the possession of Constant!-
*
nople as a manifest destiny, and consequently every measure Is 
urged forward whioh tends to accomplish it. Since the Ninth 
and Te*-th Cent 1 rles, attempts have been made by Russia to th- t 
end. Years later, after she had embraced Christianity, she 
urged pretensions to becoming heir to the Byzantine Emp re, on 
its fill to the infidels. Till the Eighteenth Century, Turkey 
was too strong, but as the collapse of the latter grew 1m ilnent, 
so did Russian feeling grow. The apocryphal will of Peter the 
Great urged Russia to seek this southern »wlndov; of Europe," but 
this dorunert has since been exposed to be but an impudent piece 
of French fabrication. it was a sign of trie future, howevs::, 
that Peter sent the first Russian man-of-war to the Bosphorus,
«
though nevertheless on a pacific mission. It Is also worthy of 
note that the influence of England at the Porte was used against 
Russia for the first time in Peter's reign. For the formation 
of a Russian navy and the rivalry of Russian merchants had 
alarmed the English Levant Company whi ^h then had all the trade
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of the near East In its h- nd3. Catherine II almost had a 
ohance of realising Russian ambitions for Constantinople. 
Alexander I even attempted to negotiates for that ?ov£ted prize 
with Napoleon I at Tilsit in rstrrn for a recognition of Trench 
claims in Syria and Egypt. "Constantinople! Constantinople! 
Never! For it is the empire of the tf-rld," indignantly replied 
ths French Emperor, placing hi a finger on the spot on the -nap 
whl -h represented the TurKish capital. Although subsequent 
events have perhaps diminished the strategic value of that 
marvellous site, few will be prepared to beny that it is still 
th-3 goal of Russian ambition. The Emperor "vicholas I actually 
stated that he did not wiah Russia to possess Constantinople, 
but it was inevitable. »As well," he said," strive to arrest 
a stream lr its descent from the mountains." No opportunity 
In the Nineteenth Centurt has Russia omitted of ag ravatlng the 
disorders of the Turkish Knpire and thus of silently hastening 
its overthrow. Long ago would she havQ fulfilled the ancient 
prediction, had not the jealousies o•' the other European powers 
and particularly Britain peremptorily forbidden this 
ag^randi 3a^-3nt.
Until late years, a high value had been given to the 
maintenance of what v.-as called a balance of power among 
European states. It Is no ge nor ally reoo-nised that any such 
arran^erent is fanciful, and that any attempt to frame and
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uphold an artificial equipoise of forces is vain. But England 
fought many wars and s^ed oceans of human blood in this 
visionary enterprise. On her principles it was clear that the 
possession of Turkey would endow Russia with an undue arid 
dangerous ascendency among European nations. Later on she 
entertained the belief that her own interests were specially 
involved. It was resirable that ^weaK power rather than a 
strong one should possess t£e eastern shores of the Mediterar.nean, 
otherwise free ocM'sunl cation with India would be put in danger. 
Under the Influence of these motives* it became the traditional 
aia of English foreign policy tc preserve the Turkish government, 
arid England laboured, often >*/ diplomacy, and ao^etimes even 
by ^rus, to uphold the most unjustifiable despotism whi3h 
modern Europe evor endured. In maintaining the Turks, she has 
prolonged the misery of a nation, and the desolation of vast 
tracts of fertile land capable of great utility to man. it is, 
beyond dispute, a singular infelioity that a great Christian 
state shoul <' have felt herself Impelled by any consideration of 
her own advantage, to the performance of a task which Involved 
consequences so lamentable. Yet It is remarkable that Britain 
did nothing to develop Turkey.
Th? climax of British policy in its continued sup ort 
of the sultan a^'dnst the aggression of Russia waa reached in, 
the Crimean War of 1854-5. This was, in the ranin, due to the
persistent effortn cf Ir/rr Nicholas I to extend hi 3 protection 
over the Orthodox Greek Christiars In tins sultan*?: dminion3. 
England, TCMCSS Govern-icnt and psorle resentsd t:ie -vrcroa^ivc?- ts 
of Puasia in th-3 last, opposed t.hs Ts?r in the w-3.r, vj.t.n t >••••» 
3ln:nr* b-^lisf, ^'cr th<3 most v art, that the Ports w?.s 8bout to 
reform and become a civilised State. The "integrity of t l-e 
Otto^.-n Empire" wag the Key-note of i^ritish policy in th-^ 11*3-? 
Eact, and a ^illinr- ally 7:as foinc7. in Jrancs, whose ruler 
!7 ap:>l3on III u?l~;:ieri to win ^ilitary ren0^,71. f'ew nenefltg - if 
indeed there really prove 1 to be any - resulted from thir rsr. 
T:nour-h suoossiful In *.B issue to Britain, It revealsd marksc* 
inisfrivlM^a and nigns of rross 3i3TTcr*age?nent in the British 
military m^G^iine. It Y;GS :i '"'.r vrni^n, e ape el ally viewed in the 
lif,?:t c»aBt by th^ history of resent yearr=*, is to ^ ;«?Teatly 
re^ettef?, not only on p.o^ount 01* the usele-33 waste of h^j^an 
life, tout al-jo on aoiount of the ultlmr.t^ t"-utility of the tsrms 
of tr;3 Trraty of P.iris (1856) which en'.ted hostilities. ^ ' under
treaty, th'* Povers bo-.ifu theiiicelveB not to intorv^ne 
gly in the adninictratior of Turfce/; t^ respect r.sr 
indepand?nr?e s..i.i territorial status; and to treat disputes 
between any of tlWs and the Porte as otters of general interest 
Turkey T/an made gra??fully to issue a firman^ 2 ^ granting
t II. no. 264. 
(2)Hertnlet II. no ?G3.
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-^ell^o-'jfl liberty to her Christian subjects, which England had 
obtained from the sultan before tha Congress. It was t vien 
embodied in the terms of tne Treaty, but at the same tiim It 
was .orefully declared fiat no power was -an tit led to exact 
fulfilment of the worthless pledge! Russia had to surrender 
the southern portion of Bessarabia to Moldavia, but perhaps the 
most futile of all the clauses was one through which Russia 
drew her pen as soon as an opportunity presented itself. Thi«3
that the Black sea should be neutral and closed to 
of-Trap of all nations, "in perpetuity," wlr le no arsenals 
vwe to be fsracted on its littoral. Undoubtedly this was
al^ed at Russian hopes t^'? naval r>ower An the ohief 
nea whicjh washed her shores. Russia however, t ; -rough the 
ast'itenets of :ier- diplomacy scored a decided SUOCQS& apalnst 
Britain in s^ourtnp: the irsartion of artiole^ which limited the 
goope of nr.vai warfare. Privateering was abolished and 
provisions were raa-'e wh^r^by a neutral flag was to rotact an 
enemy 1 g roods, whils netitral property, even tmnnr a hostile 
flag, was exemted f^o.r. ^p.pttire. Such were the main points of 
t.v,^ Treaty of Paris whereby Russia suffered pangs of wounded 
pride. They only proved transitory, however, for in less than 
half a century she obliterated every humiliating condition 
imposed on her. Thus a friendship dating bar* to the spacious 
d.?ys of Queen Elizabeth between Russia and ^rgiand was destroyed 
by the Crimean war, v.hlch left behind it a legacy of suspicion
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an«i unreasoning hatred. If tJiat wa~ was a blunder then the 
Treaty which terminate! it was equally so. Mean advantage was 
taken of Russia in her weakness, vrhiVn naturally only -*ould 
result in the tearing: asunder of **? bonds wiii^h cruelly bound 
h*r at th-3 first oooasion. But irx 1870 cameRusnia's 
opportunity,
T^e year 1370 wa3 truly anw snnus rairabilie," which 
r^voved s turning point and an apo'sh-Tnafcing dat^ In the history 
of ^iO'^--:-. 'Flu'r?pe, It ;i9d both H. r^troflpeotive and a prospective 
sign:? rirori^e. on the one hand, its last few norths wltneEssd 
*he grand final's of the ^trtigpcl'»9 for o»r:aan and Italian unities,
•
Fhieh had: beBii -In^vit^ble. gin^e the r»lose of tlvj Ksr-oleonie Era. 
T f. also 3;.vr the Btatea of* western end Central "Purope, settled 
cr settij.up -In :<i^ -"•^i»m "rnioh t"ri ey continued to abiiinie till 
>\i».TSt 1914, in this aena-j f tli« ysar 1B70 ^^rned its baoK, as 
^'; were, to ihe jaain «r^toleias of r/ent^rn and Central jTorope, 
wliio"') W^T»O de':; <in3d Dot *.o V^ seriously re-opened for fort.y-four 
years. On the oVv~r hand, so violent was t>- political earth­ 
quake th'it s^onfc tra ioundatlons of We^^.^rn "urope, that its 
tre^o^ws wc>r^ felt in Eas'tsrn Euro:.^. riiesa woro, ?acreover, 
;=?uffi -i.er?tly pT-iS*. to lessen ivsvsrely the influence of France, 
of the guara^.teeing Powern cf tl!3 status quo lr that quarter,
d the^at-y to prepare a re-oponing of the Eastern Question
th an o-ilnous and a^ornvoloudod (^>3a
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The unlooked-for defeat of France, hitherto the friend 
of national unity, ridded Russia of a powerful opponent in 
Eastern Europe, The crisis gave birth tfc a new Power in 
European affairs. From the ashes of the Frenoh Empire, sprang 
the new Oerman ®npire whi 3h was friendly,for several reasons, to 
Rusrsia* Now indeed, appeared Russia's chance to oast off the 
bonds of the Treaty of Paris whi oh had cramped her ambttlons 
southward since 1856.
The only difficulty for Russia was in regard to what 
attitude the other Powers would take of her action. France was 
already hopelessly pinned by the tenacious grip of Moltke's 
strategy, and utterly unable to give any attention to Eastern 
matters. Austria hesitated about joining France, seeing that 
Power prostrate and herself still suffering from the effects of 
Konnigf/ratz. Besides, she remembered Prussia's clemency in 
the hour of her defeat and saw Russia ready to hurl her CJossaoK 
hordes towards the Carpathians at the first sign of Austrian 
activity. The Austrian Government therefore chose to keep a 
discreet and silent attitude towards Russia. Deprived of her 
former French comrade in arms and seeing the disinclination of 
the Government of Vienna of talcing any initiative, Great Britain 
was not likely to open hostilities alone with Russia. The 
bitterest opposition, however, was only to be expected of her. 
Italy was far too engrossed with Rome and the completion and 
consolidation of her unity to offer opposition. Besides, it
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was Sardinia who joined t^ie western Powers in the CJriraean war 
in 1855, whereas 1870 saw that Kingdom merged in the newly 
unified Italy. Turkey was not likely to loudly protest a ainst 
the repudiation of the Black Sea olauses of 1856, for by them 
her own lands had been similarly bound, and with Russia, would 
be likewise freed if they were rescinded. Even then, Turkey 
had an advantage over Russia in the field of naval activity, for 
she had warships in the Aegean which she could easily transfer 
to the Euxine, while Russia had none at all in those waters. 
In any serious eventuality the sultan could count upon British 
naval assistance against Russia. The Por%e, therefore, was 
likely to gain as muoh, if non more than Russia by the latter 's 
projected action. in Prussia, the St. Petersburg Oovemnnnt 
had at least a friend who was willing to make with her a sporting 
diplomatic bargain. The valued relationship of the Tsar and 
the Prussian king, Bismarck's timely aid in quelling the Poles 
in 1883, and the pleasure experienced three years later in seein 
her Balkan rival crushed at Sadowa, all excited Russia's 
gratitude for Prussia. Russia thus observed an attitude of 
benevolent neutrality towards her in 1870 and promised to keep 
Austria quiet. in return for this, Prussia, who had little 
Interest at that time in the Eastern Question, readily gave her 
acquiescence to Russia's intention of abrogating the clauses of 
the Treaty of Paris concerning naval activity in the Blaok Sea. 
In his "Reflections,« Bismarck takes credit for coming to this 
understanding with Russia at the outbreak of the Franco-German
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War, as to the disavowal of "the most Inept oonclusions of the 
Peace of Paris. •* '
That Russia was occupied with the thought of 
improving her position in the Blacfc Sea even before s^ie 
offloially announced that intention, is shown by an article 
which appeared in the "Moscow Gazette" about July 8th, 1870. 
At the time it roused vigorous comments on the part of the 
English press, but in the rapid accumulation of more Important 
events, It w<*<? allowed to drop out of sight. As time went on, 
rumours were rife of a prospective abandonment of neutrality by 
Russia on bahalf of France. But these were soon proved to be 
erroneous by the lavlshment of rewards and decorations by the 
Tsar on the German leaders. Immediately after the intelligence 
of the bestowal *e tn<M3 honours, the British Cabinet was 
startled by the ooramimi cation of a ci^oular^ 2 ' written by Prince
t&* Bfceslan Chancellor. He abruptly announced his 
fc• a Intention to repudiate that article of the Paris 
Treaty whioh r«*f»rrad to the neutrality 01* ^ha 3lacK 3ea. This 
rrov!:«l')ii was declared ^o be insupportable to Rusaia herself, 
and to have 'oeen violated by tl^ie oilier contracting parties.
iihj Tsar, he declared, nad no wian to re-optsn the Eastern
Tide Diaviau.'jlc f 3 Rfjfi^^tioiis, vol.IX, p. 114. 
Got. Slat, 1870. Hertnlet m, No.429.
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Question, ha had deemed it a right and a duty on his part to 
notify the Porte that the supplementary Convention of 1856, 
whioh limited the action of littoral powers, had lost ita force. 
By this questionable stroke of policy, great enthusiasm was 
excited througio^it Russia. Provincial assemblies and local 
boards joined in assuring the Tsar of their resolve to support 
him, if necessary, with both treasure and blood.
The Black sea restrictions of 1856 could not seriously 
have been believed to last, any more than the restrictions laid 
by Napoleon on Prussian military power in 1808 lasted. Lord 
Palmer a ton, in reply to an observation of General Ignatiev at 
the time of the Paris Treaty, is reported - if this can be 
believed - to have given the aforesaid clauses only ten years to 
hold good. Mr Gladstone too had declared in 1856 that despite 
the popularity of the Black Sea limitations in England at t&at 
moment, such formed a far from satisfactory arrangement. 
•Should the time com«,» said he, "when Russia may resume 
aggressive schemes on Turkey, I believe that neutralisation 
would mean nothing but a serlea of pitfalls much deeper than 
people expect."* 1 '
Treitchke makes use of thla move by Russia, to 
illustrate his principle that the validity of treaties and
Morley. Life of Gladstone, vol.II, p.368.
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conventions between nations only holds pood, so long as the 
conditions under which they were primarily made remain constant. 
«A11 the limitations," Jie says, "which states lay on themselves 
in treaties are merely voluntary; all treaties are concluded 
with a mental reservation - rebus sic stantibus - so long as 
circumstances remain unchanged. If conditions have bean 
Imposed on it which cripple it or which it cannot observe, the 
nation honours itself in breafcing them. When a State has been 
wounded in its honour, the breach f treaty is but a matter of 
time. England and Prance had to admit thus in 1870. in their 
arrogant pride at the end of the Crimean war they had compelled 
their exhausted enemy to agree to remove all her warships from 
the BlaoK sea. Russia seized the opportinlty offered by the 
Franco-German war to breafc the agreement, and she was fully 
within her rights. The Ancient Athenians were therefore 
obeying a right instinct when they decided to limit the time 
during which their treaties with ot&er nations held good." 
Blaraarofc too, perhaps had the same thing in mind when he wrote, 
• international policy is a fluid element which under certain 
conditions will solidify, but on a change of atrapaphere, reverts 
to Its original diffuse condition. The clause "rebus sic 
stantlbus" is tacitly understood to all treaties that Involve 
per f orman ce. "' s '
il Mugge. *H. von TreitohKe." p.87. s ' lefleotions, vol.II, p.380.
As soon as the news of GorchaKov's circular was made 
Known in Britain, the p-iblio excitement was intense* and consols 
dropped heavily. It was felt that the Eastern Question was 
onoo more alive. "Everybody at a time liKe this looKs for 
booty; it will be hard to convince Central Europe that Turkey 
is not a fair prize," said Mr. GlaaatoneJ*' At the same time, 
Lord Lyons' s ' wrote from France that the Russian declaration was 
regarded with complacency, because a Congress was thereby 
expeoted which might oheoK both Prussia as wall as Russia. 
Rumours about immediate war with Russia were widespread in
*
England, and ware fostered by certain sections of the press. 
But i£r Gladstone openly expressed his disgust with such extreme 
suggestions. An offensive war, on the other hand, against a 
nation having peculiar advantages fT defence, and for an object 
whi3h almost every other signatory Po\ver thought in itself a bad 
one, was not desirable nor self-rssoniHBndatory at the time. 
Mr Gladstone further, did not dissent from the sub a tan os of the 
Russian claim, but was outraged by the form. "The Question" 
wrote he in a nae^orandvan, "is not whether any desire expressed 
by Russia ought to be carefully examined in a friendly spirit by 
the co-signatory Powers, but whether they ars to ao^-ept from 
her an announcement that bU her own act, without any consent
(1) Conversation between Gladstone, then Premier, and 
Lord Oranville, the Foreign Minister. Vide Morleyop. cit. vol.II, p.367, British Ambassador to France.
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from them, she has released herself from a solemn c
Oorohakov hastened to assitre Great Britain that he 
shared her anxiety to maintain the Ottoman Empire intact/ ' 
Nevertheless the Impatient action whereby he circulated his 
note, took many of tfce leading European statesmen by surprise. 
Bismarck even, feigned great surprise bafore Mr Odo Russell, but 
his foreknowledge of the event is undoubted. in view of the 
great excitement in England, Bismarck counselled Russia to bd 
patient and moderate. At the same time he prOpWed a 
Conference as the most likely means of achieving without offen?» 
the full concurrence of the signatory Bowers. The British 
Cabinet accepted this proposal on condition that the Conference 
should not onen with any previous assumption of Oorchakov's 
declaration. They also objected to St. Petersburg beln^ the 
scene of r ^gotiations. Russia made difficulties, but 
Bismarck's Influence prevailed to convene the representatives 01 
the Powers at London, and under the terms required by tine 
British Government. Lord Oranville thereupon Issued invitations 
to the participants of the Conference, which first met on 
January 17th, 1871. Of all the countries concerned, only t^e 
representative of France, M. Jules Favre, was absent, whom
Hertslet III. No.430.
t • HO. T>.1900.
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Blsraarok took good oara to prevent coning: from the invented city 
of Paris.
On the first day of meeting, all the Power u represented 
signed a Note^ 2*' exprossly denying the right of any single 
Power to retreat from a Treaty without the previo^is consent of 
the other signatories or a majority of them. On this poini;, 
Gladstone may be considered to have auccessfuily established >J s 
contention from the point of view he regarded the Russian Note; 
and rightly so, for the original Treaty, concluded thus:- "It 
(the Convention) cannot be either annulled or modified without 
the assent of the Powers signing the present Treaty.* Prince 
tfofrohakov's circular distinctly intimated the Tear's Int^n 
to violate this clause. On the other hand dorchakov justly
complained that while Russia was effectually weaKensd in t
' With regard
Black sea, turkey was not reatriotedAta her navy in the Aegean 
and the Straits, nor Britain and Franca in t/ie Mediterranean. 
As tltestralts further were only cslosed, by Treaty, in time of 
peaces, Tiusnia was always exposed in the event of asaiaration of 
war to fea- attack^ on her coast-line by a weaker st-a^e. TrJ.:> 
disadvantage was made more oppressive by the introduction ainoe 
185B, of ironclad vessels of war. He di : not consider Russia 
should be disadvantageously bound any longer by a Treaty, which,
(1) Kortslat. III. HO.453.
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as In the case of the union of Moldavia and Wallaohla under a 
foreign prince, had already been openly violated In Important 
particulars, and the terms of which hitherto Russia had strictly 
observed.
In recapitulating QorohaKov's remarks, Lord Qranville 
replied that the question was not whether Russia's claims to be 
released were reasonable, but whether one party to a treaty 
oould of Its own accord and without discussion, announce Its 
Immunity from soma or all of Itr; provisions. He further 
maintained that the right of releasing one pa^ty belonged not to
one, but to all parties, and that GorohaKov's dootrine would\
fl to "the entire destruction of treaties In their essence."
tafeing M» stand on the falti of treaties, Lord Oranvill® 
carefully declined to enter Into any argument respecting the 
actual Russian grounds of ocraplalnt. H9 llKewtse passed over 
the subject of the mi on of Rum«nrt.a f sgelnrt which t>.» Russian
Tho resiiltf? of f^ -: London Conf*?3!*eroe wnre i foregone 
eon a. '.us! on. ?r?r r that a^eemb^y wa?3 little n»ore thai? a 
diplomatic duel between Britain ani ?vnsia, cwr rsatt^ra of form 
of abrogation, rather than over the realities of the situation 
.?: from the Treaty of Paris. In *,?» nain» **$ actual 
cromplalnta were* ts^/.te jv0", nr f\ 'he re?itjtution of 
naval rights in thjt Su^lr«r equnily nnc?..lorGt«d the 
position of turkey.
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On March 13th, 1871, a Treaty(l) was executed by all 
the Powers, expunging the clauses of 1856, limiting Russian and 
Turkish naval activity in the Black sea.^ 2 ' But it affirmed 
the Sultan's right to close the straits to war-ships except 
those of friendly and allied Powers, should the Porte thinK it 
necessary to do so, to ensure the execution of the rest of the 
Treaty of Paorls. A Convention of March 18th of the saraa year 
was signed by Russia and Turkey,' 3 ' declaring that each Power 
had refrained tf» right of maintaining fleets of any dimensions 
in the Black s«a. In connection with thie Treaty, a certain 
cfcanf» In spirit of Turkish policy was noticeable towards 
Russia which appears to confirm the belief that the Porte was 
nr>t at all averse to the new arrangements. The •Turgule, 1* a 
semi-official organ at Constantinople, said Turkey had made 
frisnds with bar trUditional enemy Russia »?ar nore b«rsauiso she 
feare a conflict in which she would be without allies than 
because she trusts in the fVlar.tUy intsiitlcnij of the Pusslan 
Government. • Tins Porte too had ^e<«sn anxious thst, only the 
Black sea Question should fee discussed at the London conference. 
in England, people viewed with suspicion the displacement of the 
•balance of power« which Pus si a had caused, and the breach
y-'Hertslet. in. No.439.
)2) yi d<5 Hartslet. Vol.in. No.459.
\*> Ibid. vol.III. Ho.440.
between the two countries was thereby widened as subsequent 
events proved.
The years between 1870 and 1875 were marked by the 
rapid growth of Pan-slavism, mainly consequent upon Russia's 
diplomatic success of 1871. An enthusiastic desire, too, was 
felt by Russia to annul the other limitations Imposed by the 
IPreaty of Paris on her action In South-lBastern Europe. Military 
preparations now were well pushed forward, and Russia began 
seriously to set her household In order. The restoration of 
Sevastopol as a naval and military amporl\sn was 
pyoa«?uted, whil-3 the year 1875?, the two Jtand 
of t*ie birtr. of P^te? the Qreat, *a3 appropriately distinguished 
by an lnr?9£«K» ln-stflra.'.4 of a deficit, fo-? the first time In the 
Russian budget.
At t*ie ao"utrt of the sublime Porte, General Ignatlev 
had ouo^aedad, 1$-oar en *,ly, in establishing an In^lu^nse as great 
as tv ^f; wM^>>? Lord Stratford d» ^doliffa formerly wielded there, 
on ^half of Britain. for 3one tlma I^atlav h^ci 
enc»c:rra,^d tho BulffarlsJi griojeot.^, of the sultan in 
refusal of rali.Klous alla»;i3noe to the Oreak Patrlara*i» and In 
their claim for an lndeT)and9n** Ohuroh. 3oth Bulgarians and 
Oreelcs appealed to hira regarding their dispute. But after a 
pretence to Impartiality, Ignatlev finally sided entirely with 
the Bulgarians, who In 1872 obtained by firman an Bxaroh of their 
own. This interest of Rupsla In Bulgarian affairs was an
earnest of >ier future attempts, during the next decade or so, 
to establish her influence in BalKan politl os.
In January 1874, Princess Marie Alexandrovna, the 
Tsar's only daughter, married the DuKe of Edinburgh, but Anglo- 
Russian relations were not improved thereby. A very oold 
reception moreover waa afforded Alexander II by the British 
public, on his visit to the wedded couple in London during the 
following May. tfhe 'j?sar*s refusal to receive Disraeli was 
further greatly resented. Despite the surface •friendliness" 
which appeared In the marriage* Russia still further hastened 
her military preparations in the eventuality or any breach of 
the peace. For, In tne aairs year the Eu&sl&rj Bfoj'aror issued 
aimkair establishing a system of army ccr»Eoriptlcn.
At the same tiiae, as if the possibility of new 
ocnfJ.ict/3 wan indeed t^s prevailing: icea at st. Petersburg, a 
Conffci»3nca of the Powers was called by Puetsla tr- BriT^o^ls in 
July, to consider the expediency of Introducing certain new 
rules into the usages of war. But England* characteristically 
opposed to Russia, refused to appoint a delegate, until the 
other Governments tsfcing part in the Conference disclaimed 
intentions of Interfering in any wa$ with belligerent rights at 
sea. Russia readily gave aeQtrt.essence and Lord Derby replied
as follows through ttre British ambassador at St. Petersburg on
July 25th, 1874."Her Majesty's Government have aooepted 
the assurance of the flusalan and other Governments that the 
Conference will not entertain any question relating t-> maritime 
operations or naval warfare..... They re glad to learn .... 
that tl»re Is no Intention of enlarging the scope of the 
Conference so as to include t^e discussion of general principles 
of international law..... Her Majesty's Government accordingly 
reserve to themselves full liberty of action as to the manner
in which they will deal with any proposals In the Conference." 
The English representative was not furnished with any pleni­ 
potentiary powers, as the Conference was regarded as assembled 
• only for the purpose of deliberations.* The results of the 
Brussels Conference were of little perraai ent value, amounting 
to no more than recommendations of a committee of Inquiry.' 2 '
Nothing daunted, however, tha Russian Government 
proposed to follow up this first attempt by a formal Conference 
at St. P3t$rsburp in th»9 next year. A deaided refusal came 
from England, and Lord Derby the Foreign Minister declined to 
enter into an agreem-snt which, it was considered, mipht 
facilitate aggressive wars. It was further thought that the 
great military Powers, which as a rule would be the aggressors,
Vide Ann. Peg. 1875. Appendix. 
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wished to weaken the defensive forces of the smaller States by 
the projected agreement.' ' Britain too, feared lest the 
subject of naval warfare, whioh was expressly excluded at 
Brussels, should be discussed at St. Petersburg, and be 
r«related in a manner disagreeable to herself. At the sarae 
time, Lord Derby expressed his appreciation for the "consider­ 
ations of humanity," which had inspired the Tsar. Nevertheless, 
the position England took up in the face of Russia, caused no 
little hesitation in st. Petersburg, and was viewed as a sign of 
ill-will. Ift reply, the Russian Government expressed its 
regret of "the resolutlion of the Government of Her Britannic 
Majesty, to no lonper take part in this deliberation..... it 
would havo be^n desirable that the voice of a great nation like 
that of England, had made itself hoard in an inquiry, the object 
of which appeared to have met with its sympathies."' 2 ' Hence 
the scheme for the st. Petersburg Conference had to be postponed.
Russia, however, was soon to lie attracted by alarming 
events in the Balkan Peninsula and moved to warlike measures, 
with the great impetus that, was given to the racial feeling of 
Pan-slavism, Russia remembered that she had weaker brethren in 
South-Eastern Europe, who were still subject to the tender
Ul Hertslet. III. No.451.
Vide Ann. Reg. 1875. Ippendlx.
mercies of her Ottoman neighbour. Promises of toleration to 
Christians and of a general amelioration of conditions of living, 
whioh had been given In the past, were still ignored by the
•
Sultan. But in the autumn of 1875, matters oa'ie to a climax 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These and the adjoining provinces 
formed the most inflammable parts of Turkey* and now^here else 
did tlB animosity between Christian and Moslem burn more fiercely 
Despite the disastrous results of the previous year's harvest, 
the tax-farmers and Muhammedan land-lords still demanded their 
full dues, and owing to the harshness and cruelty of their 
exactions the Christians rose in revolt. Slavophil committees 
eagerly fomented the rising, and their propoganda was carried 
on with restless zeal. The flame spread to Serbia and 
Montenegro whence many insurgents had fled to aid the rebels 
of Bosnia. As an antidote to this manifestation of Ban-slavism 
Turfcey preached Pan-ielamism, but utterly failed to quell the 
insurrection. it was soon clear that the Eastern Question had 
once mora entered on an acute phase. On October 2nd an Irade' 
declaring that "all the subjects of His Imperial Hlgmess the 
Sultan without distinction are the constant object of his 
especial care, and of his never-ceasing kin cm* as "(i) was issued 
by the Turkish monarch. He further promised all his Christian
Turkey No. 3. (1876) No. 39. 
(Also Hertslet IV. No. 454.)
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subjects some remission of taxation and rights for choosing 
delegates to supervise their privileges at Constantinople. 
produced little effect, however, on the Bosnian revolt, although 
more definite offers followed on December ISth, 1875, giving 
religious authority throughout the empire and assigning seats 
for Christians on the elective councils.* 1 ' the Russian 
Ignatiev had been mainly instrumental in procuring the latter, 
by threatening sultan Abdul Azlz with his bugbear, European 
intervention.
Meanwhile Austria had been anxious to prevent the 
Balkan disaffection from spreading to her own Slav subjects. 
Her Chancellor t Count Andrassy, together with tha other 
Chancellors of the members of the Holy Alliance, BlsmarcK and
fcorohafcov, had prepared a scheme of reforms which was to be
fa) forced on fur icey to conciliate the Bosnian Insurgent a.**' This
was Known as the *Andrassy Note.* Complete religious liberty, 
the abolition of tax-fanning, the appointment of a half Christian 
half Moslem Joint committee and an attempt to adapt taxation 
to suit local needs, formed the main part of the project. These 
proposals would probably havs bean forwarded to the Porte earlier 
In 1875, but for ths diplomatic Intervention of the British 
Cabinet and of Disraeli in particular. with the latter*s
Ibid. Mo.59. (Also Hertslet.IV. No.455, ) 
ibid. No. 55. (Also Hertslet.IV. No. 456.)
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Jewish descent ca^e a consequent hatred of Russia as the 
oppressor of his rase. Disraeli's policy of Imperialism 
regarded Muscovite expansion n.s the chief danger to British 
ooroniile&tlons with India. The British Prime Minister had put 
forward that he believed sufficient time should have been allowed 
the sultan to carry his recent programme of reforms into 
execution. For theae reasons, he had warned tl» Holy Alliance 
to withhold the And"assy Note whi ?h bs considered inopportune.
Although tto Holy Alliance collectively supported the 
Andrassy Note/ 1 ' the attitude of its thre^ members differed 
r«3-pec*lvaly. derm any was leaat affected and mo<?t lively was 
glad that Russian and Austrian attentions were attracted from the 
west. The Dual Monarchy was striving to localise tne rising, 
bo tii for the safety of ter own frontiers, ana to prevent Russian 
Interference ir the Balfcana. Whil® Russia was attempting to 
cope with hhe trouble, ahe wished at the sane time to see 
Paiislaviatm come to ^he fora. For although a e endeavoured to 
fT?se the Andra^ay scheme of reforms on the Porte, Russia, on 
the otner hand* had har fronts throughout the lurKish Umpire 
ssoratly encoijratln?r P3nslavlet movements. in sir Henry 
Blllott's despatch of February 14th, 1876, for example, the 
following rcas seated. «»At Ra?uaa, the FM?selan consulate is the
(1)
. IV. No. 456.
open resort of the Insurgent chiefs; their correspondence Is 
sent to the consul, who is a party to all their projects and 
associates himself Intimately with them. He does not appear 
to mafc<3 any attempt to conceal the part he is playing. 11 * 3'' in 
reply to British representations, OorchaKov later stated that he 
could not remove the consul for fcindnes of heart I All this 
time, too, a Russian general was at the head of the Serbian 
forces.
In his reliance on the Sultan's promised reforms, and 
the consequent delay of the Andras y Note, Disraeli stood almost 
alone. He regarded the whole Eastern Question from the sole 
standpoint of British Interests, as evinced by his speech at the 
Guildhall Banquet on November 0thv 1875.
But Russia was becoming Impatient and her relations 
with England were made worse by Disraeli's masterly coup in the 
purchase of the Suez Canal shares. Hostile comments appeared 
in the Muscovite press, and the spirltad trend of foreign 
affairs appeared to indicate a possible war between the two 
Powers. The "Moscow Gazette" remarked as follows, early in 
December, 1875.(2) «Snglandt who has so long Kept watoh and 
ward over the property of the Porte, all at once adopts a
Ann. Reg. 1876. Appendix, p.209. 
(2) see Ann. Rag. 1875. p.291.
different course and pooKets her coveted share of the spoil 
(i.e. Sues Canal). So the conclusions we drew from the 
enigmatical declaration of British ministers about the 
important English "interests* In the Bast, are borne out by 
fact..... But there are indeed no»lnt»rests" to defend in the 
present instance (i.e. Bosnia).»
Throughout the winter, the Balkan troubles continued 
unchecked, for the insurgents were fully roused. Despite the 
liberal appearance of the Sultan's promises of December 12th, 
thaf remained unheeded. In view of the seriousness of the 
sittiation, the Russia:: ambassador on Jaicu&ry 13th, 137S, 
erpresaed to Lord Derby hi a Government's strong; desire that 
"England should not hold aloof fyoci joining in tho oth&r Powered 
r s^i on s+r trices tc the Ports.*1 Purfthar, he assured the British 
Cabinet i.hat In supporting the jkn&rasay Note they "would not in 
the slightest degree pledge them wive a to ulterior steps. "(^ 
After due consideration, Disraeli and Lord Derby, (tJw Foreign 
Secretary), ware forced to give a cautious and cool/assent to the 
Note/ 2 ' which was presented to the Porte on January list. 
The British acceptance was reported by Lord Loftus^ 5^ from 
St. Petersb-jrg on February 2nd, to have given "great satlsfaction 
In Russian circles.
ii °-' N0- 3 - U876) - NO 62 -
5) Parl. Reports. Turkey No. 2. (1876) No. 83.
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To the astonisHnent of the woljl, the Porte astutely 
accepted the Andrassy Note with one reservation,' 1 ) on 
February 10th. But the characteristic eotivity of the Sultan 
ended with that acceptance, and no attempt whatever was made to 
carry the promised reforms into execution. Previous experience 
of the wort hie sane s~> of Turkish promises especially when 
unsupported by the pressure of the Powers, of which the 
Annrassy Note gave no Indication, oauoed the disturbances to 
continue unabated. Fuel was added to tl» conflagration by tKe 
fomentations of Slavophil eo^lttees.
On April l?th, tl^e Russian Govsrrvnarit indlor*,ad to 
tiord Perby tnro^gh the British Am^aeeadnr, Lord Loftus, a 
desire to secure ^eaot. Prince QrrrchfKcv fisrtfcor expressed 
M3 nnrl.^ty the.t the Ir^.Tgents 1 A^n^da should r^ot be 
summarily r^lecti»1« Tetcr, on April ffOth, *$ told Lord Loftus 
that he otron^cly hoped the eylsting SritopeaTi concert would be 
maintained. "La ^arole est aux canons," daid OorchaKov.' 3 ) 
The British Government, howevar, still maintained an awKward 
attitude of non-intervention.
Matters grew worse in the BalKana, and d€»v©looed into 
a religious war. In Bulgarla t where revolt had been smouldering
Hertslet.IV. No.458.
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a flame of insurrection brofce out against the intolerable 
Moslem rule about May 9th. this was put down by Bashi-bazuKs 
and other turfcish irregular & witii rslentleaa fury. Three days 
previously at Salonioa, the French and German consuls - the 
latter a Britisher - were murdered in an outbreak of Panislc-tnic 
fanatioiam. Ehis convinced the Powers of the necessity of 
adopting sterner measures towards Turkey.
In Russia, a roar of execrati vn was raiised arid 
Alexander II saw that armed intervention would ultimately be 
necassit itod. rne ^sar was as yet, not free to act singly on 
behalf of hiu co~i»eli t;ioniats a*id uroti-jsr uiavs. 7oi the Holy 
atiil Hold good, aric. co/,o3i! v;jsd aotion witr Austria and 
had . > tti ^oribidoi s-:,. Bu; .luviru? dacidod »^o draw 
iDb^r w/toii" in-uiiiiajy, s -n& tura^ S^eror^ on !%y is^n agreed
ijtruttiGiii iUixOsl.ife rofojir.ks on tho ?o-?te, to be 
executed isr.dor Joiut 3-*rapaa^ aui'arvision. Tliiss was Known as 
t-ia- Berlin Ms craiiaun^ 1 ) ana was malr.ly loentlasl v~ith the 
Andrassy Note. Jise relief of Ohristiar refugees and the 
reconstruction of damaged buildings were stipulated, together 
Tith consi'l&r supervision of t v: ? Powers over reforms. Further, 
in order to overcome t!:e sultan^ ezcuae that reior«n ooijld not
See Hertslet IV. No.461.
be effected In districts In open revolt, a combined naval 
demonstration of the Concert of Powers was recommended. Lastly, 
a two months 1 armistice was to be enforced, and If on the 
expiration of that time no settlement had been reac ed, 
•further action* was to b« taken.
Although the measure bore the name of Berlin, and 
originated from former Austrian proposals, the spirit behind It 
was the spirit of Russia. For Germany had little to do with 
Turkey till after 1878, and the Austrian Andrassy Is Known to 
have given but a doubtful consent to the Memorandum. it was 
accepted by Prance and Italy, but was finally rejected on 
May 19th by Disraeli and Lord Derby.(1) The whole ostensible 
object of the Berlin Memorandum was shown by Lord Derby to be 
defeated by the final clause, threatening "further aotlcn » if 
no definite settlement were reached in two months. For if the 
Insurgents only held out for that time, they were sure to 
provoke the Powers 1 intervention in their favour! Further 
"the mere fact of the Insurrection remaining unsuppreased, would 
be likely to glva it additional vitality;and the result of an 
armistice might therefore lead to a rejection of any de -ands 
which the Porte might ffcirly be expected to concede, and thus 
hinder rather than advance tha prospects of aaolfloation ....
Hertslet IV. No. 462.
Regarded In this light, the proposal of an armistice seems to 
Her Majesty's Government, to toe Illusory." Thus In
4
Britain's eyes, Russia, undoubtedly the chief instigator to the 
Instrument, was seeking to burn the candle at both ends. For 
she not only secretly encouraged the BalKan Insurgents through 
Panslavlst agenoles, but sought to procure International legal 
sanction to a measure promising them active support after two 
months! Britain's withdrawal from the concert of Europe was 
fatal to the policy of the Berlin Memorandum. Together with 
more positive acts on the part of ©igland, this proceeding was 
taken both by Russia and the Porte, to assure tire moral support 
of Britain to the Sultan, and probably to threaten military 
measures against Russia.
A more serious step was now taken by the British 
Cabinet. For in response to the entreaties^ 2 ) of sir Henry 
llliott, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, a British 
squadron was despatched, and took up its position on May 26th at 
Beslka Bay. ThiL measure was requested, nominally for the 
protection of life and property of 3'.«sii&h {subjects in Turkey. 
But the tardlnass with which th& flest was finally sent and the 
length of time it was kept in great strength, tend to show 
that its presence was meant by Britain to en o our age Turkey
Hertslet.lV. p.2465. 
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against any possible Russian aggression. This belief was 
later strengthened by the unfortunate utterance of Disraeli on 
July 30th, to the ef: eet that the warships were stationed at 
Besifca Bay solely In defence of "British interests.* A similar 
statement was repeated by the Premier in the commons on 
August llth. But both Russia and Turkey Knew well what "British 
interests'* were in the Near East. This act ended all hopes of 
immediately forcing Turfcey to grant th» much-needed reforms.
Meanwhile, Serbia and Montenegro had declared war on 
their bullying overlords on June 30th and July 2nd respectively.
~f
Their troops were led by the Russian CHneral Cherftalev, and 
undotfotedly received secret Muscovite support. Mainly ttr ough 
the expositions of the "Dally T'ews" reliable tidings of the 
Bulgarian massacres at BataK and elsewhere, nov befran to be 
more fully Known in England. Despite the efforts of the 
Government leaders and of the T'reophll press to minimise these 
reports, a stoi»*n of Indignation was raised throughout the whole 
country. In vain Disrstetl sovrM to 31e ise the terrible news 
as mere "aoffee-fcors* babble." aiad^tor^ was fired to write 
his famous paTBphl*t en "T** Tta!rs»-?l£n Horrors rtr.d the Question 
of the Uast," He advocated the expulsion of the UurKs "bag 
and baggage" ft"wi th** provinces they had desolated and profaned. 
Lord Derby even, felt constrained to telegraph to the Porte that
Herts let IV. Nos. 463-4.
"any renewal of such outrages would prove more dldastrous to 
Turkey than the loss of a battle." Further, "any sympathy 
which was previously felt" by Britain for the Porte, was 
"completely destroyed by the lamentable occurrences In Bulgaria. 
Even if Russia were to declare war against the ?orte, Her 
Majesty's Government would find It practically impossible to 
intervene."
Thus the ugly results of British policy, which was not 
without deserved censure, were revealed In their ghastly 
nakedness. The "moral support" afforded by tne presence of the 
British aquadron at Besika Bay f had had the effect of indlreotly 
encouraging the Turks to commit nameless* barbarities. Sir 
Henry flllott's despatches too, show that the Porte had been 
pressed to take active measures in the disaffected districts,^2) 
although that official later protested against them;- but too 
late. "We have be^n upholding what we know to be a semi- 
olvllised nation," confessed Slliott, with reluctance. 
Britain's ^restige in Eastern Europe greatly paled before these 
happenings, while the righteousness of Russia's cause appeared 
to increase proportionately in the eyes of Europe. Lord 
Stratford de Redcliffe thought the crisis would not have arisen, 
had Britain, from the first instance, upheld tho European
Parl. Reports. Turkey No.6. (1877). Parl. Reports. Turkey No.s. (1876) p.173.
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Concert; not that Russia was always and fully trustworthy, but»•
because her clroumstances then made her open to the full bearing 
of British moral influence. She would have best counteracted 
Russia's alleged designs, by joining Austria, the other rival 
of Muscovite influence in ths Balkans. For most llKely Russia 
would never have faced an Austro-British combination. But the 
opposition of England to the Andrassy Note and the Berlin 
Memorandum, had causedBrifeinto drift away from the Dual 
Monarchy, and left Russia with a freer hand. "It seems -?o me," 
said Lord Stratford de Redollffe,"that Russia has been drawn 
into a position from which she can hardly retreat with credit*'*'
But Russia had bean straining for a suitable occasion 
for Intervention on behalf of tne Bulgarians, while her Serbian 
brethren wero now hard-pressed by the TurKs. Therefore, she 
eagerly s&tjsed the opportunity, which Britain had missed, in 
coming to an understanding with Austria. However inclined 
Russia might have been to act alone, she dared not risk trouble 
with the Central Powers In view of Bismarck's frank warning in 
the event of an Austro-Russian war. In order, therefore, not 
to infringe upon the understanding underly ng the Holy Alliance, 
but at the same ti^ne to prepare the way for an honourable 
intervention in th- crisis, a happy means was devised for 
allaying Austrian apprehensions. On July 8th, the Emperors
Merley. Life of Gladstone. Vol.IX, p.431.
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Alexander II and Pranz-Josaf concluded a sacrat compact at 
Reiohstadt. A policy of non-intervention was, for ths time 
being, arranged by both Powers, But if a forced entrance 
into Bulgaria wars necessitated, Russia agreal ^o recognise ur. 
Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Heraagovlna to tha same 
extent as, and for as long as, a Russian occupation of Bulgaria
«
proved naoaesary. The insular attitude of British politicians 
th$s threw Austria into tiia ar<?s cf Russia.
Buring this time, despite the Tsar's previous 
assurance to Lord Derby on June 10th* 1 ' that if the Prince cf 
Serbia attaclcad Turfcay ha would rsaeivo neither ^national 
aseiatnaae from Ru&~*a,» nor "m-rrj.! support and sympathy,* 
Russian volunteers were attractad in large numbers to the 
Serbian colours. Although they wers lad by tha Russian 
Cv rrnalav, t/i® E: Ifcan ailios wars severely worsted by th® TurKs, 
g;:ti in Septembsr the Slavs is^^ht the meaiati.cn ci* the Powers 
E7^;r. England, owin;? to t:ie rtvul^. en of public santiment 
e.gainst Trrv-ey, lont n^- good -;rfla?3 .4.n persuading t:"?a Sultan 
to prop o s« 13BA s o i' ii*!i c 111 c?. 5 ' ^v. t th© 96 • ^ ?r3 so 36v<sra, 
r/?at Serbls recited t'.ien^ anc h:;i-;MUt-e3 T«?er? rsh3...:oa.
starn in their ocurseu ^tlli fought against the
Ann. Reg:. 1870. Appendix, p.311. 
Hertslet.iv. p.2488.
(5) Ibid. p.3489.
Slavs, and It was soon seen that unless Turkey modified her 
claims, Russia oould be restrained no longer. undoubtedly, 
that Power had displayed considerable patlenoe and moderation, 
mainly due to the influence of the peaceful Alexander II. But 
racial feeling and* possibly t a fear lest the stability of his 
dynasty might be otherwise threatened by Pan-slavist 
revolutionaries, urged tha Tsar to make more drastic efforts. 
On September 26th, count Shuvalov, the Russian plenipotentiary, 
proposed to Lord Derby the occupation of Bosnia and Bulgaria by 
Austrian and Rtisalan troops respectively, and a 3o*nt naval 
demonstration of the Powers in the Boaphorus, if Tur&ey refused 
the terras of Jbeaoe which Serbia had since offered.^) On 
October ?rd Derby Informed nount Shuvalov that Britain was 
»unabl<* to concur in the measure® of occupation and the entry 
of the united fleets into th« Bosphorua,* as suggesed by Russia, 
but would "give support to.,., an armistice of not less than a 
month.* Accordingly, sir Henry Slllott was Instructed, on 
October 6th, to press a month's armistice on t>e Porte, on 
the expiration of whlchf a Conference was to be held in order 
to th»»oughly consider Balfcan matters. But if this were not 
accepted by the sultan, Bliiott was »to leave Constantinople, 
as it would bo evident that all further exertions on the part
Hertslet. IV. p.2493.
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of Her Majesty 1 s Government to save the Porte from ruin would 
feave become useless.a**'
on October llth* Lord Derby complained to Russia of 
the continued influx of Russian volunteers into Serbia, where 
their presence "had assumed proportions little short of national 
assistance."' 3 ' He wished to press upon the "serious 
attention" of the Tsar, "the dtfflcultlas thus thrown in the 
way of a settlement." Next day the Sultan offered a regular 
armaitlce of six months and cleverly promised the early 
publication of an elaborate scheme of reforms.^ 3 ) fhis was 
calculated to secure the wavering friendship of Britain once 
more. It proved acceptable to Lord Derby, who essayed to 
press a similar acceptance on Russia. He further warned 
Russia that hotfevor great was "tha reeling of national 
inctl&iatict' against furbish orueitiwa, it would be superseded 
by a vary dii*r'ejrent se»ntirnent if is were believed by the English 
nation that Constantinople was threatened. Rightly or 
wrongly..... the rejection by Russia of the TurKish proposal 
indicated a tlxed purpose of going to war.»(4)
On October 12th ^^ the Russian charge'd'affaires at 
Oon ; tali tin opie replied that his Government was averse to a long
Hertslet. IV. p.2494. (Also Ann. Reg.1876.p.215).Hertslet. iv. p.2496.
and (4) Hertslet.iv. pp.2496-7.
- 44 -
armistice. But when sir Henry Elllott reminded him that 
Russia had previously aaked for one of three months duration, 
the former made the excuse that "circumstances had changed,» 
and that "his Government would not be satisfied with the 
proposal." Prlnoe Gorohafcov defined Russia's attitude more 
fully on October 14thf by saying that the financial position of 
Europe would suffer greatly by the delay. "We must Insist 
( 'devons insister 1 )" said he, »on an armistice of a month or 
six weaKs, the original porpoaal of sngland.•( 1) Lord Derby 
Informed Prlnoe florchafcov, therefore, on October 30th of 
Britain's "regret that other co^insels have prevailed" In 
Russia to reject the amtstl^e which "raaarr; peaoe." Notwith­ 
standing, however, "they isannot -jmiflidsr... any fresh 
propositions, and. while most anxious to co-operate with the 
other Powers in any ^eazures of r^cifioaticr;..*. liuat refrain 
fpoin pledging t"r:..n^l.v*»8 to any thing w!ii<5h imr/ impede their 
liberty of ^stl-^r. vie?*oaft'»r, 3hr::lri t v:3 :.^. r'it-5 arm interests 
of this country be af/'^iiM.*^)
Whila r?-x?l«:a/ pfiT:.-i'*!tai in h.:. ian^itid ''^ 
Alexander II dsterrainad a*, on ^ *.? zu^ the Oordion
y on October Slst, ht-. doapatah^d Choral Ignatiev to
Hertslet. IV. p.2498. 
Hertslet. IV. pp.3600-1.
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the Porte summarily demanding an armistice of six weeks for 
fie Balkan Ohristians, who were "united.... by many bonds and 
seou ar traditions" to the Russian people.(!) This brought 
Turkey quickly to her senses and tha Ottoman Government 
immediately yielded on November Ist.^ 2 )
While striving to prevent Russia from being embroiled 
in the horrors of war, the Tsar, nevertheless showed he would 
not shrink thsrefrom, if he found it to be his incumbent duty. 
For he had a heart to heart conversation with Lord Loftus at 
St. Petersburg on November 2nd, Alexander endeavoured to 
define and Justify the attitude df Russia and appeal to the good 
sense of Britain. Regarding the Turkish rebuffs, "he was not 
arxlous to separate from the European concert, but the present 
state of things was intolerable and couic n^tlonger be allowed 
to continue. unieqa Europe was prepared to act with firmness 
and energy he should b« obliged to act alone." He also had 
"not the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of 
Constantinople... (which) would be a misfortune for Russia." 
As for the will o^ Peter the Oreat and the aims of Catherine 
auoh were "Illusions and phantoms." Further, the desire of 
Russia for a joint nt-val display of the Powers before 
Constantinople, "where Her Majesty's fleet would have been the
Hertslet.IV. No.469. 
(3) • • • 469.
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dominant power.... ought to be a sufficient proof that Russia 
entertained no Intention of occupying that capital." Finally, 
Alexander saw no reason »why there should not be a perfeot 
understanding between England and Russia.... based on a polioy 
of r^eace* In rescuing their fellow Christians from the Turk, 
and thus help to 'dispel the cloud of sfcsploion and distrust of
Russia.** 1 ' Next day, these pacific assurances of th$ Tsar
( 2) were «'ir.bodied in an official despatch to the British * '
Proposals for a Conference of the Powers at Constant 
inople to discuss the Eastern Question had already been 
suggested tai /nany quarters. Therefore, aa Lord Derby thought 
Alexander II f s attitude agree abler and the opportunity fitting, 
he issued a circular invitation to the Powers on Novembsfc 4th 
to meet at the Porte/ 5 ' A programme was set forth, but 
Britain insisted on the assertion of two special clauses, as a 
ft of negotiation. According to these, the Powers were to 
&9 to respect the "territorial Integrity of the Ottoman 
" and »not, to aeelc for any territorial advantages, any 
exclusive influence, or any concession... for commerce.... 
which evary other nation may not equally obtain. •( 4)
Hertslet. IV. Wo.470. 
Hertslet. IV. No.471.(3) Hertslet. IV. No.472.
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The next few days* however* were marked by unfortunate 
and threatening indiscretions on both sides. Every superior 
officer In the Tsar's army and the Russian War Minister 
olaraoured for prompt Intervention. Katkov, the editor of the 
"Moscow Gazette,* sounded the alarm-bell In the press, and 
Ignatiev's Intrigues at the Porte aimed at making a peaceful 
solution Impossible. in England, at the Lord Mayor's Banquet 
at the Oulldhall, Disraeli, (now created Lord Beaconsfleld), on 
November 9th, used menacing language towards Russia. "If 
England enters Into a conflict In a righteous cause, her 
resources are practically Inexhaustible. She Is not a country 
that, when she enters Into a campaign, has to ask herself 
whether she can support a second or a third campaign. She 
enters Into campaign which she will not terminate till right is 
done."d' Beaoonsfleld thereby not only showed his ill-faith 
In the Tsar's assurances, but sent a scarcely veiled titreat to 
Russia. It was, moreover, an encouragement to Turkey, and an 
incitement to the war party in England.
On the following day November 10th, however, 
Alexander replied In equally determined words at the Slavophil 
Mecca - Moscow. Although he strongly deprecated the affusion 
of Russian blood at almost any sacrifice, he declared he was
Ann. Peg. 1878.
•firmly determined to act alone.... should it be necessary, and 
should the honour of the country demand it," unless a oonrnon 
agreement was reached by the cooing: Conference.^ 1 ' The 
suspicions of Russophobes in England were further roused by the 
mobilisation of some 160,000 Russian troops, which Oorchafcov's 
despatch to Londcn on flovsmber 13th showed to be necessary.* 2 ' 
A Russian loan of 100,000*000 roubles war aluo floated. But 
finally a despatch from Prince Oottohafcov'on November 19th 
announced Russia's intention of »most rliMngly aoseptInr the 
proposed Oonf^r^roe. *Tf ?srtaln differences "IGVO manifested 
themselves between the two flabinsts in ths different .... 
negotiations, they ar^ due to circumstances, afcd not to th«ir 
Intentions..., Tha London Cabinet may dop&nd on OUT a&#*• stance 
... In a pacific solution of the present crisis. 1^ 2*'
All tir» Powers similarly afp*eect to tho Conference 
which was to -nsat eurly In ^cemtar, erd ril truly das'lrsd 
peace although they differed individually pa to the ?;itto:* of 
their g»arant*as. in th<? ^?.artlms, a lottr? fYoro Prince 
Oorchakov to the ^UR^lsn Ambassador in Lor.cJTi, dat^d >Tovetab?r 
25th, appeared In the "Jox^mal cl^ St. Pfltersbijpg,» This 
revealed the opinlor cf ths T^t^ra^ r->tatef?man on the citrrent 
situation, as follows. »The only rational combination for 
Russian interests la to leavo the Keys of the B.i.acK S»a In hands 
feeble enough not to clos* to Russia that commercial outlet, or
Her tale t. IV. No. 473.
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menace her security. Turfcish domination answers to this 
programme. Is it our fault If the Turks have abused it by 
rendering their away Intolerable to their Christian subjects? 
Has not British polloy contributed to the abuse, by exciting the 
suspicions of th« Porte against Russia through her own rivalry, 
and In assisting to make force the sole basis of its power?"' 1 ' 
This, of course, referred to the presence of the English 
warships at Be el lea Bay.
Lord Salisbury, who was to represent England at the 
forthcoming Conference, made a diplomatic tour round the chief 
European capitals to sound foreign opinion on BalKan affairs, 
before proceeding to Constantinople. The German Emperor told 
him In believed »th«j course taKen by the Emperor Alexander had 
been Imposed upon him by circumstances, 11 and that »the promises 
of the Porte could no longer be accepted.» As for count 
Andrassy, Salisbury reported that his views "were In many 
respects Identical with those entertained by Her Majesty's 
Government..... His excellency was also much opposed to the
Idea of a Russian occupation, and expressed a hope that Bngland
(2)
would not sanction lt.» Most interesting of all, was Lord
Salisbury's Interview with the redoubtable Ignatlev himself 
at Constantinople. For the two statesmen not only became
fol Ann ' Rae - 1876 « P.353. 
* a ' Ann. Rep. 1876. p.387.
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cordially intimate at once, but special corresp on dents even 
desoribed them as walking about the streets of Pera, arm in arm I 
The Russian general's remarks concerning an armed occupation, 
seemed very satisfactory. "Hla gxoellenoy," wrote Salisbury, 
«toofc an early opportunity At stating that the occupation of 
Turkish territory was not put forward as a tt slne qua non» by tne. 
Russian (Jovernment. But they Merely suggested it as the only 
measure that appeared to them calculated to meet the pressing 
necessity which they foresaw. He.... had no doubt that the 
Conference would b<5 abls to arrange institutions that would 
furnish a sufficient guarantee for the reforms which the Porte 
had promised or mlgh^ be asked to enact. "(1) Although Ignatiev 
still urged an armed occupation as the only practical and 
effectual guarantee, Lord Salisbury replied that his Instructions 
were "to refuse assent to all schemes of military occupation.**^)
By the second week of December 1876, all the
representatives of the Powers reached Constantinople. In order 
to obviate the inexpediency of exhibiting their disagresments, 
before the Porte, ths Powers held ^ preliminary meetings, to the 
exclusion of the Turkish representatives, from December llth to 
22nd. These resulted in the agreement, more or lens, or the 
Powers in granting administrative autonomy under Christian
(1) Ann. Reg. 1876. p.237.(2) "State Papers.* Vol.68, p. 1064.
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governors, to Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Serbia and 
Montenegro were to receive slight territorial increase, and the 
Ottoman garrisons were to be confined to the fortresses. 
Finally an international commission baoKed by a force of 6,000 
Swiss and Belgian gendarmes, was to watch over the execution of 
reforms. Ths latter was a ootLproaise to avoid a Russian 
OCK* option or Turkish territory. Xi3anwhile f Abdul Hamid had 
basn biMy In scheming the overthrow of these specious projects. 
For, on pecember 19th, he resorted to the ruse of making Midhat 
Paaho *,he Liberal reformer, his Grand vialer. His accession 
si'^lilad t? at while tre Sultan was trilling to grant reforms of 
hi a owi 'vili, he would allow none to be imposed by the dicattion 
o:r T'-re'gn stages. The damaging results thereof were soon to
On r&cetabsr 3Srd, the full conference^) of th» Powers 
first met under the presidency of Safvet Pasha. Through the 
»h representative, the proposals resulting from -&*ne 
minary cmfererica were laid before the full asa«unbly. But 
the delegates of the Porte were more offended by tte far- 
yor3r-/ilng character of the proposals, than iraprassod by the 
unexpected unanimity of the Powers. Suddenly great nalvoes of 
arttllary from outside, interrupted the proceedings of the
Hertaiet.IV, pp.2526-30. (Also Parl. Reports. 
. Turkey No, 2. (1877). 3) Hertslet.IV. p.477.
Conference. Safvet Pasha, however, calmly explained this as 
the proclamation of a new and most democratlo oonstitutlon for 
the whole Ottoman Bnpire.^) "A g>eat aot is accomplished at 
this very hour, whioh changes a form of government which has 
endured for six hundred years. The oonstitutlon whioh His 
Majesty the sultan has bestowed upon his Empire is promulgated. 
It inaugurates a new era for the happiness and prosperity of 
his people.»^ 3 ' with duo aelosmity, safv^ thus ushered in 
this unexpected sl?n of vitality, which was the worK of Midhat 
Pasha. The Powers were tafcen abaofc, but to all their warnings 
end proposal?, the delegates of the Porte asntjned an attitude of 
injured r altitude. All reforms proposed toy the Powers f they 
argued, were r-:.* quit* superfluous in view of the superior 
benefits conferred by the new constitution. Before long, 
Salisbury, who was less Tttenophll than Eeae«w>afield, 
atad hlf> dls^ns* and resentment by or^arinp th* withdrawal 
of the British fleet from Besifca Bay. fh« conference of 
Constantinople tlins h^oane & compiet-i flg.seo, which had fooled 
Europe; and on January 20th, 1877, it came to a close. Befor© 
leaving the Surfcish capital, Salisbury remfcr5rec» that he and 
his colleagues had -all tried to pave JitrX<«y,« but e.he "would 
not let them save her." From that moment, he recorded war as
Hortalet. IV. No.476. 
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certain. According to Midhat Pasha, however, Lord Derby 
congratulated the Sublime Porte on tlB breakdown o^ the 
Conference, which he thought "a success for Turkey."
The failure of the Conrwjrt by no ^eans Improved the 
temper of Russia. Especially In view of the Tsar's declarations 
of November 2nd and 10th, 1876, separate action on the part of 
Russia now appeared Inevii&ble, and of which Turkey had had full 
warning. On January 16th, 1877, Russia and Austria are said 
to have secretly confirmed the Reichstadt agre^ent of the 
previous July in the form of a definite treaty. Further, a 
circular despatch was received on February 5th from Prince 
Oorohakov by Lord Derby. This recapitulated the previous 
efforts of the Powers to restrain Turkey and preserve the < eao©. 
But "aa the refusals of the Turkish Government threaten both 
the dignity and tranquillity of Europe," the Tear In a last 
resort was "desirous of knowing the limits within which the 
Cabinet is willing to act.^ 1 ' To this, t>ie English Foreign 
Secretary replied that "circumstances had changed, and Her 
Majesty's Government had determined it would b« better to defer 
their reply.... until events should have developed themselves." 
Derby also advised Russia to see "the effect of the recent 
change of Government at Constantinople In reference to the 
promised reforms, and of the negotiations of peace... between
Ann. Reg. 1877. Appendix, p.208.
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the Porte arid Serbia and MontenegroM
One further effort was now made *y the British 
Government to prevent war. Through its influence, the Porte 
was induced, on February BStri, to sign a treaty of peaoe with 
Serbia on the basis of existing conditions.* 2 ' But the first 
and last Turkish Parliament whioh met later <-*i March 19th still 
stubbornly voted the continuance of hostilities with Montenegro. 
Undoubtedly the Porte here committed an unreasonable error, for 
otherwise v ar might hmv© bson avortad. Nevertheless, 
Alexander II, still unwilling to break the paace of Europe 
unnecessarily, a«nt Ignatlev on a diplomatic isission to the 
European capitals early in v/aro'ri, with a view to bringing 
"pacific prenBure,* if possible, on the Porte. on March 13th, 
the Russian r*nvoy visited LoiM Dox-oy, aiid ddllve?*dd the followin 
rae-jrjage* aAftor t?i« 8^';^.lfi.3*is Russia h.id imposed upon herself.. 
.. and by oln mobilisation of 500,000 nien, she vjoula not retire 
nor son • bae& he:^ troope without, having obtained soma tangible 
res'Jlt as regards th» liaproyeis^nt of the Christian populations 
of Turkey... 7ha Eurp^roi* was sincerely desirous of peaoe, but 
not of peace at any price... She agreement of the Powers... 
might b«? broken,... (bui tha^ would be)a determining cause to 
induce Russia to seek for a solution either by mcano of a
. 1877. Appendix, p.308. 2) Hertslet. IV. Nos.480-81-83.
direct understanding with the Porte, or by foros of arms." 
Th:> Russian Oov^mm^nt t, tore fere proposed *th r signature by the 
Powers of a Protocol in London a? *t>^ most prastlsal solution." 
The London Cabinet unfavourably :?e calved th» proposal to adopt
ooeruive measures against $i.a?>;9y, wnish Ignatisv announced.
(o)Bu4: they agroad to the assembly of a Scnferesoe at London,* ' 
most probably with a vletr tc p,utpor;ing the Rusftten attar»K whioh 
now seerued inevitable, and favourable in the eyas of the rest 
of Europe.
At London, on March 51st, the conference duly met. 
Cognisance of the l?urco~Serbian Treaty was tafcen, but the new 
Ottoman «Constitution* ras astutely ignored by the Powers. For 
they rightly read the virtual end of that unnatural foundling 
with the aiomifcs&l arid fli&vl •*>£ it.3 .;ieator, Lilahat Pasha, 
diiring; the previous montl:. c.ily a f^cblti r^otoooi resulted 
IT cm tLw Lond-Ti oonf-ja»yji je,t 3} axpivas&i.fs the Powers f oonviotion 
of th ^ inooKipatibilit^ of the s^&t© of b.:rair« in J4 in»K«y, with 
the ^.&i--pir.GSo or th€> SuibiiTi'i. Ol^lytioi, a'dbj^uta. fli^ 
esf»ctl.lo: of th* Xttrltlaii pxrduibee of rerorm of Pabruijry 15th, 
1876, and the i^duotlaii or Hie Ottoman ariay to a peaoo footing 
wore tlo<.< den arLdecI. Filially, should no ain«iiorali..)/i result in
Ann. Rog. 1677. Appendix, pp.£10-11.
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the lot of the Christians, the Porte was threatened by the 
European Concert with - only f^trth^r deliberation P Russia, 
however ^ showed herself much mere determined than all the other 
parti oipatln*; Powers to brinr th* procrastinating methods of 
the Porte to a definite end. F^T ele appended to **.he London
( 2 ^'
Protocol a deolaration sSgnifyiner her Intuition or no longer
holding her hand, unless the Poi*te made peace with Montenegro. 
Britain too, declared *he Fro toco:. "null and void.,, in the 
event of the object propose c net beiric attained, - namely, 
reolpror?a3. dior-rr-r^ent on :.hs part cf !?usr>ia and Turkey, and
between ther?..
+* Port*: vclcsc'. c.'. April St . her protests afcHlnst the 
lc~rTr Protocol, ^  4) which ra« finally r^aeif^ by the sultan 
three <3«ye l?t*r.^ 5 ^ It ^r&& dteclc.:r&d "clavoia o>: LI.II equity,
t.ottti-.* J L^«i> r-egret* was 
d-icl&ion, for ft«5 *saw no 
at could ;,sfce to av^rt a 
^v liable.*'^' The Porte f s
-M "by T.crd JJ^rfcy at 
further 3t.sps Herr ^a^asty's MO
war ?h appear - hav©
of ths ?rot03*Jl aid refus&l to t.o teriiis with
Montenegro, w?s taXen the fear aa tlie abdioation of
(1) K.3?t*l*t IV. P.3555.
(2) Hertslet IV. P.2566.
(3) Hertalet IV. p.3567.(4) Hertslet IV. No.484.(5) Ann. ne^. 1J77. Appondix, p.312.(8) Parl. Reports. Turkey No.15 (1877) p.554.
diplomacy. Accordingly, he ordered his armies to cross the 
Turkish frontiers on April 19th, broke off diplomatic relations 
on the SSrd, and formally declared war on the Sultan, fhe next 
day in the name of humanity, good government and Christian 
eman clp ati on. * *'
The Russian declaration of war provote d the emphatic 
disapproval of Great Britain. On May 1st, in reply to 
Gorohakov's olroular explaining Russia's motive, he declared the 
"deep regret" of the Brltlah Government. The latter, he wrote, 
"have not concealed their feeling that the presence of large 
Russian forces on the frontiers of Turkey, menacing its safety, 
rendering disarmament impossible, and exciting the feeling of 
apprehension and fanaticism among the Mussulman populations, 
constituted a material obstacle $o Internal pacification and 
reform... in taking action against Turkey on his own part.... 
the Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European 
Concert." Further, "as Prlnoe Oorohakov assumes.... that 
Russia is acting in the interests of Great Britain and the other 
Powers... they (the British Government) feel bound to state.... 
that the decision of the Russian Government is not one which can 
have their concurrence or approval."* 3 '
A definition of Britain's specif io "interests" in the
Hertslet IV Nos.487-4*3. (Also Ann. Reg. 1877. 
i~\ Appendix, p.316. 
(3) Hertslet IV. No.496. Also Ann. Reg. 1877. 
Appendix, p.217.
last was asked by Russia on May 6th, which was given by Lord 
Derby's note to count Shuvalov two days later.* 1 ' He demanded 
that Russia should retpeot the neutrality of Egypt and the Suez 
Canal, and give a pledge excluding Constantinople and the 
Persian flulf from military operations. Further "if necessity 
should oblige him (the Tsar) to occupy a portion of Bulgaria," 
It was to be llonly provisionally, and until the peaoe and safety 
o-~ the Christian population were secured."
The views of the Russian Foreign Office were recorded 
on May Slet In a despatch to Earl Derby. They were on the 
whole conciliatory, and the British demands regarding Egypt, the 
Suez Canal, and the Persian Oulf wer^ respected, subject to 
Britain's continued neutrality. Russia also recognised that 
"the futi^re of Constantinople is a question of common Interest 
whl(?h oannot be settled otherwise than by a general understanding; 
and that if *.e possession of that city were to be put in 
questlm, it covld not be allowed to belong to any of the 
European Powers." Tha queetlor of tj» Bouphorus and Dardanelles 
was also to be "oflttlr^ br a c«nr»on a«Teeinent on equitable and 
efficiently gitarant^ed bases. "^ 3 ' But a memorandum to the^ 
British Porelfn Minister fro-n count Shuvalov on June 8th, 1877, 
showed a revielm, to some s^twt, of Russian RenttmentB, as
U) Hertalet IV. NO. 499. 
(3) Hertalet IV. No.[501.
follows. "With regard to Constantinople, our asaurances oan 
only refer to taking possession of the town, or occupying it 
permanently. It would be singular... if at the outset of war, 
one of the belligerents undertook beforehand not to pursue Its 
military operations up to the walls of the capital.... It will 
depend upon England and the other Powers to relieve us of this 
necessity, (and)... to use their influence with the Turks, with 
a view to making peace possible before thia extreme step is 
taken. On our side, Be shall readily fall into thia view.«(X) 
Regarding India, Russia declared, "It is not at all to our 
interest to trouble fingland In her Indian possessions, or 
consequently, in her canmunlcations with them,... but Russia has 
a rignt on her part to expect Bigland to ta*;« no hostile action 
against her,*^ 2 ' the previous assurancss of Russia touching 
ilia other spheres of JBgypt, ti» Persian aulf and the straits 
ware repeated, and an outline of conditional terms of psaoe 
aovitipiabla fco Russia was glv4n.Cs) An understanding respecting 
neuiral trade in contraband of war was latar reached between 
tlie two Powers on «fuly lith.(4)
in tij«i Meantime, war was baixig vigorously prosecuted 
on both aldea, and eventa at first proved favourable to Rusoia 
both in Europe and cne Caucasus. irhi3 wad followed by a sudden
(1) and (3) Hertalet IV. No.503. Also Anr. Re r. 
• . Ao^ndlx, p.386. & 
}*{ Hertslet IV. pp.2636-8. 
V4) HertslOt IV. Ho.506.
victorious rally of the Turks In Asia and Europe, especially at 
the Plevna and Shipka passes. But ultimately an e qually 
sudden period of Muscovite successes ensued. British opinion 
on the whole, was decidedly Turoophil, and as the Russians 
became more successful, the British public became more warlike. 
Both press and stage pandered to the popular desire for inter­ 
vention on behalf of the Porte. On Deoeraber 10th, the fate of 
Plevna was sealed after a brilliant defence under Osman Pasha, 
and Oenerals Ourko and Skobelev continued their victorious marsh 
southwards, towards the Turkish eapltal. in the eyes of 
England, Russia appeared to be seeking satisfaction for her 
material desires to further the cause of Panslavism and to 
possess Constantinople, under the outer cloak of philanthropy. 
Bismarck even, declared that Alexander II waged the war "under 
stress of Panslaviot influence. •(!) The crusading reputation 
with which Russia entered the campaign, appeared to* pale, as 
the Tsar's troops neared Constantinople, and the uneasiness of 
the British Government Increased proportionally. England, too, 
was now no longer able to restrain Serbia from attacking Turkey, 
and her apprehensions were thereby roused aa to the Integrity of 
the Ottoman dominions.
(1) Blsmarok. Reflections and Reminiscences. 
vol.11, p.869. '
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Accordingly on Deconber 13th, 1877, Lord Derby again 
approached Russia, through Count Shuvalov, as to further 
assurances. "With the view of avoiding what might endanger 
seriously the good relations... between the two countries," the
9
British Govemment expressed their "earnest hope" that»no 
attempt will be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles* 
Otherwise, "Her Majesty's Government must hold themselves f*ee 
to take whatever course may appear.... necessary for the 
protection of British interests."^ Three days later,
Qorchakov, ever wary in hia dealings with Engand, repeated his 
master's pledges regarding the future of Constantinople,
Desiring, further, "to maintain the good relations between the 
two countries, he asked for a clearer definition of British 
interests "with a vi?w to seeking in ocmmon the means of 
r^oonoiling those interests with those of Russia, which it is 
the duty of His Majesty the Emperor to protect, »( 2 '
These were defined by a despatch to Gorohakov through 
Lord Loftus on January 13th, 1878, England thereby indicated 
her disapprobation of "any operations tending to place the 
passage of the Dardanelles under Russian ccntrol," arid of the 
occupation of Gallipoli by Russian forces.(3) J^Q assurance
(1) Hertslet IV. No.507. Also Ann. Reg. 1878.
Appendix p.233. 
13) Hertslet iv. No.510. Also Ann. Reg. 1878.Appendix pp.338-3. 
Her islet IV. No. 511.
was readily given by the Tsar's aovernment, on the understanding 
that Britain and Turkey would likewise refrain from making 
(Jallipoli a military base.^ 1 '
Everything thus far, seemed satisfactory and sufficient 
to revent aotual warfare between Britain and RUssia. But the 
return of the Tsar to his oapital, and the bestowal of power on 
the Grand Duke Nicholas made it probable that the latter might 
entertain fewer scruples in seizing Constantinople. The 
consequent likelihood of Russia seeking to separately enforce 
her own conditions of peace, elicited a memorandum from the 
British Government to Russia on January 15th. This indicated 
that no separate conclusion of peace affecting the treaties of 
1856 and 1871, between the two belligerents, would be considered 
valid without the collective consent of all the signatory Powers 
to those Treaties.^ Queen Victoria's speech at the opening 
of Parliament on January 17th further indicated that she had 
offered her "good offices" of mediation, on the direct appeal 
of the sultan. But if the conditions of British neutrality 
should be infringed and should "hostilities be unfortunately 
prolonged, some unexpected occurrence raay render It necessary... 
to adopt measures of precaution.«( 3 ) Althomh this cautiously 
worded statement scarcely amountea to a threat of war, it clearly
iii Hertslet IV. No.512. H^rtslet IV. No. BIS. 
Ann. Rag. 1878. p.4.
indicated the determined attitude of the Bea^onsfleld Oabinet.
On January 23rd, 1878, they tooK such a "measure of 
precaution,* For hearing of the Russian occupation of 
Adrianople on the 20th inst., the'/ ordered the British fleet to 
enter the Dardanelles and proceed to Constantinople. Lord 
Carnarvon thereupon resigned office. For he maintained that so 
long as Russia did not violate any of the conditions whereby 
Britain promised neutrality, ouch demonstration of force was not 
only unreoessary, but impolitic and provocative. Lord Derby 
only withdrew a similar resignation by the rescinding of the 
orders to the fleet, the day following. Shis was done because 
news of Russia's conditions of psace ware then first to hand, 
and such a step would h-iva been inopportune.
the Ruseian t«rms comprised the creation of a Big 
Bulgaria according to racial limits; the complete independent© 
of Montenegro, Serbia and Rumania; and territorial additions to 
Russia together with an indemnity. Finally, »an ulterior 
under standing for safeguarding the rights and interests of 
Russia In the Straits* was to ba reached.'*' 'Tat-orally, the 
furcoi&il British Oabinet received this news with groat dis­ 
favour, wor it was felt that a Big Bulgaria would mean too 
great an extension of Russian influence in ths Balfcans. it 
also appeared to spell danger to British communications with
Hertslet IV. pp.3668-60.
India, seeing a footing in Egypt had not yet been semir«d. 
indeed, tha whole affair "amounl&ad to the destruction or t
i
Turfcish Umpire in Etnrop<s,» as Mr Layard wrote from Constantinople 
Accordingly, the Boa-jonsfield Government signlflai its int^itl.%, 
of not even shrinking from war, if necessary, and on January 38tli 
an extra £6,000,000 was voted in Parliament for an increase in 
armaments.
Preliminaries ->f perjce, and an armistice were at last 
signed by the belligerents at Adrian op le on January 3lst. They 
contained similar terms to those outlined above, with the 
significant exception that the offending clause regarding the
Straits was withdrawn, probably in view of Britain 1 9 menacing
(1) attitude. ' On February 8th f the Grand tttilce Nicholas advanced
his headquarters to the lines of Ohatal^a, the ohlef neutral 
defence of Oonstantlhople, who >« ninareta now ^arae into the 
Russian view. fhla was in io^ordance with the armiatico of 
Adrlanople, and. perfectly in harmony with the usual practices of 
war. Though technically constituting no br»ao>^ of Russia's 
promises to England, however, thif? movement had a far from 
conciliatory effect on Britain, despite Qorcha&ov?s assurances. 
Russia's attitude now ap^ared ambit!ous ar.d grasping, for while 
her statesmen Kept to the letter of her agreement, her
Hertslet. IV. Nos.614-5.
oomraanders by no means appeared to fulfil Its spirit. Although 
Russia refrained from actually seizing Constantinople, die took 
good care to hold Its Keys. Besides, the Russian oonnanders 
powers of resistance to the temptation before them was truly 
Indeterminable, an^ the situation was alarming for the British 
Ministry.
Consequently, a portion of the BrltL sh fleet was sent 
on February 7th, through the Sea of Marmora, "for the protection 
of Christian life and property" at Constantinople. Gorchakov 
thereupon telegraphed to the Russian ambassadors at the various 
European capitals that the movement of ths British squadron 
"obliges us... to take into the consideration the proper means 
of protecting those Christians whosa life and property might be 
threatened, and... to attain this result, to contemplate the 
entry of a portion of oir troops into Constantinople." Such a 
measure would indubitably have precipitated war with England, 
for peace depended solely upon the observance or otherwise of 
this condition. Britain on the other hand had to consider t>?@ 
effect that the fall of Constantinople would have on her 
Muhammadan subjects. As Lord Derby said, the last word of the 
Eastern Question concerned the possession of that city. "No 
great Power would be wining to see It in the hands of any other 
great Power; no small Power could hold it at all; and as for a 
joint occupation, all such expedients are both dangerous and 
doubtful."
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the despatch of the English ironclads was to a large 
extent due to a disquieting telegram sent from Constantinople 
on February 7th. This stated that the capital was practically 
In Russian hands, and Muscovite officers were walking about 
Per a and stambul without ary escort! Happily, this falsehood 
was denied the next day by a reassuring message from the German 
Babaasy at the Porte, announcing that the terms of the armistice 
were duly Inlnp observed. As the Porte moreover protested 
against the action of the British fleet as an infraction of the 
Treaty of Paris, the English vessels stopped short of the 
Bosphorus.
A vigilant eye was nevertheless Kept on tfte Russian 
lines, and England's precautionary but stern display of power 
warned Oorchakov against aarrying out his threat. Besides 
Austria was now uneasy, and a Russian occupation of the Turkish 
capital might conceivably have provoked an Austrian attack from 
the rear. But the words of Goroliakov were not followed by the 
threatened fulfilment. For on February 19th, an agreement was 
reached between the tv.o Powers, whereby Russia undertook not to 
occupy the defensive lines of Bulair before Constantinople, the 
Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, nor the Oalllpoli Peninsula. 
Britain similarly bound herself not to land troops at these
(1) Hertslet IV No.517.
- 67 -
Nevertheless, the Russian and British forces continued 
to face each other in a ntate of sullen preparedness and 
hesitant expectancy. But suoh a dangerous situation could 
certainly not last long. in fnjriand, the idea wan formed that 
the Russians had arrtinged conditions of peace with the Porte, 
and were being allowed to aooupy Constantinople. Demands for 
war against Russia were therefore made in some quarters. A 
counterpart to this British feeling, however, prevailed in 
Russia. the •Oolos* demanded the occupation of the Dardanelles, 
while the "Moscow Gazette" suggested the inmediate possession of 
the Bosphorus by Russia, unless the British vessels Immediately 
returned to Beslfca Bay. indeed, so great was the tension that 
prevailed on tha banks of the Thames and the Neva, that every 
credit is due to the statesmen at the helms of the "rltlsh and 
Russian ships of state, that they Kept their heads so well. 
For the slightest sign of an indiscretion on the part of eitner 
Government or of their respective forces, might easily have 
precipitated war.
It soon became evident that the only means of escape 
from the situation, from which both Russia and Britain showed an 
unwillingness to retreat, lay in a European Conference. Already 
on February Bth, Jlndrasay had proposed a meeting of the Powers 
at Vienna.(*) Britain and the other Powers readily assented,
(1) Herfeftlet IV No.516.
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but Russia was reluctant to consent to a course wnioh probabl$ 
tended to deprive her of the coveted prize already within her 
grip. But the cost of her suooesa, the exhaustion of her war­ 
worn armies and the restiveness of her Rumanian ally were cogent 
factors for her to consider. Besides, a refusal would most 
likely have been regarded as a desire to continue the war. These 
reasons, and the oonsequant possibility of a Joint Austro- 
British attack ultimately decided Russia's consent to the 
Conference. A Congress was proposed on March 7th, Instead of a 
Conference, thus including the Chief Ministers of the Powers in 
addition tc their ambassadors, and the rendezvous was fixed at 
Berlin.(1) Meanwhile, Bismarck the Oracle of Europe, had 
effaced his good, offices of mediation as an »honest broker," 
between the disputants.
But before that great meeting took place, disquieting 
events were destined to happen, which strained Anglo-Russian 
relation a almost to the breaking-point. After a display of 
military force, the Russians moved Vielr head-quarter a to the 
maritime village of San stefano, a western suburb of Constanti­ 
nople. Hoi"*, on March 3rd, 1878 f in order to forestall any 
possible decision of the Powers whloh might prove disappointing 
to her, Russia sought to Impose a binding treaty on Turkey.
(1) Hertslet IV
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Besides she could the more easily overawe the Porte singly before 
they very gates of the capital, than before the Concert of 
Europe. Even if the Powers uttered protests ano threats, 
Russia might still have averted any outbreak of war, by pointing 
forward to the coming Congress, and reminding them of her assent 
to submit thereto. Further, by tlB Treaty of San Stefano, an 
opportunity was afforded of testing European feeling, and of 
initiating a persuasive preliminary to the Berlin deliberations.
While the drastic terms of the Treaty would have 
opened up new problems, they certainly would have prevented 
Turfcey from doing much more mischief in Europe. A new 
autonomous, but tributary Bulgaria was to be formed, bounded by 
the Danube on the north, the BlacK sea on the east, the Aegean 
on the south, and the Albanian mountains on the west. The 
creation of this Big Bulgaria would thus have left only three 
Isolated pieces of European TurKey under direct Ottoman control!* 
Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania were to be independent, the first 
two receiving territorial acquisitions, and ths last named 
exchanging Bessarabia with Russia for the Dobru;ja,as a "point of 
honour." Russia was also to receive the districts of Kars, 
Batum, Ardahan and Bayaaid in Asia Minor together with a war
(l) Vis. The district of Constantinople, Adrlanople 
and the straits; the OhalkldlKe Peninsula, and
tn^ district of Albania, Epirua and Thessaly See map. ««**.
!».•*. „.
•• f J
Indemnity. Her troops were moreover to occupy the chief 
strategic points, In order to watch over the execution of
* 'promised reforms both In European and Asiatic
On afflTing his signature to this document, safvet 
Pasha Is reported to have broken out Into convulsive sobs. 
Ignatlev however, rose to the occasion and proved a Job's 
comforter. «You see,* ha said, *I h*iva always told you that 
England woula le^ve you In the lurch; the English do not Know 
how to ke^p their ??a?dj everything has happened precisely as I 
foretold.*'^' the sultan, however, was astute enough to Know 
that Britain and Austria would never allow Russia to obtain 
Immense advantages. Indeed, the Treaty of san stefano was ^n 
signed lender Ignatlev's threat of the immediate seizure of 
Constantinople unless this were done.
This wholly Slavonic settlement of a question whloh 
concerned all Europe, met with no acceptance from the Powers. 
and Its object was defeated by the stringency of lt» terms. 
The British Ministers of the time feared an undue extension of 
Russian Influence towards Constantinople and Asia Minor. ?or 
the notion that true British poll ay in the Kast lay in the 
formation of strong independent Balfcan states to serve as a
Hertelet IV PP.2678-96. Also Parl Reports No. 22.
f i£70 \ 
(3) Ann. Reg. 1878. p.333.
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barrier between Russia and the Porte, and possibly even as 
allied putposts of furfcey, had not yet gained decisive 
acceptance in England. However •oorreot* ethnographioaily, a 
Big Bulgaria might have be^n, appearances at that moment 
justified British suspicions of Russia's intentions. The 
latter f s previous relations with Greece proved that she did not 
desire to see a really strong Christian state on the ruins of 
Turkey. the proposed administrative organisation of Big 
Bulgaria »uncier the superintendence of an imperial Russian
^' for the next two years* aroused British
Appeals were, moreover, made to Quean Victoria 
against fcho treaty by the dissatisfied Qreefca, Rvananians, 
Mussulmans, and Lasrss.
A Further difficulty arose aa to whether t'm forth-»
doming Oongress waa to ba competent to discuss the treaty of 
3&n 3tsfano aa a v/hois. Britain claimed it must be so 
subMitvsd/*) *hila Husaia strongly resisted this demand, as 
interfering witii her just ri^ht as oonquoror. ffhiie|bl8claiming 
caiy intentioti of such intttrferonca, Lord Derby maintained that 
European station must be given to the new settlement which 
suparsodad that of i860, and Insisted upon the suozalssion of ths
Ji| UortBiot; iv p.3681. (2) Hart lie t I? p. 3700.
Also Part. Reports. TurKey Ho.34.(1878). p.5.
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entire Treaty to the CoingBess. To this, Russia replied on 
Maroh 26th that every Power had full "liberty of appreciation 
and action" relating to any article which, it might think, 
ooncerned all Europe. Henoe the Russian Government "leaves to 
the other Powers, the liberty of raising such questions at the 
Congress as they thlnfc fit to discuss, and reserves to Itself 
the liberty of accepting or not accepting the discussion of 
these questions."' 2 '
this curt and high-handed reply meant that the Berlin 
Congress would have been practically under the dictation of 
Russia. Once more, the London and St. Petersburg Governments 
were brought to the verge of war. With t>re sole excepting of 
Lord Derby, who maintained his earlier attitude, the Beaoonsfiela 
Cabinet determined to prepare for war. Lord Derby resigned 
on Maroh 28th, and was succeeded in the Foreign Office by Lord 
Salisbury. Derby stated the reason of his resi&iatlon in the 
following July. The Ministry, he alleged, had secretly proposed 
to fit out an expedition from India to seise Cyprus and a point 
on the Syrian coast, with or without^the sultan's consent. These 
were to form bases for military o eratlons against Russia, but 
undoubtedly that Power would have entered Constantinople as a 
oounter~move. Salisbury staunchly denied this allegation, but 
Information of the whole matter is too vague and scanty to allow
Hertslet IV p. 3701.
g- 870*- Al8° Pa*l- Sports. Turfcey No. 15
P • 7 .
of any authentic determination.^ 1 )
On May 1st, Beaoonafield sailed out the reserves and 
ordered Indian troops with artillery to proceed to Malta. The 
same day, Salisbury Issued a circular to the courts of fche 
Powers, summing up Britain's objections to the treaty of San 
Stefano.^ 2 ) He reminded the Powers of the force underlying t e 
London Protocol of 1871, to whioh Russia was signatory, and 
stated that the crushing prepondaranoe of that Power in the 
Bast, would prove fatal to British interests. OorchaKov's 
reply to the Salisbury circular on April 9th, fortunately proved 
pacific in the highest degree. He asked for a clearer statement 
of the views of the British aovernment, and reasserted that the 
Treaty of San stefano had been communicated to the Powers in its 
entirety. Further, if the Congress were to meet, the Russian 
Ohanoellor reaffirmed the "full liberty of appreciation and 
action* of each Power, and only claimed the same rights for 
Russia.* 3 *
Immediate advantage was tafcen of this offer by Lord
N
Salisbury, who dexterously applied himself towards the interests 
of peace. It was singularly fortunate that the Russian 
ambassador at London, Count shuvalov, was an equally persevering 
and tactful worRer to the same end. Through a heart to heart 
conversation with Salisbury, he ascertained the true objections 
of Britain to the Treaty of San stefano. Further, he
(1) Ann. Reg. 1878. p. 93. 
Hertslet IV 
Her tale t TV
(2) Ho. 520. 
(S)
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euggestingly negotiated how these could be met or modified, in 
order to secure as far as possible, the preservation of most of 
the essential Russian gains. A suggested agreement was reached 
and Shuvalov set out on a mission to St. Petersburg, to obtain 
the Tsar 1 a assent. fhls development, together with the 
replacement of Ignatlev by Prince Lobanov at the Porto, pointed 
towards a more pacific state of affairs. shuvalov hastened to 
London via Berlin, where he interviewed the German Emperor, and 
also visited Bismarck at Frledriohruhe. It was remarfced by the 
•Horth German Gazette" at the time, that It was not oorreot to 
assume that Shuvalov was the bearer of any proposals from the 
British Government. His task was rather to make proposals at 
St. Petersburg based upon his Knowledge of British intentions, 
to obtain instructions, and then to aot upon them on hla return 
to
thus Judgment was afterwards di own to be oorreot.
C OYi Y C T S 1 Tig W?tK
After liUru'v IffFiPtffg Oorchakov, the Russian ambassador Interviewed 
the Tsar on May 13th. As he left the Imperial Palace, Shuvalov 
told some members of the Tsar's suite, that they mlyht well 
hop*? for peace. fhe mission proved a success, and shuvalov was 
fully authorised by his Government to conclude a secret under­ 
standing with Lord Salisbury at London. This was accordingly
(1) Ann. Reg. 1878. p.235.
done In sa^et on May 30th, 1978, Althoug: the ffcll text was 
published later on July 14th f the British Ministers stoutly 
repudiated the existence of the treaty At the time.
the object of the understanding was indicated in its 
full title:- 'Project for a Memorandum determining the points 
upon whicn an understanding has bean established between the 
Governments of Russia and Great Brl- ain, and which will serve as 
a mutual engagement for the Russian and English Plenipotentiaries
at the Congress. *l 1 ) It did not absolutely bind both parties
#
oonearned by hard and fast rules. But it defined certain
limits of conditions, within the range of which, Russia and 
Britain could each endeavour to obtain the acquiescence of the 
Congress, to best suit their respective requirements and 
aspirations. Britain objected to the wide extension of the 
Big Bulgaria of San stefano. But nevertheless the Russian 
representative reserved the right «to point out the advantages 
to the Congress, promising nevertheless not to insist upon It 
against the definite opinion of England. 9 Fu^ner, the 
Bulgarian district south of the Balfcans was to be partly under 
Turkish control* and to "receive a large measure of administrative 
self-government,.... with a Christian governor.»^ 3 ^ Russia 
conditionally assented thereto. »The right of the Sultan....
(1) See Annual Register 1873. Appendix p.245 for full 
Treaty. * 
(a) Ibid, clauses 1-4,
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to canton troops on the frontiers of southern Bulgaria," was 
also maintained by Salisbury. Further, the officers of the 
militia of that province were to be "named by the Porte with 
the consent of Europe." "The promises concerning Armenia" 
in the Treaty of San stefano were also "not to be made exclusive 
to Russia, but to England also.»^ 2 ) England also stated her 
intention of accompanying Russia in recommending the Greek 
claims in Epirus and Thessaly to the consideration of the 
Powers/ 5 ^ in view of the Rumanian complaints, she also 
expressed "profound regret in the event of Russia insisting 
definitely upon the retrocession of Bessarabia." But Britain 
however, did not "find herself sufficiently interested in this 
Attention.... to Incur alone, the responsibility o^ opposing... 
the change proposed.•(** Russia agreed to restore the Bayazid 
district to the sultan, as it was on "the great transit route 
to Persia," and had "an immense value in the eyes of the Turks. " 
Ardahan, Kara said Batum were however to be retained by the Tsar. 
Finally, "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that tl» duty 
of protecting the Ottoman Empire... henceforth will rest
(1 
(8
(6
Ibid, clauses 5* 
Ibid, clause 7. 
Ibid clause 8. 
Ibid clause 11. 
Ibid clause 10.
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largely (d'uns measure speolale) upon England. •* ' This
hinted at an Anglo-Turkish agreement, which was soon to be
« 
concluded.
Although denied at the time, the seoret Anglo-Russian 
agreement was noised abroad, and was considered by the 
Continental press as a decided success for Britain. The 
Viennese "Eastern Budget" considered it "a most brilliant 
diplomatic triumph for Bngland, as there is no oage recorded in 
history where a nation has obtained so great a result with so 
small a display of fopoe."' 3 ^ But the "Moscow Gazette," the
Pansiaylat organ edited by M. Katkov, viewed Shuvalov's action
fearing
with displeasure, and^the Count might displace Gorohakov, did 
its utraoet to oppose him. According to the correspondent of 
the "Bally Hows" at 3t, Petersburg "Count Shuvalov's aooeptable- 
nes^ to the I3mperor Alexander (was) regarded as a sure proof of 
the pacific disposition of that monarch, and of his equitable 
intentions with reference to the future settlement of the Easti'(3)
No disguise was made by England throughout hfcr under­ 
standing with Russia, of her intention of defending Turkey 
against MusaDvit© ag^Tession. while Russia was allowed to 
hold the keys of Armenia, Britain at the sante time feared a
Ibid p.J347.
and (S) Ann. Reg. 1878. pp. 68-65.
- 78 -
Russian advance over the Caucasus. This was a weak spot, 
where Russia alono appeared to be unchecked in menacing India. 
With a vlewf therefore, to make up for this patent vulnerability, 
the British Government entered Into a similar secret engagement 
with Turkey. This was Known as the convention of Constantinople 
or the Convention of Cyprus, regarding the conclusion of whioh, 
the British Cabinet had secretly been negotiating with the
Porte. Om May SOth, final arrangements between England and
fctttteey/,%
Turkey*-1 ' were made by Salisbury's despatch to Mr Layard, the
British plenipotentiary at the Porte. Accordingly, this 
Convention of defensive alliance was signed at Constantinople 
on June 4th, as follows.
"if Batum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be 
retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any 
future time by Rusdta to take possession of any further 
territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia* as fixed 
by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England agrees to join His 
Imperial Majesty the sultan, in defending them by force of arms. 
in return. His imperial Majesty the sultan proi4ses to Engiahd 
to Introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between 
the two Powers, into the Government, and for the protection of 
the Christian and otner subjects of the Porte in these territories
And in order to enable England to make necessary
(1) Hertslet IV No.523. Also Parl. R ports. Turkey
NO. 56. (1878). 
(3) HflTtSlet 17. NOS.534-5.
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provision for executing har engagement, His Imperial Majesty 
the srultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to 
be occupied and administered by England. 1" 1 '
Any surplus of revenue over expenditure in its 
administration was to toe given to the sultan, and tine island was 
to be restored, If Russia renounced her acquisitions.
Suoh were the ambiguous tsrms of the Cyprus Convention 
At the time, the Porte was evidently unaware that the possibilit; 
of a renewal of hostilities was so remote, on account of the 
secret Anglo-Russian agreement of 1'ay 30th. Similarly the 
Tsar's Government was not yet cognisant of the JUiglo-Turlish 
defensive alliance. in his famous speech of July 18th after 
the Congress, Beaconsfl^ld thus expressed nis reasons for 
concluding the Cyprus convention. »we... entered into a 
defe- nive alliance ?Tith Turkey, to guard nor grainst any further 
attacK from Russia... We hive a substantial interest in the 
last; It is a comm inding interest and its behest must be obeyed. 
... Our Indian n^lre is on every occasion on which these 
(Russo-TurKish) troubles occur, ... a sooroe of grave anxiety, 
and the time bapearsd to have arrived when, if possible, we 
should terminate that anxiety... in taKing Cyprus, the movement 
Is not Mediterranean, it is Indian* we have taKen a step there 
which we t v'infc n-cessary f'-r the maintenance o o IT Empire, arid
(1) Hertslet IV Nos.524-5.
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for its preservation in peace,... our first consider a ti on.» 
A weak point of th* Cyprus Convention nas that its very terms 
enabled Russia to seleot her own time for attaofc. For had she 
so wished, undoubtedly the occasion would have been <m@ when 
was embarassed with other complications.
Much criticism has be*m directed against the aotion 
the British Government in separately concluding, somewhat 
privily, these two arrangemtnts.' 2 ^ indeed, both Russia and 
turfcey considered themselves trlofced by tl» British Ministers 
when these faots came to light. Britain, it was said, had 
warned Rus&a that she alone would not be allowed to settle 
Eastern affairs, which were the oommon interest of Europe. She 
was guilty therefore, of secretly bargaining with Russia in 
contempt of those very interests. But Russia, as party to that 
transaction was equally culpable, for she too, had declared th© 
future of the Porte to be entirely a matter of European Interest 
Further, that Power had exhibited indecent haste in forcing the 
San stefano Treaty on Turkey and moving her forces nearer 
Constantinople, when a European congress had already been 
agreed upon. Russia thereby had betrayed her fears lest her 
cause should not receive due consideration at the hands of 
the Powers.
(1) Speeches on British Foreign Policy pp.495 497 and 498 ed. B.R.Jones, M.P." ' (3) speeches on British Foreign Policy. Gladstone p.396.seq.
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With a fairly olear definition, within certain limits. 
of an understanding regarding the points at Issue, RUB ?la and 
Britain attended the Berlin congress. Britain espaolally 
displayed equanimity, for her Interests were oovered by a 
double guarantee. All the Powers were represented at Berlin, 
and not since the Treaty of Paris In 1856, had such an Important 
gathering of statesmen assembled to discuss the liquidation of 
the Eastern Question. Lords Beaoonsfleld and Salisbury were 
the spofcesraen of Britain, while Prince OorchaKov and count 
Shuvalov pleaded the oause of Russia. On June 13th 1878, the 
first meeting was held radar the presidency or Bl&naroK.
Of the Inner happenings of the congress, little Is 
known, but affairs did not appear to go along smoothly at first, 
in the main, f he ypooeedlngs assumed the role of a dlplomatio 
duel between Britain and Russia before the other Powers as 
umpires, while TurKey added, now her entreaties, and now her 
protests. Beaoonsfleld is said to have demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of the Russian forces, but to have declined to sent 
to a corresponding retirement of the British fleet. Another 
report stated that both OorohaKov and the British delegates 
threatened departure at a oritioal stage of negotiations, but 
such stories must be accepted with due reserve. on the whole, 
Austria supported Britain against Russia, while waddlngton, who
represented France and had be n educated at Fugby arid oa^ro 
also had British predications. After twenty sittings of 
heated discussion over the Eastern imbroglio, a definitive 
{settlement was reached or July 13th, 1878! *'
instead of the Big Bulgaria of San stefano, the 
Berlin !Preaty fixed the Danube, the Blaefc Sea, the BalKans and 
the Serbo-Mcntenegrin front lorn as the boundaries of the new 
Bulgaria proper. TMs was constituted on "autonomous and 
tribvitary principality under tLe suzerain ty of., the Sultan, 
(with) a Christian Government."* 2 ' To the south of +bls was 
formed a -••rovlnwi with "aoniniotrativo autonomy, « diplomatically 
as Sastern Rumelia. this raora or ISB:( artificial
^ was to b^ "iridfjr ^he c Ireot political and military 
authority of the sultan,* but ac?^i^lst^*ed by »a Christian 
Oov-»rnor-(Jeneral. .. nominated by ti- gubliirr; Per to with the
vcf the Powers, ^or a perio of fiv? ysarp.» % ' the
cf Russian occupation of B'xl^rla rjid Eastern Rum^lia was 
restricted to nine Tion the . af &£r the exohsngs* of ratlficaUons cf
the Berlin Tra^ty.^ 4 ' By the er.l of tn^t time, the I'
wer« to "freely11 elect a Pririce; and the sultan, »wlj;h the 
a cent of the ?ov.e^fj,» was to ^an^r^ thsir choice.
(1) Hertslet IV No.528-30. Also Ann.Reg. 1878. An , T> 32(2) Arts. 1-12. A '*•**
(3) Arts. 12-21.
(4) Arto. 32-?3.
For the moment, the division of Bulgaria into two 
sections was re/rarded as a triunph for British statesmanship 
and a dimtnlftion of Russian influence. On July 18th in the 
House of XtOrd3 9 Beacon afield later remarked on the suHjeot of 
Eastern Kumelia as follows. «At one time it was proposed to 
call it South Bulgaria, but it was nanifeat that with such a 
name, between it and North Bulgaria there would be constant 
intriguing to brlnp about a union. we therefore thou$it that 
the Province of E stem Ruraelia should be formad.. (with) a 
government somewhat different from that of the contiguous 
provinces, where the authority of the Sultan might be more 
unlimited.*' 1 ' But reflection might have suggested that 
national feeling would sooner or later Join together what 
diplomacy had severed, as in the case of Moldavia and Wallachla. 
But the irony of history is that when the union of the two 
Bulgarian was effected in 1885, the British Government a^tanlly 
approved, while the Russian Government condemned it I
fhe Berlin Treaty awarded Montenegro and Serbia, with 
their Independence, but gave them less territorial acquisitions 
than allotted by the Treaty of san stefano.^) Putt her, in 
assigning the port of Antivarl to Montenegro, Its waters were to
(1) Speeches on British Foreign Policy, p.476 (a) Arte. 36-49. See Map.
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•remain alotsed to ships of war of all nations.
Montenegro itself* this frustrated any future Russian -fenpt
to esti&lish a naval base on the Mediterranean. Although 
Rumania still lo^t Bessarabia to Russia, she gained her full 
indepandenao arm a little acre territory ir th» I-otoruja thaw at 
San S^efsno.' 2 ' Main'y it tha instant of saliBbury, 
was ^TQRisea s^inp&t'ietia si^rcort for tr.e futitre t alt v<^ 
gained no territory at Berlin.^ 5 ) ^o Anstria-Hungary were 
riven the provinces 01 Bosnia end Kersr-e^ovina for Odoupstic»n 
ard admlnl strati on. Further, "the righto of Ke?xlnr f 
and Jrvlrc military and oomorelal roada* In the sanJaK: of 
Hovl^BaKar between Serbia anc' Mmntepegro wero also entrusted to 
the Dual Monarchy. Kevnrthele^s, *th«? Ottoman AdNinlstr?tlon» 
wes to ''oontlnue to exerolse ite furi-r»tlono ther 
Beaoonsfield and Salisbury warmly Bup-ported the 
oon^atlon as the best means o^ preventinf: a chain or Slav 
atatea from stretching across thf> v.hole Baliu^ Peninsula.
Run-ia'B diraot gainn in Aaia Minor diff^r^d only 
from those awarded av, san st^fano in that tho Baya??1d diatr3c?t 
was restored to Ti^rkey in -^oordanoe v/ith the eeoi»«-
1) Art. 29.
2 ) Arts. 45-51.
3) Art.34.
4) Art. 25.
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Russian agreement of May 30th. Kars, Ardahan and Batuin were 
oeded to Russia, but the Tsar declared his intention to 
constitute the last-named »a free port, essentially oonmeroial* 1 
Russia, however, disregarded this condition, ii closing and 
fortifying Batum a few years later. In confederation of th® 
oommerolal character given to Batum, the status quo ante bellum 
was restored to the Dardanelles.
I i tils sa:n® speech quotaj above, Lord Beaoonsfield 
thus justified Russia's gains in Asia. "Russia has acquired in 
Europe, nothing but a very small portion of territory occupied 
by 130,000 inhabitants. She naturally expected tc fin 1 some 
regard ir- her O'fiquests in Armenia for the sacrifices w#ioh shi 
had made... Consider what t/iese conquests ara... Take the great 
fortress of Kare. 'fhree times haa Russia talcen Kars.^ 2 ' Three 
times either by oitr Infr/i^noe Hr by other infiueariaes, it has 
been restored to mr»&ey. fere we to to |o war for Kars and 
restore* it to Turkey, and than wait till tha next ffilsujnder- 
staia^Jift "oetweer has it', ana Turkey, w^en Kar© wo-jlu have ceeii 
taXen againr ... then look at Batum.., it is generally spoken 
of in society as it it were a sort of Portsmouth, whereas in 
reality, it should rather be compared with Cones. it win hold
(1) Arts. 5C
) in l p>yo, 1854, and 1877 respectively.
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(only) three considerable ships... Now Is that a question for 
whl?h England would be justified in ^oing to war with Russia?... 
Y/e have, therefore, thought it advisable not to ' grudr-B Russia 
those conquests,. .. espeoially after obtaining tte restoration 
of the town of Bayazid and its import rt district. 11 '
Although officially announced on July 9th as a counter- 
blast to Russia's Asiatic pains, the full terms of the Cyprus 
Convention were not embodied in the Borlin Treaty. The latter 
document, however, expressly stipulated that Turkey should 
•without further de ay» carry out reforms In the Armenian
0\provinces. ' But unfortunate 'y, no stringent steps were 
threatened by t : e Powers in the Treaty, for their enforcement. 
Nevertheless, these clause : did not relieve Britain from her 
special responsibility for reform in Armenia by the terms of the 
Cyprus Convention. This fact Russia took good care not to 
forget.
Such in the main was the Treaty of Berlin. on his 
return home, Lord Beaoonsfield Informed tha London populaoe he 
had brought "peace with honour." The motives which guided hia 
policy at Berlin were indicated In hlpjspenoh to the Upper House 
on July 18th, to which reference h?t s been made above. The 
Premier stated that the Treaty of San stefano had reduced the
(1) Speeches on British Foreign Policy pp.490-493.
(2) Arts. 61-62.
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Sultan «to a state of subnotion to the Great Power which 
defeated his armies." British volley at the congress therefore 
was "to re-establish the Sultan as a real and substantial 
authority," and "to retain him as pr^rt of the aoKnowledged 
;oolitioal system of Europe." England, he thought, had no
•rig'"t to oomplaln of the decisions of the Congress. . so far as 
Eir opean Turkey was ^»on3«rned. " For these results had been
• obtained without shedding the bfcood of a single Englishman."* '
So far as English "Interests" were ^onc^med, this appeared to
«> 
be true enough at the time. For despite the "Hare-brained
ohatter of irresponsible frivolity" ascribed by Beaco&sfield to 
fcls orltlos, the Treaty forboded futir e trouble by its very 
nature of a compromise.
in its discernment of ftture difficulties whioK the 
Berlin Treaty left, the St. Petersburg official newspaper of 
August 7th, was almost prophetic. It oontalned the following 
words. "Th-3 worK had many weak points. One of those must to 
be regretted Is the arbitrary settlement of boundaries by 
geographical and political rjonsiderations without regard to 
nationalities. The Imperial Cabinet (of Russia) had porposed 
a more rational and equitable plan, *' which would have left
(1) Speeches on n*itlsh Foreign Policy, pp.470-499 Inol
(2) i.e. Treaty of San stefano.
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til the Eastern races free to develop themselves, each in its 
natural limits. This it was with regret obliged to abandon. 
But everything depends on the way in whitfi the decisions of the 
Congress are carried out. It cannot b*> too often repeated that 
the difficulties of the Eastern Quention lie not in Turkey, but
On the other hand, Russia can hardjty be ftaid to have 
been richly recompensed by the Treaty, in view of -er enormous 
losses in the war. Nevertheless she had the satisfaction of 
seeing the Balkan Christians to a great extent relieved from an 
Intolerable yoke. Russia soon gave proof, however, that this 
was not the cause nearest her hsart, in her dealings with 
Bulgaria. The acquirement of Cyprus by England, and of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by Austria, which Powers had claimed to respect 
the integrity of the Ottoman dominions and who had not fired a 
shot, only added to the Russian chagrin. Her demands at san 
Stefano appeared exorbitant and rapacious, but ethnographi^ally 
they were not so very unjust. Hence the Berlin Treaty proved 
the very abnegation of Russia's hopes, and the universal 
discontentment of her people was soc&i shown in the Nihilist 
rei&i of terror.
On tin whole, the European press thought the results 
of ths Berlin Congress favourable to British policy. Btt the
(1) Aim. Reg. 1878. P.SS9.
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French newspaper, »L funion,» oonaldered that "England, balm a 
nation of shopkeepers and Indisposed to fight Russia single- 
handed, oonoeded everything to Russia on condition of taKlng 
compensation,* 1 ' the sultan payinp the piper.«( 3 '
in August 1878, Russia began to evacuate the Balkans, 
although peace was not yet signed with the Porte, despite the 
Berlin Treaty. Dissatisfaction was shown by various risings In 
the Balkan states, and reports were revived by the British 
Embassy at Constantinople of the inundation of Eastern Runella 
fcy Russophll Bulgarians. The sultan, too, refused to sign a 
special treaty of peace with Russia, and the Muscovite forced 
momentarily returned to the lines of Ohatalja. Rumours were 
rife about Rus«an desires to revive the Treaty of san stefano, 
for the separation of the two Bulgarians was unpalatable to 
Russians and Bulgarians alike. indeed, up till the last 
moment, an influential section of the Russian Government enter­ 
tained hopes that the Powers would agree to some compromise, 
which would virtually surrender the point stipulating that 
separation. Th* following significant atatement too, appeared 
in the "Berlin Post « In November. "Russia means to remain in 
Bulgaria and southern Bulgaria... What she had already obtained.
(1) i.e. Oyprus.
(2) Ann. Reg. 1878. p.77.
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by Ban stofano, but was obliged to give up by the Berlin Treaty, 
she has now a fair prospeot to acquire, since the Indo-British 
troops can no longer take p«rt in the struggle in the Balkans, 
thanks to Russian polioy in Afghanistan."* ' England, however, 
was the only Power who reminded Russia of heri obligations in the 
execution of the Berlin Treaty,
Meanwhile many obstacles had been put in the way of 
the European International Commission, which theBerlin Treaty 
had appointed to organise the new administration of Eastern 
Runella,(£) It first mot on September 30th, I8J8, but after 
three months' negotiations as specified at Berlin, its task was
by no me amended. Uuoh vexatious delay also took plaoe in/
Bulgaria in calling the assembly for the election of a Prince. 
As th-'administration in both countries was conducted by 
Russian officials until the new governments were installed, 
Russia was naturally regarded as responsible for those delays. 
In a despatch to St* Petersburg on January 26th. 1#79, Lord 
Salisbury gave vent to these ocmplaints.O) He maintained that 
the Russian delegates of the Ocnmiis&Lon persistently opposed 
those of the other Powers. Further their conduct tended to 
promote agitation in favour of a union of Eastern Rumella with 
Bulgaria, while a combined militia from the two provinces had
(1) Ann. Reg, 1*7*. p.31*5.
(2) Berlin Treaty Arts. Iff and 19.
(3) Parl. Reports. Turkey 1379 • No,9. Pt.l.
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been formed under Russian officers, as directed by the Rusaian- 
aovornor-oenemal at Sofia, To this Indictment Prince Oorchafcov 
replied a tew days afterwardsf l ) that Russia would strictly 
adhero to the Berlin Treaty, but no practical result seems to 
have followed the British representat Ions. Prince Dondufcov- 
Korsafcov the Oovemsr of Bulgaria, continued to encourage the 
Bulgarians in .the hope that the division of their country, as 
preseorlbed at Berlin, would not be onrried out.
Accordingly, the Tsar sent Count Shuvalov on a 
diplomatic tour to the chief European capitals, to sound foreign 
opinion on that sublet. On his return he rported that an 
unfavourable Impression had been produced in Europe. For, the 
repeated declarations of the Tsar's intentions to strictly 
adhere to the Berlin Treaty were apparent3y contradicted by the 
attempts of some of his officials to ma^e the most of existing 
difficulties and even to create new ones. Ho signatory Power, 
therefore, was at that time llfcely to tolerate, and still less 
consent to, any departure from the Treaty respecting the two 
Bulgarias. Britain and the Powers, further, stated they would 
hold Russia responsible for any complications arising fron her 
equivocal conduct.
Meanwhile after many regotlationa, peace was finally 
signed between Russia and the Porte on the basis of the Berlin
(1) Parl Reports. Turkey 1279. No,9. pt.l.
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Treaty on February *th, 1579.^) Prlnoe Lobanov for Russia 
also promised an early evacuation of all Turkish territory 
exclusive of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, provided the Porte 
ceded to Montenegro thn districts awarded her at Berlin.^ 2 ) 
The Russian withdrawal was duly carried out. At the beginning 
of Ma'- 18791 however, the question of the Rus&an evacuation 
of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia as required by the Berlin Treaty 
wajtf discussed by Russia on the on^ hand, and Britain and Austria 
on the other,(3) This was interpreted by England and Austria 
to have been completed by May 3zd t while Russia held that 
withdrawal was only to be commenced on that date, but completed 
by August 3rd. But it was obviously too late to insist upon
what was now an impossibility, and therefore it was agreed that
e
no Russian soldier should raain in those territ ries byh
August 3rd at the latest. By the first day of that month, 
Eastern Rumelia was duly evacuated, and at the same time the 
British fleet left the Sea of Marmora,
While these things were going on, the Oommissioners 
of the Powers had drawn up an "organic statute" for Eastern 
Rumelia on April 26th, which the Sultan confirmed the next
1) Hertslet IV.
2) Hertslet IV. p.2961.
3) Hertslet IV. Berlin Treaty, Art.22, p.277#.
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month.' 1 ' Further, a constitution was on April 25th proclaimed 
for Bulgaria,(2) and next day Alexander of Battafrerg was elected 
Prince of that country. He was related to the ruling families 
of both England and Russia, but had received his education and 
military training at Berlin. Alexanders occupation of the 
Bulgarian throne and his troubles with Russian Influra >es were 
destined to form the subject of futtoe negotiations between the 
London and 8t Petersburg Governments Meanwhile by i he end of 
Kovertber 1#79, the Gonmiisffionoffc the Powers, in which Russia 
and England worked side by side, had octapleted the delimitations 
of all the Balkan bounderies as directed at Berlin/*'
The years between 1##0 and Iff99, as far as Europe 
and Its Eastern Question are concerned, formed on the whole
a period of comparative calm between the British and Russian
a^y v Governments, The latter regarded^orusadel^ to flfoe oppressed
people as a delusion and a snare,(^) for little reward had 
resulted from recent exploits In the Balkan*. The Austro- 
Oerman rapprochement of 1379 did much to daw up Rus^la«s 
European aspirations. Further, the internal troubles which 
followed the war of l#77~ff caused her to sullenly fceep at a 
respectful distance from Balfcan affairs, alone excepting the
(1
(2
(3
Hertslet IV.
Kertslet IV.
Kertslet IV. Nos.536-9, 9^. $^5^, 55^t 577- Ala
parl. Reports, Turfcey 1*79. No.9« Pts.i and II. 
Blsmarok. Reflections and Reminiscenoes. Vol.II, 
p.292.
oase of Bulgaria. Henoe the attention of Russian politicians 
was directed towards Internal re-organisation, and Central Asia 
wlwrce they sought to regain Russian military prestige. 
Bismarck, too, encouraged Muscovite expansion in those fields, 
which for some years now formed the chief storm-centre between 
England and Russia.
with the accession of Mr. Gladstone to the leadership 
of the British Government In April 1990, came a revorsal to 
some extent of British policy in the Near Sast. Gladstone 
thought thi^should have been to befriend the Balkan Christlans, 
and expel the Turks "bag and baggage* from Europe. Forestalling 
Russia in this way, Britain night hmve beooma the recognised 
protectress or" th© Balkan peoples and hrr/e kept that Power from 
working southwards towards Constantinople. Beaeonsfield's 
policy from 1275 to Iffyar, thought Mr Gladstone, had had the 
effect of encouraging the Porte. It had also caused Britain 
to appear an accomplice of the Sultan In the eyes of tlie Balkan 
races, who were thus forced to regard Russia as their champion. 
In this sense, England had indirectly aided the aggrandisement 
of Russla.( l >
These principles were Immediately put into practice by 
the new premier, and Anglo-Russian relations vere thereby 
ameliorated for «"• tiiw. On June llth, mainly through Mr
(1) See Gladstone's speech of Not.27th, 1879. Speeches 
on English Foreign Policy,* pp.371-3^9.
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Gladstone and Mr Oosohen, an identic note was-sent to the Porte
(1)In the name of the signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty.
This complained of the non-exooutfn by Turkey of reforms In<\
Armenia, and affairs concerning t'-:e Montenegrin nd 0»eek 
frontiers. For it had boon decided since the Berlin Treaty, 
that Greek claims to certain districts in The*sal» and Bplrus 
should be granted at Turkey "s exp nse. An evasive reply came 
t&m the Sultan on Juns 2fct,n, but on July 15th the powers 
recommended the adoption of mw frontier lines for Greece and 
Montenegro. On Gladstones initiative, a Conference met the 
same month and also later in March 1891 at Berlin, whereby the 
Porte had to surrender the disputed districts, vrit* fha full 
approval of Russia.' 2 ' Th3 Sultan too, countenanced the 
attempt of th? Albanian League to prevent Montenegro firm 
taking possession of t.h-5 part of Dulcl^no end t]he districts 
SiSslgned her at Berlin. Tc enforce this, the Power c held a 
naval dewobstratlon before Bulolgno against the Alb?n.1ans. But 
as tho,y v/ere not anxious to bombard the town, the d
proved a far oe and the Porte held cut. Gladstone soon turned
the tables however, by suggstlng a joint pelaure of Stryrna by
the Powers. This had the deired eff?>?t or th* Porte, who
(1) Kertslet IV. No.566.
(2) Hertslet IV. Nos.567-71» 5^2-4, 5^6-90.
immediately gave intrusions for t e surrender of Duioigno to 
Montenegro/ ' These two episodes restated In the gratitude 
of Greece and Montonegro towards England) and want far to 
restore British prestige in the Balkans f which had hitherto 
been lo*t to Russia. In addition to the feov^full agreement 
was reached on August nthf 1880, between Britain and Russia 
regarding the Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia Minor/ 2 ' For, 
a nixed Commission of British, Runs! an and Turkish officers had 
been working since May 0f that year to fix the boundary as 
required by the Treaty of Berlin*
During the next fev years, Russia's dealings with 
her protege Bulgaria, on^e mere roused British apprehensions* 
At first, England feared lest Russia should seek to nake 
Bulgaria little nore than a Muscovite outpost In the Balkana. 
for, up till 1S55, the most important posts in the adnlnistratio 
of the Principality were occupied by Russianlagents, while the 
native Bulgarians were passed over. Alexander of Bulgaria was 
natural? Russophil for the first ytwo years of his reign. But 
finding himself unable to work with hira Parliament, he 
suddenly threatened resignation early In ltf*l f unless absolute 
uthorlty were given him for seven years* He further 
suspended the constitution of Bulgaria and set the Russian
(1) Hert^let IV. Nos. 5^3-^t 57*-*0» Also Morey's Lifte of 
Gladstone, vol.XII.pp.7-9-
(2) Hertslet IV. Nos.565,
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General irnroth at tho head of a provisional adrnlnistration.* ' 
On Hay 11th, lff#l, the aussan ambassador at London, Prinoe 
Lebnov sc<-£ht to alln.y English apprehensions by infoming Lord 
Granvlile that Russia had not adWSed Prinoe Alexander to take
that step. Granville replied, however, that the British
/ p \ 
Gwranent could not be indlffere t to such happenings.* ' Pour
days latr, Sir Prank Lasoelles the British represontat:ive at • 
Sofia reported that the Russian Oovnrnnaf. ha« supported 
Alexandor despite Lobanov»s as mranoes.^3) Meanwhile Russian 
officers continued to be appointed as military ooiamisuioners 
throughout Bulgaria. But Lasoellea informed General Ernroth 
at Sofia on May 3<)th that this "would produoe an unfavourable 
effect upon public opinion in England.•(**•) The Liberal 
Opposition of the Bulgarian Sobranje were nevertheless opposed 
stron-ly to the influx of Russian Influence. They oonplaJUIed 
to the British, Russian and Italian Governments against the 
•^illegalities oownittoed in Bulgaria against the Berlin Treaty." 
But; on June l^th Lobanov again denied nussian complicity in 
Bulgarian affairs, and further told Granvllle that "any support 
given by Hor Majesty«s Government to the Bulgarian Opposition 
would tend to create the crisis^ of anarchy. In reply,
(1
(2
Hertslet IV. p.2$69-
Parl. Reports Bulgaria No.l.(lffari) No.3,
Ibid. No.I*.
Ibid. No 29.
Oranville said that "anything of a nature of a coup d*etat 
directed against existing constitutions" was unpalatable to 
England. Nevertheless, considering the difficulties of the 
inexperienced Bulgarian Ministers, hn did not object to 
Alexander^ action, as that ruler had promised Lascellos early 
in May, that he would follow a strictly legal course/ '
Later on June 27th, Lobanov approached Oranville 
proposing t(jejoint presentation of a note by the Powers to 
Bulgaria "to produce, in a conciliatory spirit, a salutary and 
pacifying effect." This was to record their indention *to 
fully respect the in.tependenoe of the Prince and people of 
Bulgaria regarding Internal an airs within 'he stipulations of
( 2}the Berlin Treaty."* ' In reply, the English Foreign 
Secretary cexplained of its vagueness of purpose, but after 
similarly rebooting an amended note, finally accepted it on 
July ffth as.M. de Oiers the Russian Foreign Minister begged him 
to maintain the European Oonoert.'3) Three days later de Glers 
expressed his satisfaction with Oranville^ decision, as he 
understood that "any question affecting constitutionalism was a 
most delicate one to touch ipon with England.»(^) Lobanov 
howevor, withdrew his note on July l#th, owing to the recent
( 
(
1) Parl. Reports, Bulgaria No.l.(lff&l) NosA to 37.
2) Ibid. No. 67.(3) ibid Nos,7^f 76, arif, #6,
Ibid.
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elections in Bulg ria still favouring Prinoe
Thus matters remained for some tine, while Muscovite 
officr^and munitions continued to pour into Bulgaria. In 
rain the Liberal opposition had "irel to the Tsar - "A knife 
is felaoed at our throats; wo request the Russian officers be 
withdrawn... and pray your M^e^ty' 2 ' to continue the benefits
which your august father te stowed up-n us after five centuries
<? 
of slavry. 11 The completeness of the Russian control over
Bulgarians Is shown by a letter in the "Moscow Gazette* of 
De^embe .• 13&2. This was written by a Russian staff officer at 
Jofla, who said that the Bulgarian army would soon become the 
van-uard of the Russian antvv''
By degrees, however, Prinoe Alexander began to resent 
this ha;;ghty Russian tutelage, whi^h was rendered all the more 
overbearing by the personal hatted pf Tsar Alexander III. He 
leaned more and more towards the Bulgarian Liberals and restored 
the constitution in 188$ /^^ The ,ulf between Russia and 
Bulgaria deepened, and with the vigorou aid of Staiabftlov a 
Pan-Bulgarian movement was begun which awoke the old national 
instincts and menories of Tsar's Simeon and Samuel- Aspirations 
for political union with Eastern Rumlla were fostered, and
(1 
(2
I
Ibid. No.107. 
Alexander III. 
Ann. Reg. 1882* p.26o, 
Hertslot IV. p.2#69»
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•Bulgaria for the Bulgarians* was the watchword. It was not 
desired that Bulgaria shoui cimerely become a Muscovite satrapy 
and after 1883 , Prince Alexander begaAnto dismiss his Russian 
ministers. A decisive divorce Boom St. Petersburg, however, 
was not Just yet destined to happen.
Meanwhile an incident occurred between t^e British 
and Russian Governments in /Vovember 1884, which still revealed 
the existence of mutual distrust between them. By the Treaty 
of London 1871 , Russl an warships were forbidden egress from the 
Black Sea through the Bosphorue and Dardanelles. Nevertheless, 
with the Sultan's permission, Rusdia had been in the habit of 
sending ships laden with criminals and ariyy recruits though the 
Straits for Siberia. She now requested the Porte for a 
standing authority for th« passage of such ships at stated 
intervals. The British Ambassador at Constantinople objected 
to this, alleging that these so-called criminals and reouits 
were very often effective troops. In this way, he argued, 
Russian soldiers would be able to reach India through the Suez 
Canal in the evnt of war, more quicKly than English troops.
Russl a mads obj*e$* ns, buf. finally a compromise was reached. 
The proposed authority was granted by the Sultan on the condition 
ttet no more than 1,500 men should be sent through the Straits 
each year.f*) Considering Russia had as yet no efficient
(1) Ann. Reg. 1884. PP.S09-10.
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means of transportation across Asia, the English objo-^ions seem 
to be somewhat petty.
By the autumn of 188ft, affairs in Bulgaria had oorae 
to a olimax, and on September 18th the Russophil Governor of 
Eastern R-uraelia, Oavrll Pasha, was expelled from that province. 
By ths bloodless revolution of Phillppopoils, the union of the 
two Bulpartas was declared, and Prince Alexander accepted the 
crown o^ the new Big Bulgaria. The hostility o^ the Tsar, now 
Knew no b<rmds, for the union frustrated his hopes of possibly 
becoming Orand DuKe of Greater Bulgaria. Bow greatly Russian 
attitude towards Bulgaria had changed since 1878, can be Judged 
by the fact that in 1880, the Russian Government would brook no 
extraneous oommlaaion of Inquiry into Eastern Rumelian affairs. 
But a corresponding reversal of policy took plaoe at London 
while the marriage of Prince Henry of Battenburg to Princess 
Beatyloe only added another personal interest favourable towards 
Bulgaria arid its ruler. For Lord Salisbury now realised that 
Bulgaria was not merely a Russian advance-guard as had been 
feared in 1878, and warmly approved of the union.
While he dared not alone jttack Bulgaria, win? to 
the difficulties of the altuatiai ,< s ' the. Tsar bade Kelidov, his
(1) Parl. Reports. Turkey No.9. (1880) Nos.45, 47, 87.
(2) The Holy Alliance was still binding, and Russia
was not free to take single action in the Balkans.
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representative at the Porte, urge the Sultan to do so and 
restore "legal order" in Eastern Runella. But oonslderfclg thia 
as merely a treacherous device of Russia, the Sultan listened to 
the good advloe of Britain. For, Sir William White, the 
British plenipotentiary at the Porte, acting on Salisbury's 
instructions, pointed out that the accomplished union ->f 
Bulrtrla would act as an effective bulwark against Russia. 
Further, as Alexander still 10Knowledge the Sultan's suzerainty. 
Turkish interests would be best served by refraining from taking 
action.' 1 ' The sultan wisely followed this counsel.
Although tin Powers formally disapproved of the
revolution and fully admitted the ri ht of the Porte to send
(«}
troops to Eastern Rumelia, ' none except Russia displayed open
hostility. Tsar Alexander III withdraw his officers from 
Bulgaria, and struck t^e Battenburg's na^ne from his own list of 
commission-holders. He further proposed a Conference of the 
Powers to meet at Constantinople. This was according to the 
"Journal de St. Petersburg," for th-> purpose of discovering «a 
solution ... more in conformity with the interests of Turkey and 
Bulgaria, and also more in harmony with the balance of power in 
the East and consequently with the general peace."' 5 )
Parl. Reports. Turkey.(1886) No.l. p.424. 
Pee Berlin Treaty. Art.16. 
Ann. Reg. 1885. P.
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After expressing a very mild disapproval of the 
violation of the Berlin Treaty at a preliminary me^tlnf, t^e 
formal oonfere -oe met on November 5t% 1885. In the teeth of 
all Europe, Sir William white, representing Britain, warmly 
Ohamploned the Bulgarians oause. Russia especially favoured a 
restoration of the status quo in Eastern Rumelia by the Sultan's 
troops, but Britain supported by Prance, proposed an alternative. 
Thi s ras to institute an Inquiry In Eastern Rumelia, wioh a view 
to the adoption of a plan whereby a return to the status quo 
miKht be reconciled with the v.ishes of ths Bulgarians. But 
the Russian -representative emphatically declared that his 
Government would never subscribe to such an arrangement. Sir 
William White, however, persistently opposed the suggested 
return to the old state of affairs In Eastern Rumelia, and the 
Conference oame temporarily to an end.* 1 '
But any resultant action therefrom, was forestalled by 
Serbia.s sudden attaoK on Bulgaria/ 2 ' which, if not actually 
instigated by Russia, at least hau her approbation. After a
•
few minor reverses, the field of Sl^vnitza assured the moral, 
if not material, suoces > of Bulgaria. But Austria Intervened, 
and an armistice followed by peaoe was aimed on March 3rd, 1886,
(1) Hertslet IV. No,608. Also Parl. Reports Turkey
(1888) Nos. 1 end 2. also No.l (1886).
H^rtslet IV. Nos.606-7.
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on a basis of the status quo 3nte bellum.^ 1 ' But previously 
on February 1st, a turco-Bulgarian Convention was signed forming 
a defensive an-i offensive alliance between the two ;ountrles, 
and recognising Prince Alexander as Governor of Eastern Rumelia 
for five years.^ 8 ) This did not satisfy the Powers, but 
although Salisbury resigned and Gladstone resulmed office, 
British policy in Eastern Europe did not change. Russia 
ohlefly objected to the stipulation promising mutual military 
aid and also to the naming of Prince Alexander In the Turco- 
BuJgarlan Convention. fhi c wae canoeiloci on England*s advice, 
in deference to Russian views, and the Conference of the previous 
November was resumed. Finally on April 5t*, 1886, a compromise 
was reached and signed. "The Prince of Bulgaria," and not 
•Prince Alexander" was recognised as Governor of Eaaterm Rumella 
far five years. Britain also reserved the right to renoralnate 
Alexander at the end of that time. A Conrnission was also 
appointed under t*e sanction of th<? Powers, to revise the 
"organic statute" of ^astern Rumelia.* 5 '
Despite this arrangement, the Tsar soon showed he had 
not forgotten the Battenbu?gen's audaolty in achieving for 
himself-in Bulgaria, what Tsar Alexander II had failed to
(1) Hertslet IV. 'os.609-10.
(2) Pmrl. Reports. (1886) No.8.
(5) Hertslet IV. Nos.611 and 615.
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alre-.riy asked the Iron Chancellor if he would allow them the 
annex Bat-urn. »He answered them that he did not care twopence 
about Saturn, indesd it was evident that he would have been 
glad had they entered Constantinople ana celebrated Mass in 
St. Sofia - provided, of course, -.hey hnd marched out again.ft* 
Russia's action was strikingly similar to h^r forrawe 
repudiation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris in 
1871. But it was fortunate for the St. Petersburg Government 
that Mr. Gladstone wa3 Premier at this time. For, in a speech 
given as far back as November 27th, 1879, that statesman had 
indicated Russia's right to fortify Batum if she so wished. On 
that oc?a,3lon, he used the following words. "The Treaty of 
Berlin... states that Batum shall be essentially a commercial 
port, .but not that It sh ill be only a commercial port... Leith 
is essentially a 3om-nercial port, but there is nothing to 
prevent the people of this ? untry, if they should think fit, 
from constituting Leith as a great naval arsenal or fortif! - 
cations. And there Is nothing to prevent the Bnperor of Pussia 
while leaving to Bat1 on a character... essentially comber ol^l 
from joining with that, another character that is not in the 
slightest degree excluded by the Treaty, and making it as much 
as he pleases, a port of military defence."**'
1) Lyall's "Life of Lord DufCerin,- p.277.
2) Speeches on British Foreign Policy, p.577.
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The Russian excuse, however, was that owlntt to the 
conditions stipulated by the Berlin Treaty conoarnin; Batum, 
local commerce was "condemned to compulsory stagnation instead 
of undergoing: progressive exparsion."^ 1 ' and travellers were 
unduly inconvenienced, ^ut Lord Rosebery told the Russian 
ambassador at London the matter was "most grave" as it concerned 
all the signatory Powers to the Berlin Treaty. He reminded 
Russia of the words of Qorohakov tt the congress on 6th July, 
1878, "My august master.... win declare Batum a free port. 
This meets the material interests of all commercial nati-ms, and 
more particularly, perhaps, those of Great Britain, r/hose 
oo-mene employs the largest number of vessels."(2) Rosebery, 
finally intimated his disapproval or the Runnian disregard for 
the London Protocol of January 17th, 1871, whl^h discountenanced 
the self-liberation of any Power from the engagements of a treaty 
without the ^onnent of the other contracting Powers. 3 '
On July 15th, Lord Rosebery more fully enunciated his 
complaints in a despatch to St. Petersburg. "Her Majesty's 
Government cannot re o-\mise any amount of oommerolal inoonvenieno 
as firnishlnr a justification for a peremptory declaration of 
the Russian Government, on Its whole sole authority, that this
(1) Hertslet IV. p.3176.
(2) Hertslet IV pp.2750 and 3173.
(3) Hertslet III. No.433.
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portion of the (Berlin). Treaty is... no longer valid." He 
denied that Britain dl<< the greatest trade at Batura, but 
intimated, that England's "one direct, supreme arid perpetual 
interest* was "that of the bindin^ force and sanotity of inter­ 
national engagements... at all times and in all seasons. 1" 1 ' 
in reply on July 22nd 1886, M. de fliers ^xpresssd his "painful 
surprise" at the "accusation made against a Great Power of 
violating tv « faith of treaties." This he said "with all the 
strength of his convictions." Besides "the spontaneous 
declaration of the intention of the Emperor ro m^Ke Batum a free 
port, did not constitute an obligation; and con sequent I:/, the 
modification of that intention, which circumstances require, 
could not be considered as a d^rarture from engagements which 
did not exist." This despatch concluded with a fcint that the 
Berlin Treaty h^d already been violated In the case of Bulgaria, 
by tho moral aid of England, despite Russia* s efforts to observe 
its execution. The imperial Government, wer<s, nevertheless, 
"anxious to contribute to the consolidation of the general 
peace."' 2 ' Lord Rosebery could hardly protest vory much 
against what his ohlef Mr. Gladstone, had declared In 1879 to 
te perfectly valid. Besides, the Interest of Europe was not 
sufficiently roused by the Question, and Britain had no option
(1) Hertslet IV. No.616. Also Parl.Reports Russia
No.l. (1886) No.2. 
(3) Hertslet IV. No.617. Also Parl. PCports Russia
No.l (1886) No.3.
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but to acquiesce In the Russian occupation of Saturn.
Meanwhile on June 34th, a further Instance was 
afforded of the Tear's suspicions of British moral support for 
Prlnoe Alexander of Bulgaria. For M. Onu the Russian 
ambassador at the Porte declared at the Turkish Foreign Of floe 
that his Government nossessed proofs that England and llurkey had 
intrigued with Prinoe Alexander against ussia. M. Onu 
expressed the dissatlsfaction thereby shown to Russia and 
requested Turkey to ensure that the arrangements as established 
by International treaty in her vassal state, should be 
respected. Part payment of the Indemnity or the 1877-8 war, 
then due, was immediately demanded. M. onu further intimated 
that Russia would hold the Porte responsible for any further 
disturbances or the part of the Prince or sobranjeof BulgarlaC*) 
These charges were not denied, but being taken as veiled threats, 
Turkey in alarm hastened to conciliate the "usoian Government. 
This led to the Russo-Turklsh rapprochement, which later caused 
so much uneasiness to Britain.
Startling events now happened In Bulgaria. For on 
August 21st, 1886, Prlnoe Alexander was kldna ped by some 
Rjaasian of leers, forced at the muzzle of the pistol to sign his 
abdication, and hurried into Austrian territory. He was
(1) Ann. Reg. 1886, p.567-8.
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released at Lemberg, whence he returned to Bulgaria, thoroughly 
shattered and brow-beaten by the treatment he received. 
Although it has never been proved that the Tsar actually ordered 
the Prince's seizure, he obviously d^d not discountenance it, 
for the Russian oon$piratore were left unpunished. British 
appTTefiensions were much roused, but she was too hampered with 
Irish and colonial troubles to take action against Russia. 
Finally the resignation of the Austrophil Lord Randolph 
Churchill from the Salisbury Government, ended all hopes of
*
Britain seconding any Austrian support on behalf of Bulgaria. 
Thoroughly unstrunp, and reviving no foreign aid, Prince 
Alexander left Bulgaria for ever on September 7th, 1886.
Nevertheless, Lord Salisbury's speech at the Lord 
Mayor*a Banquet on November 9th, revealed England's irritation 
towards Russia In this matter. Although Russia was ftot even 
named, he utterly condemned Muscovite complicity in Alexander's 
betrayal by officers "debauched by foreign gold." This had 
been followed by "encroachment after encroachment -upon the 
rights of a free and independent people... fortunately hitherto 
limited within the bounds of diplomatic menace." Salisbury 
further stated that i3rltain had an interest in ths last and 
would perform her part ,if "the Pov/srs of Europe or any 
considerable portion of them," performed theirs. "If England 
were directly assailed in her interest or honour, she would act 
at once and alone, but the duty of defendinr Bulgaria fell to
- Ill -
her only ae ona Power in Europe." Finally, the Prime Minister 
hoped that peace would be maintained a 1 d that the infant 
liberties of Bulgaria would not be destroyed/*' In the 
Continental press, Russian writers abstained from contnent, but 
the French journalists craftily observed that Russia's conduct 
in Bulgaria was Justified by that of England in Egypt.
Despite these unfriendly utterances, Anglo-Russian 
dealings IT Bulgaria became mors tolerable on the whole. For 
much of the Russian hostility was due to Alexander Ill's 
personal teoaldbl^y towards th$ Battonburger, and on ^is removal 
the Trjar's anger greatly subsided. After attempting to regain 
her lost influence in a way equally clumsy as unsuccessful 
ae~ordin? to the M Nord» of February 20th, 1887, Russia intended 
to "let things taXe their own course in the Balkans. Henceforth 
RURBla will w a toll the sverits on the Rhine, and relegates the 
Eactern orestion to the second place.»' 2 ' This probably 
referred to Russia's rssBlre to be free to vatch Germany, who, 
It T/as thought, contemplated an attack on France, the Tsar's 
new friend. With the sole protestation of Tsar Alexander III, 
Prince Ferdinand of Saxe Oobnrjr Ooths. was elected to the 
Bulgarian throne on August 12th/ 5 ' But Russia displayed no
(1) Ann. Reg. 1886, p.895-6. 
Aim. R«£. 1887, p.262.
Hertolet TV. No.6^2, and p.3278. Also Parl. 
Reports TurXey (1888) No.l.
v */ID
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hostility eallln.? f^r British remon strati on, although she 
refused to recognise Ferdinand until the so-oalled conversion 
of his 3en Prinoe Boris to the Greek Church In 1896. At first, 
Lord Salisbury adopted an attitude of reserve, but soon 
acquiesced in the rule of the Coburger. for Ferdlnan-i was a 
relative of Queen Victoria.
Thus Russia succeeded in uniting the liberated Balfcan
tfvrougKnations against their liberator j hey mistaken policy slnoe 
187P. Thie Bpmarfcable negative result of Russian policy was 
accompanied nevertheleRs by a ?orrespondlnrl$ happy result 
through British policy. For England, regained the prestige in 
the BalKan Peninsula whl?>? she *ad lost sln?e 1876. This was 
mainly due to t*e efcllful and syrrtpathetlo diplomacy of Lord 
Salisbury and sir willlaw White,
From 1889 till the opening of the Twentieth Oentury, 
events In Armenia formed the main subject of negotiations 
between icngland ard Russia, as far as the Near Eastern Question 
Is concerned. Of all the Christian races of the Ottoman Empire, 
the Armenians held a position different from the rent. For, 
while vulgarians, Gre^Ks and Serb* could looK to Sofia, Athens 
and Belgrade for support the Armenians had no state of their own 
to which tbey covld looK for protection. Possessing rn irXed 
proollvitiesfo-p oomrneroe, and a nature generally pacific, the 
Armenians suffered periodic persecution and pillage, at the
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hands or the untutored Monle Kurds. Massaore often resulted, 
accompanied by every barbarity conceivable to nh« savare mind. 
But the Sultan naturally sided with his oo- religionists, and 
often gave his tacit approval to their deeds. She Berlin 
Cdigress had considered the Armenian Question, but had been 
content with merely obtaining vague promises of security and 
reform from the Porte.(*) unfortunately enough the enforcement 
of these conditions had not b^en basfced by the force of the 
Powers. Nevertheless, each signatory Power to th ^ Berlin 
settlement, ipao facto, simred in the responsibility for good 
govtnment in Armenia. Undoubtedly Britain had in addition, 
taken upon herself a special altho i; ph not exclusive. share in 
that responsibility by the terms of the Cyprus convention. 
Haws of fresh Kurdish outrages in Armenia first 
reached Europe about the mid le of 1889, but the question as 
yet attracted little attention. indettd. Lord Salisbury, 
although expressing Britain's interest in the conditions of 
Armenia, stated at that time, that the eng.°.pe«ent wit the Porte 
with respect to Its Christian subjects, did not lay any special
f o)obligations on England/*' A Commission of inquiry was 
nevertheless sent to Armenia but nothing resulted beyond the 
prosecution and subsequent acquittal of Mussa Bty, a notorious
(1) Berlin Trenty Art.61.
(2) Ann. Peg. 1889. pp. 146-7.
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ohief of ths Kurda. As the Turkish ambassador denied the 
outrages, little notice was taken In England of the matter. 
The Tear's Government similarly dlsoountenanted the reports, and 
professed to see an i^™61118*1 Peril" before them. For the 
Caucasian provinces of Russia wer^larpely inhabited by 
Armenians, who still dreamed of the restoration of this ancient 
empire. But Europe was to be roused later on.
Meanwhile in September 1891 Europe was startled by 
the reports that the British fleet had occupied Slgrl, an islet 
off the coast of Mltylene, conrlanding the mouth of the
•
Dardanelles. This was considered a British retort to a recent 
Russian success in obtaining a rlfht from the Porte for the 
passage of the •Russian volunte*K "fleet,* through the straits. 
This was explained, however, to be only the "routine oracti^e 
with torpedoes* which the fleet was accustomed to perform in its 
annual cruise to the Archipelago. Although the scare was 
finally dispelled it nevertheless conveyed a hint of how Britain 
might be pre ared to act if her eastern Interests were seriously 
endangered.
in 1892 pusAa repeated tl» attempt to obtain further 
oonoesBlonsjregardinF the passage of her ships through the 
Bosphorusand Dardanelles. For, in autumn Brlalmont the 
famous Belgian engineer began to strengthen the Turkish 
fortifications of the Straits. Russia was naturally anxious,
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and took advantage of existing negotiations for a 
treaty with the Porte. she porposed the free passage of all 
ships flying the Tsar's commercial flag, proceeding fron one 
Russian port to another. Objections were made by the Porte to 
this, which she considered contrary to the international treaties 
regulating the navigation of the Straits. Brttain supported 
the Sultan's action, and demanded equal rights for English 
if these proposals were conceded to Russia. Accordingly 
matter dropped.
But, further, in October 1893 a Russian squadron 
visited French waters at Toulon, thus sealing tne new franco- 
Russian alliance. It seemed as if the Tsar intended keeping 
hi a ships In the Mediterranean for some time. Evil designs for 
tafclnp possession of a Montenegrin port to form a Russian naval 
base were suspected by England. For In 1889, tlB Tsar had 
publicly toasted to hln «only sincere and faithful friend 
Montenegro. 11 A British fleet therefore was despatched to 
visit Italian ports, in case of emergency. However the 
situation was cleared up, by the departure of the Russian vessels 
from the Mediterranean.
in 1894 disquieting reports were ag^in received of 
further excesses in the Sassun district of Armenia. The
(1) Ann. Rer . 1891.p.174- 
Ann. Reg . 1892. p.270.
- 116 -
Christians had pleaded Inability to pay their taxes, owing to 
Impoverishment resulting from Kurdlsh depredations. To 
enforce payment Turkish Irregular cavalry had bean despatched, 
but were repulsed by the Christian mountaineers. A powerful 
contingent was thereupon sent by the sultan to punish the
•Armenian brigands* as his Oovemnent termed them. The
•rebellion* was put down with a savagery characteristically 
Turkish. But the sultan, as he was wont, issued a report
giving quite a different coloiBr to the whole story from those
i of the consuls of the Powers. on learning the true and
lamentable state of Armenia, the British ubllc boiled with 
indignation, and a powerful action favoured the granting of 
Armenian autonomy.
But in pretending to defend the Armenian Christians 
by the Cyprus Convention, and superseding Russia's stipulations 
at San Stefano, England had obviously undertaken an obligation 
she :>ould not discharge. ?or the provinces of Armenia were far 
too inaccessible for any effective means of protection by 
Britain, as a large and well-equipped array would have be^n 
necessitated. But Russia on the contrary was geographically 
in a favourable position to do with -»omparative ease, what 
England was not abl^ to fulfil. yor while the scenes of outrage 
were not within easy strlklnr distance of British armies and 
fleets, Russia had large forces which she could Immediately send
(1) For full ara later reports see Parl. Reports, Q895-8)
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through th^ Caueaslari door of Armenia. She had regained her 
naval and military strength on the Euxine, and redoubled her 
facilities of railway ^ommunloatlon. The s ronghold of Kars and 
the newly fortified port of Batun were In Russia's possession ana 
her physical superiority over Turkey was more ovrwhelming tftan 
ever. Russia stood In an unique position in this respect of 
all the European Powers, v/no were nearly all pre-oo^upied In 
other fields at that time. Again, the Northern Power almost 
alone possessed the hereditary Instlnots to coerce the Porte. 
For it had been said in effect at the time of the Crimean war, 
that every Armenian was a protege and agent of Rus3la.
The best policy for England, therefore, appeared to 
oall for very effort to secure t i ;e friendly oo-operation and 
intervention of Russia. But by the Cyprus Convention, Britain 
had made Russia fear lest any Muscovite Invasion of Turkish 
Armenia should be considered an act demanding English inter­ 
vention on behalf of the sultan. Further, it was doubtful 
whether England considered herself absolved from her obligation 
or not, through Turkey's non-fulfilment of her promises. 
Besides Russia felt that she peace of her Caucasian provinces 
ml^ht be endangered If the Armenians were liberated.
Nevertheless, despite the uaelesaness of the Cyprus 
Convention, Britain made an effort to rally the Powers In the 
cite charge of their common obligations. For on December 8th, 
1R94, a circular was sent to all the English Plenipotentiaries
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at foreign courts, inviting the Powers to Join in an inouiry 
into Armenian affairs, six days afterwards, Prince Lobanov 
replied coldly that Russia "did not wish to see an independent
*
province of Armenia. Neither did she desire to create a
/ n\ 
second Bulgaria, nor re-open the whole Eastern "uestlon."**'
Russia's attitude was further explained on December 18th. For 
Gount Kapnlst said there was a movement "by no deans confined 
to the Armenians living in Turkey for the purpose of establishing 
an independent Armenia." Further, it was a "Question which 
oould not be Indifferent to the Russian Government considering 
the lar?e number of Armenians living in Russian territory." 
Finally the Russian Government hart no "arrlere pensee poiltique" 
on the subject, but were "averse to raising any political 
question.*^3) But England, aa yet failed to assure Rusnla that 
•she had no intention of proposing changes ao naturally 
objectionable to her, for o^terwise she might have secured 
considerable Russian aid.
More inquiries were made by ti» British Government on
(4)December 27th, and Lobanov 1 a reply appeared more ho eful. He 
admitted that evidently "something must be done," and hinted 
that Russia mi«ht take action if only she were assured of
(1) Parl Reports Turkey No.l. (1895). Pt.l.No.73.
(2) Ibid. No.91.(3) Ibid. Ho.119.
Ibid No 1*z
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limited demands In Armenia, The Posebery Government, however, 
appear to havs let slip t>iis oprortniity of coming to a 
confidential arrangement with St. Petersburg. For although
Lobanov's confidences wers repeated In March 1895* ' no 
further netermlned attempt was made till Salisbury returned to 
power ir July. In view of £nr land's persistent hostility to 
Russia during the past forty years, the contlmd silence of the 
British Government naturally went to confirm Muscovite suspicions 
For, when sir Frank Lascellea, the British ambassador at 
St. Petersburg called on Prince Lob-mov on July 3rd, lie was 
informed that a difference of opinion between Russia and m gland 
in the Armenian Question, h^: occurred. Lobanov recapltiilated 
more clearly hi a Government's tfears lest the London cabinet 
contemplated changes in Armenia, to which ho had already 
Indicated his objactiona. La sat lias, however, having n o
further in str^ actions could only reply that he had dons his best
fa)to explain Russia's view to his Government. 1 * 7
But Salisbury hastened to make uo for lost time on his 
accession- to the premiership. He told the Turkish amba ssador 
In London on July 10th that he staunchly repudiated all designs 
for an autonomous Armenia as "absurd,* and only desired security
P rl. Reports. Ho.l. Turkey (1895) Pt.I.No.179. 
Parl. Reports. Turkey No.l. (1898) No.lio.
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for the Christiana. To this end, Salisbury proposed the 
appointment of a Governor for Armenia "In whom Europe oould 
oonfide."'1) This suggestion was Immediately communicated to 
Sir Frank Laacelies, whoi|n return telegraphed the Russian view 
on July 35th.' 2 ' This was to th« effect that auoh exceptional 
political reforms for Armenia oould not be entertained at St. 
Petersburg. The follovrlng day, the British Premier informed the 
Tsar f s Government t^at England was only "anxious to obtain for 
the Armenian population, nerely justice and security of life and 
p&eperty; and that the bestowal upon them of any exceptional 
•privilege is neither pressed, nor Is It desired by Her Majesty's 
Government."' 3 '
Europe was now in a condition entirely the reverse of 
that which existed before the Rus so-Turkish war. All the 
Powers especially Rusala, were then begging Britain to maintain 
their concert whi^h she refused to do. But in 1895, Salisbury 
was trying hard to secure "Russian co-operation. Further d»eadful 
tidings reached Europe from the Ottoman provinces, and on 
August 5th, Salisbury, again wired Lascelles, He immediately 
inquired to w>>at extent Russia would be prepared to "put pressure, 
upon the Porte," as the British Government "did not consider that 
diplomatic means would be of rauah further avail." He further
(1) Parl. Reports. Turkey. No.l. (1896) No.112.
(2) Parl. Reports. Turkey No.l. (1898) No.120. 
(5) Ibitf. No.!??.
was of the opinion that "the Powers oannot withdraw from the 
enterprise without loss of credit," and there exi3ted "the
possibility of b**ln^ driven to more enerretio ^asures."^'
/ 
The Russian charge d'affaires in Lo don assured Lord
Salisbury In reply that Russia would oertainly co-operate with 
Enrland provided that "nothing in the shape of an autonomous 
state in Armenia should be attempted."( 2 ) The London Government 
immediately assented, but all hopes of combined action were 
soon dashed to the ground. For Russia toofc fresh alarm as 
regards armed co-operation, since Lobanov informed Sir franfc 
Lancalles that "both the Emperor and himself wers strongly 
against force being used by any or all of the Powers." Forcible 
methods were said to be "personally repugnant to the Emperor."( 5 
But the real reason of the Russian refusal was more prob *bly 
because she feared revolutionary trouble in the East, whloh 
might be beyond control.
Meanwhile tto sultan qulofcly realising Russia's 
changed attitude, and the dissensions of the Powers, disregarded 
their mild remonstrances. Hideously false reports of Armenian 
"revolutionary movements" as bein^ at the bottom of the whole 
trouble were prepared at the Porte for Russiar oonsunr tlon. 
Kver dreading revolts within their frontiers,the St. Petersburg
(1
(2 
(8
Ibid. No.l»9.
Parl. Reports. Turkey No.l. (1896) No.133 
Ibid. No.139.
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Government readily accepted these "explanations." simultaneously 
Turkey threatened England with throwing herself into the anna of 
Russia, and meanwhile revelled in her unutterable atrocities, 
which even spread to Constantinople itself. "I sea in iy 
mind that wretched Sultan, whom God has given as a cirrse to 
mankind, waving his flag in triumph and the adversaries at hla 
feet are Russia, France, and England," wrote Gladstone to 
Mme. Novlkov• '
All this proved the futility of th Cyprus Convention, 
and much blame la to be placed upon the shoulders of Russia. 
A complete departure was made from >IOT» crusading traditions of 
1876, in her refusal to uphold t*e EuBOpean Concert. The fear 
of revolt in the Caucasus and tine "personal repugnance" of the 
Taar formed bad excuses for non-intervention when vlewad in 
Labanov's very worda t^at "something must b^ done." But the 
suplneness of th-3 St. Petersburg Government paled greatly before 
the hideous slaokness or failure of the German Government to 
oheck the Armenian massacres. For since 1878, their Inflwanoe 
over Turkey hnd greatly Increased, while that of England and 
Russia steadily declined. Further excesses ensued, but more 
determined pressure of the Powers immediately prompted the issue 
of an irade^by the sultan on October 17th. This formally
(1) Oct. 22nd, 1895.
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approved of a schema of reforms whl-jh the Powers had previously 
drawn up in May. in p-romisinr to oarry out these faithfully, 
th^5 Sultan informed the British ambassador at Constantinople, he 
considered "the question was now finally closed."* '
Hlo slowness to taKe more vigorous action in Armenian
 
matters was explained by Lord Salisbury at the Guildhall on 
November 9th, 1895. For he feared showing partiality towards 
the Christians against the Moslems. "The Queen is mistress of 
more Muhamraadans than the sulti* of TurKey and we should have 
been neglecting our duty if we had allowed oir selves to appear 
as the ^artisans of the one religion against the other."( 2 ) The 
British Government was believed in Russia to have been actuated 
ly motives of self interest in advocating intervention on 
behalf of the Armenians. Hostile vapourings had exudod from 
the official Russian "Messarsr" of October 29th, but these were 
later denied by the Tsar's Government as being without their 
inspiration.
in 1898, Russia at first continued her policy of 
steadfast refusal to interfcflre in Armenia. But towards the end 
of the year she Joined the Powers in demanding reform for the 
Christians. Nevertheless certain sections of the Russian 
newspaper world continued to attaoK England. "The It. Peters-
(1) Parl. Reports. Turkey No.l. (1898) No.203.(2) Ann. Rer. 1895, p.190.
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burg Gazette" for example, wrote aa follows:- "The troubles 
produced by Englishmen In the Armenian provinces... had the 
future object of the establishment of direct communication 
between India and the Mediterranean by landM 1 ' The friendly 
visit of the Tsar and Tsarina to Queen Victoria at Balmoral, 
however, proved that little misunderstanding existed between tine 
two Governments. At the Lord Mayor's Banquet at the Guildhall 
on November 9th of this year Salisb^ *y f s speech indicated the 
same sentiment, "The discussions we have had with lussla are... 
the most oonolae of all (foreign relations) In which we have 
engaged. It is therefore, I thlnfc, a stperstltion of an 
antiquated diplomacy that there is any necessary antagonism 
between Russia and Britain."* 2 '
in the same month, however, hints were expressed In 
Russia whereby an Anglo-Fun si an rapprochement might be effected 
in granting the right of free egress for the Tear's warships 
from, the BlacK Sea. The following statement made it 
appearance. "The Russian Government still adheres resolutely 
to... f he clause relating to the Black sea. This olause, far 
from being disadvantageous, is a valuable guarantee to the 
Muscovite Empire. For, though it is an obstacle to the egress
(1) Ann. Reg. 1896, p.392.
(2) Ann. Reg. 1896, p.201.
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of Russian men of war from the Euxine, it constitutes an 
equivalent obstacle to the entrance of foreign ships$ and 
consequently an indirect safeguard for Russia's southern 
coast as well as fop the weafc Black Sea Fleet. On the oth*r 
hand.... in time of peace, vessels with Russian soldiers or 
raianitions of war are at perfect liberty to pass the Dardanelles, 
and Russian ironclads in time of war would.... have little 
difficulty In forcing a passage.... if required.*^ 1 ) But the 
insincerity of this declaration is shown in the concluding 
passage. "The Rusrian Government no more desires the abrogation 
of the clause relating to the BlaoK sea, than the occurrence of 
such events as the deposition of the sultan, or the fall and 
partition of tha ottoman mpire.^ 2 ' It is interesting, 
especially in view of recent similar attempts, to note the boast 
that the »weaK BlaoK Sea Flest* -ould "have little difficulty in 
forcing a passage •thr~u0i the Dardanelles. ^ut nothing 
resulted from these hints.
Finally, regarding Armenia, i f, Is sufficient to say 
that Russia joined Britain and the Powers In October 189°, in 
steps tafcen to redress grievances. For by an lrade f «=s? the 
Sultan promised pardon and due compensation for Armenian officials
(1) and (2) Ann. Reg. 1896, p.395,
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and the repairing of buildings damaged during the reoent troubles 
paolflo advances were also made by the Tsar, not only towards 
Britain, but to the whole world. Such, however, form a fitting 
epilogue to the story of Anglo-Russian relations, but meanwhile 
the attention of both Powers h d bean attracted by events in 
other parts of the world.
I 21
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTION 
OF CENTRAL ASIA,
"The nore powerful Russia becomes in Central Asia, 
the weaker loes England become in India, ant oonsequent.it 
the more amenable in Europe." - General A. Sobolev.
The reasons which guided British politicians in 
their persistent opposition to Russia in the Near Eastern 
Question may be summed up in the single word "India." Each 
successive move southwards of Muscovite expansion was 
regarded as in additional menace to England 1 a Indian possessions 
or to her communications with them, on the other hand, each 
counter-measure taken by Britain in the Levant was calculated 
to safeguard them from possible Russian aggression. In 
taking Cyprus, for example, Lord Be aeons field considered that 
movement not Mediterranean, but Indian.^ But while attempts
were made to "defend India in London", as that statesman 
in effect, Russia became no less formidable in the land4* to
1 See above p."79
(Before Berlin Congress).
the north of that Empire itself.
Until the last few years of the Nineteenth Century, 
Britain and Russia alone of all the Bxaropean countries, oould 
be described as world Powers. For it must be understood that 
before her position in Europe even had been definitely 
consolidated, Russia was a threat Asiatic Power. Before 1*4-63, 
the Russian princes were little more than tax-gannerers, who 
paid homage to the Mogul Khan3 of the Golden Horde. In that 
year Ivan III repudiated his vassalage to the Mogul chiefs, 
while his grandson Ivan the Terrible subdued Astrakhan and 
annexed parta of Siberia to the Russian dominions. Further 
Conquest in Asiatic fields was rendered possible in the 
Sixteenth Century, when the Tsar freely pardoned the Cossacks 
in return for their assistance against the wild tribes across 
the Urals. Only through the services rendered by these 
hardy free-booters, was Russia able to make such difficult 
and extensive conquests in Asia. Completely carried away 
by wonderful tales of riches in the Khivan oasis the Cossacks 
were emboldened early in the Seventeenth Century to explore 
that region and seek booty. Their lust of conquest however, 
brought them to failure and subsequent expeditions ended 
equally disastrously.
During this time, England attempted to trade with 
the khanates of Central A^ia through Russian territory, by
the agency of the English Muscovy Company. For cfwlng to their 
ignorance of the true facts of geography, Englishmen then 
thought a good way to tne Indian Empire of the Great Mogul 
lay overland through Russian  toirilniorw. It is thus strangely 
interesting to think, that Russia who was onco looked upon 
to afford a weans of communication with India, oame later to 
be regarded by Britain when ^he had established her Empire 
there, as her envious and most dangerous opponent.
Further stories of Khivan wealth Induced Peter the 
Great in the Eighteenth Century, to continue the policy of 
Asiatic expansion. But the failure of his expeditions taught 
him the necessity of consolidating efficient bases in the 
Tr^ns-Caspian regions for further operations. The spurious 
*W111 of Pwter the Great" set forth a policy for the conquest 
of India. "Extend the power of Russia to the Indies.......
Bear in mind that the oonmer^e of India is the commerce of 
the world, and he who can exclusively command It is the 
dictator of Europe. 1* 1 Although this document is undoubtedly 
a forgery, it* principles strangely enough, appear later to 
have been followed by Russian commanders.
XAnn. Reg. I#77, p I.
A scheme for the invasion of India through the 
Central Asian fchanates is said to have been considered in 
Catherine II «s reign. No serious attempt was carried out 
however, excepting a few predatory raids against Tartar tribes 
in order to replenish the drained purses of Catherine's 
extravagant court. Thoroughly fascinated by Napoleon, Tsar 
Paul in I8fOI actually projected a joint invasion of India with 
that conqueror. Paul's death ended the schen» but Alexander I 
after the Peace of Tilsit, revived these plans for an expedition 
through Persia. But the French had overreached themselves, 
and Sir Harford Jones the British agent persuaded the Persians 
that Russia was their true enemy. This scheme.therefore was 
not carried into effect.
Such plane, however plausible and grandiose could 
scarcely have been expected to be brought to a successful 
issue, in view of the repeated failures to atorm Khiva. But 
the humiliating defeat of Russia in the Crimean War brought 
no good to England with respect to India. For, thwarted in 
Europe, Russia sought to regain her military prestige across 
the Urals. Here she resumed her career of conquest, in 
applying a counter-irritant to Britain. Her eastward path 
was smoothed by the subjugation of the Caucasusleftfreis^, while 
thirteen years previously Russia had secured control of the
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Gen t
V
N
3
N
/V
U
^\ 
-7
/1
W
 
-
i-
131
lower Jaxartes, 1 But the territory between Port perovsijf 
on that river, and Port Verny on the extreme east was 
oontinually raided by the marauding ^nummm, tribes of 
Tashkent and Kokand, It wr.s naturally incumbent upon the 
Russians to peremptorily terminate the ferment on the frontier 
by attempting the subjugation of these districts .
In 186^ the stronghold of Chim&ent w s successfully 
stormed by the Russian arr» f but the alarm of English 
Russophobes v/as excited. Hitherto, Britain had been busy 
with the Sepoy Mutiny and Governor General Lawrence had 
inculcated the doctrine that "Russia might prove a safer 
neighbour than the wild tribes of Central Asia." But in 
November of that year Gorcha^ov sought to allay British 
apprehensions 2ni explain Russian policy in Asia, by issuing
his famous circular. He declare i that Russia could not
txiLes 
endure the depredations of the Turkomans on her frontiers
any longer. Hence she was obliged unwillingly to pursue her 
conquest southwards till her boundaries became contiguous
with those of a civilised Power, » whose authority would
p guarantee order and tranquillity. »* These were reasonable
arguonentff to ;;rstlfy i/mrsovite expansion. For Russia could 
hard?.?; be expected to fix P farmal limit to her own line of
1. Sir
2. Parl. Reports, reprinted I2th May
advance into lands mainly desert or overrun by wild nomads. 
"Neither in physios nor in politics is the theory of a vacaun 
admissible; and the vacant spaces on the world's map aro 
gradually filled up by the gravitation towards each other of 
the solid political bodies. It vms vain and even unreasonable
«
to suppose that diplomatic protests would retard the subjugation 
by Russia of the wild TurKomans..,.. Between lawless barbarians 
and a regular government, no frontier is tenable or durable. 1* 1 
Besides the^e punitive expeditions were often accompanied by 
great risfcs and hardships. Retreat therefrom would only have 
been regarded as weakness, and probably have necessitated a 
re-entry. For th© Asiatic races on the whole only reapeated 
visible force and the law of club and fang. Indeed Russia's 
position in Central Asia wae similar to that of Britain in the 
Sudan «ome years later.
The thirst for renown of the nussiari generals and
tvi feesTnenthe religious fanaticism of the %uiftumiig5 hovfever, a till sought 
satisfaction despite the conciliatory circulsx of Prince 
Gorchafcoy, For following the fall of CJhrrafcent. General 
Chernaiev took Tashkent, the capital of the Turkomans in 1565, 
contrary to the orders of Alexander II. The proclamation of a 
sacred war of vengeance by the Amir of Bokhara necessitated
ILyall | s Life of Lord Dufferin pp 321 and 359.
further conquest, resulting in trie capture of Kojend in Jnne 
1866. A wedge was thus forced Between Bokhara and Koi-and. 
The Russophobe Sir Henry Rawlinson.in the following month 
indicated in his famous Memorandum to the British Government, 
the nature of this new menace to Indiai Next year General 
Kaufmann was appointed Governor-General of Turkestan. But 
failing to oome to terms wtth the Amir of Bokhara, h© marched 
on Samarkand, 2 which capitulated after an indiscriminate 
slaughter. By a treaty of peace, the Amir became the Tsar § s 
vassal, although he remained still nominally independent. 
This was done despite the assurances of the Russian ambassador 
that the Tsar would not retain his conquest.
Great alarm now possessed many people in England lest 
the Russian tide of conquest should be carried into Afghanistan. 
For with Russia's southern march, that country assumed more 
and more the nature of a buffer state.between British and 
Russian territory. British relations with Afghanistan there- 
fore now became of vital importance, since the security of 
the Indian north-west frontier seemed at stake.
British statesi en formed two distinct schools of 
political opinion, whose frontier policies differed accordingly.
1. Parl. Reports No I Afghanistan (rT7#) No 12 p.31.
2. Th^ 3?-t capital of Tlviur.
Those who viewed the Muscovite advance as a direct menace to 
British India, maintained that Britain should occupy the 
Afghan fortresses of Kabul and Kandahar. In this way, a 
Russian invasion could be checked by a comparatively small 
force holding the narrow mountain passes. The exponents of 
this "forward policy," while not advocating the entire conquest 
of Afghanistan, wished to enlist the Afghans as supporters of 
Britain. This was to be clone by promising them the more 
popular forn of tribal government Instead of the overbearing 
rule .of their Amir. On the whole, they believed in the 
possibility of a Russian invasion of India in view of the 
exploits of Alexander the Great, Tiraur and Nadir Shar. This
was
vlewAs6engttened with the development of the Russian railways 
of Asia.
A much calmer view was taKen by the other school, 
of the Russian advance. This was believed to be a political 
necessity to oheofc TtijikmiijM marauders without any desire for 
the possession of India. For the supporters of this policy 
held that the poverty, pestilence and famine to which that 
country is susceptible, had no attraction for Russia. ?or if, 
in her folly or otherwise, she attacked India they believed
I. See Bruce. "The "Forward Policy" and its results" 
and Colquhoun. "Russia against India," for the 
views of this school.
the triple barrier of mountain wall, parched desert ani almost 
unfordable river would give sufficient protection. They 
advocated a policy of "masterly inactivity," 1 by refraining 
from any advance into the Amir's country. For it was thought 
that such a movenient would replace Afghan friendship 
enmity, while the already onerous finance of India would 
unnecessarily strained. At the same time, the interval between 
the advanced posts and an effective Indian base would be 
dangerously increased, while the distance Russia would have 
to traverse would be correspondingly decreased. Additional 
English garrisons would be necessitated, 2 ani the decreased 
proportion of European to native troops in India itself would 
be more conducive to revolt. The followers of this school 
preferred an independent Afghanistan bound to Britain by ties 
of self interest and benevolent guarantees for aid in case of 
unprovoked attack. In this way they thought Afghanistan would 
serve as an outlying bulwark of Iniia.3
1. This phrase was invented by Lord Lawrenoe the chief 
exponent of this policy,
2. Sikhs and Hindustanis would object to service in 
Afghanistan.
3. See Ool. Hanna's books:-I."Can Russia invade India?"
2."India's "Scientific Frontier," 
where is it, and what is it?"
3."Backwards or forwards?" for 
views of "masterly inactivity,"
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After son» correspondence with the Tsar's Government, 
an understanding was reached on November 1st 1869, between the 
two Powers. It wn agreed that the territory then actually 
held by the Amir Share All, shoull constitute the limits of 
Afghanistan. The British Ooverrunont promised to restrain that 
ruler from attempts of aggression beyond the limits of his 
dominions. Similarly the Russian Government promise! to 
prevent the Amir of Bofchara fron attacking Afghanistan. For 
the Tsar 1 n Cabinet considered Afghanistan ^entirely beyond 
its sphere of action." 1
But between I£69 and 1872 difficulties arose as to 
what constituted the northern limits of Afghanistan. For 
Russia stoutly contested Shore All's claims to the lands 
bordering the Upper oXus. 2 England however championed the 
Amir's cause ani negotiations continued between the two 
Governments. Finally General Kauftnann was instructed to 
investigate the disputed elalms. The resultBof this research 
were to be forwarded to the London Foreign Office, but reliable 
Information wa^ lacking. For difficulties had been increase! 
by the civil war which had transpired before the final 
establishment of Shere All T over rival claimants to the throne.
1. Parl. Reports No 2. Russia (187*0 No 2.
2. Or Ariu Darya.
By October 17t.h IS72, Granvllle oould wait no longer. "In 
consideration 1 ' both for the maintenance of peace and for the 
removing of all causes of raisunderstending*, he requested a 
speedy settlement. "After carefully examining all the evidence 
before them," the British Government thought "the right of the 
Amir,,..to the territories up to the Oxua as far as KhQja Saleh 
.... were fully established. 11 These -egions included Wakhan, 
Badalfahan, Afghan. Turkestan, and the districts around Akoha, 
Ankol, Shlbarghan, Sar-i-pul, and Maimena. Further, the 
English Cabinet considered the Amir "would have the right to 
defend these territories if attacked." On the other hand they 
declared "their determination to remonstrate strongly with the 
Amir should he,... overstop these limits." Finally Granvllle 
reguested "an explloit recognition of the rights of the Amir... 
which Bokhara herself admits to be his," and *an assurance that 
the territorial integrity of Afghanistan will be respected by 
those states....which are amenable to the influence of Russia." 1
Meanwhile Gorohakolf received Kaufmann«s report, and 
accordingly sent a reply based on its conclusions to Granvllle 
on December 19th. He considered the nor-them Afghan boundary 
extended from the confluence of the ox\w with fche tributary 
Kokoha, to Khofla Saleh. But he thought the northeastern region* 
of Badaljphan and vmfchan, Independent and outside the limits of
I. parl. Reports No I. Afghanistan (I#7S) No 20A, p loi, and 
inolosures for whole negotiations, (reprint).
SHere All 1 3 sovereignty. Kauffcaann considered it unwise to 
incorporate these territories with Afghanistan, but advocated 
their formation into fta barrier interposed between the northern 
and southern states of Central AAla." "This, strengthened by 
the combined action which Britain and Russia are able to bear 
upon... such states as are accessible to their influence, would 
effectually prevent any dangerous contact and ...secure...the 
peace of those countries. 11 Doubts were oast by Kaufmann on the 
de facto possession of the Amir, of Afcoha, An&ol, Shlbarghan, 
Sar-i-pul and Malraona. Nevertheless if the British Government 
insisted upon Shore All's clafems, "the Imperial Cabinet would 
be disposed T. ... to accept the line laid down in Lord Oranville1 s 
despatch. 1*
In addition. Count Shuvaloy "a statesman enjoying the 
confidence of the Swperor of Russia, tt was aent to England on 
January afth IS73 to explain Russian polloy in Central Asia. 
Regarding the Afghan boundaries, Shuvalov considered "the 
question ought not...to ruffle the good relations between the 
two countries." The Tsar complied with Britain's requests, 
excepting "the point regarding the provinces of Badaltahan and 
Wafchan." However Alexander II was "determined that such.., 
should not be a cause of difference between the two oountries.»- 
But the Count, as w!3,l be seen later, had really come to London 
to discuss a more important matter fro$ the Russian point of 
viow.
Sinoe Russia still contested the claims to Badaifehan 
and Wafchan, Granville sent a further despatch to St Petersburg 
dated January s^th 1873. He more vigorously pressed Shere Al^s 
case, and promised his Government would "impress on the Amir 
in the strongest terras, the advantages given him11 if Russia 
aoquisoed in his claims,"and the consequent obligation to 
abstain from any aggression on his part." Lastly, the Russian 
Government was advised to "weigh these considerations dis­ 
passionately" and help in "putting an end to tha wild 
speculations... that there i« aorro marked disagreement between 
England and Russia." 1
A most conciliatory reply oan» from prince Goroha&ov 
on January 5Isti. "Considering the difficulty experienced in 
establishing the racts" concerning Badatfohan and wafchan, "and 
the greater I'soilities the British Government possaases for 
collecting preoiso data... we accept the line of boundary laid 
by England." Russia moreover was "the more inclined" to give 
way, as Bngland engaged *to use her influence with Shere All... 
to Maintain a peaceful attitude, (and) insist on his giving up 
all measures of aggression." Gorohafcov recognised this as »a 
real guarantee for the maintenance of peace," and repeatedly 
declared the Amir to be "under the protection of the Indian 
Government." 2 Little value was placed by Shere All however,
1*2. Parl. Reports. Nol. Afghanis tan ISJS. No 21 22 and r> 101. 
Also Annual Register I#73. Appendix. State papers/p,221.
upon these great services rendered by British diplomacy on 
behalf. For England had persistently withheld a guarantee for 
the continuance of his line off the Afghan throne. 1 For the 
Gladstone Government then in power evinced no desire of meddling 
with the Internal complexities of Afghanistan. Prom this time 
forth, the Amir entertained overtures of Russian commanders f 
for the guarantee of his succession. Lord Nofcthtorook had 
reproached the Amir for impristonlng his son Yakut Khan to 
whom he owed his throne. But the Russian general then on the 
Kabul frontier had congratulated him upon having under lock 
and key so dangerous a rival. "You are not a kind antf 
grateful father* said the one. »You are a wise ruler* said 
the other. Comparing the two letters which had arrived in 
Kabul within a few hours of each other f Shore Ali found the 
Russian congratulation more to his taste than the English 
admonition. Nevertheless hi** agent tried to frighten Lord 
Northbrook the Indian viceroy into concluding a treaty, by
*
pointing towards a projected. luseian attack on Khiva.
But the British Ministers were already aware of this 
intended movement, for which Shuvalov ha'd been sent by the Tsar 
to prepare and reassure them. It was also in anticipation of a 
Khivan oawpaign that oorohakov soon afterward* humoured the 
British Cabinet by conceding to their demands respecting the
I. parl.Reports. Afghanistan No I.(1875) p.if.
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northern Afghan frontier, on the occasion of his mission in 
January 1573, Shuvalov stated the full reasons for the Intended 
expedition against Khiva. These were %to punish acts of 
brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teaoh 
the Khan that suoh conduct on his part could not be continued 
with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him 
to believe." It was furtner, "not only far from the intention 
of the Emperor to tafce possession of Khiva, but positive orders 
had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the 
conditions imposed should ... not in any way lead to a prolonged 
occupancy." Shuvalov than expressed the Tsar 1 a surprise at the 
uneasiness in England and hoped Granvllle would give "positive 
assurances" to Parllarnent on the matter. That minister infonned 
the Count of I»ord Northbrook's advice to the Khan of Khiva to 
comply with the Tsar's reasonable demands. Nevertheless, "if 
the expedition we^e undertaken... with the ob|eot and within 
the limits dffscribed,..* it would meet with no remonstrance 
from Her Majesty *•* Government, but would undoutotedly excite 
public attention." 1
For some time Russia had been preparing to settle old 
scores with Khlvaf for in I#69 the port of Krasnovodsfc on the 
Caspian had been occupied to serve as a base for subsequent
I. Parl, Reports Afghanistan No I*(I37#) p.ioi.
Ann. Reg ier/3. Appendix stato Papers, p.221,
operations. In ISJI the Khlvan oasis had been successfully 
penetrated by the Intrepid SKobelev and three Cossaofcs disguised 
as merchants. General Mar&as ov reached the same spot the 
following year f and obtained valuable information. Besides its 
very situation between Samarkand and Bofchara on the east, r.nd 
the Trans-Oaspian provinces on the west, rendered Khiva a 
coveted entrance for all commercial routes to Central Asia.
In the early spring of I #73 therefore, Russia entered 
upon her Khivan expedition with the equanimity afforded by 
oranville*s assurances. Under General Kaufteann's directions 
five converging columns marched from Orenburg, Fort perov»yrf 
Tashkent, ftrasnovodafc and another point on tho Caspian. 
Disaster overtook the two last-named, but the others simul­ 
taneously met and carried KMva by storm on June 10th, Peace 
was made with th^ Khan by a treaty whereby he 'declared hlroself 
"the obedient servant of the Emporor of all the Russians. 11 
All rights of making war or pr^.oe without Ruesian consent were
renounced and Khiva beoait* practically a Muscovite protectorate.
As Iiord oranville had warned Shuvalcv, the Russian 
suooess caused some uneasiness In Brltainf especially in view 
of the prolonged ocoiipation of the Tsar 1 ® troops. Ax^prehenslons 
lest the tide of conquest should pass through Merv Into 
Afghanistan, were entertained by Shere All. But the Viceroy
I. Parl. Reports Russia No 2.
assured hire on June 27 th with these words. »We have abstained 
from entering any treaty engagement to give support by British 
troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked. Yet the 
complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the 
interests of British India that the Government... could not look 
upon an attack..* with indif fere nee .a* Although the St 
Petersburg "Kessager Official" of November 30th gave further 
reasons for the Russian stay at Khiva, Qranville thought it 
expedient to again approach the Russian Government on January 
7th I #7*1-. He was »not dl«po«ed to share in tha exaggerated 
apprehensions.., as to the darker to India which may arise from 
the extension of Russian influence. 11 But he thought it 
desirable to arrive at "a clear and ffcanX understanding. . . as 
tg *ha relative points of British and Russian interests in 
A£:Uu« Granviilc then related the uneasiness of Share All as 
r\nioi:rs of v. Russian expedition to Merv IP the near future were 
then current. P^r the Anir feared last his dominions would be 
open to the demands of Russian officers, if the Turcomans
2sought refuge in Afghanistan.
on January I9thf prince Ooroha&ov informed Lord Loftus 
the British ambassador, that «the Imperial commander had
1. parl. Reports No I. Afghanistan (I$7#) p. 105,
2. Parl. Reports xio 2. Russia (187^). Ho 2.
strictly abstained from reTnainlnr in occupation of Khiva, 
although requested to do so by the Khan for his own protection." 
Nevertheless he was "obliged to occupy such a position... to 
maintain pea^e and order." 1 With regard to Shere All's fears. 
Prince oorohafcov repeated, two days later, Russia*s pledge that 
Afghanistan was "entirely beyond her sphere of action." The 
Tsar moreover, hat "no intention of undertaking an expedition
p
against the Turkomans" of Merv. Additional assurances were 
afforded on January 25th,^ while Kauflaan himself promised Shere 
All that "no Russian officer ^voul i interfere with the affairs 
of Afghanistan."^ How Ion this condition held good will be 
seen later.
But these statements by no means southed the English 
Russophobes, For tidings cane in May that a Russian expedition
from Krasnovolsfc had set out to explore the old bed of the Oxus
5 in the regions of Khiva. Its alleged object was to ascertain
whether a waterway could be made joining the Caspian and Aral 
Seas, which would holp to secure Merv in the future. Although 
the adventure proved a failure, reports reached the British
1. Parl.Reports No I. Central Asia (I#7#) Nos I # 3.
2. Parl.Reports No 2. Russia (IS?M No 2.
£. Parl.Reports No I. Central Asia (I8"f%) No **-.
4. Parl.Reports No I. Central Asia {I8^8) Nos 5*6.
5. Parl.Reports No I. Central Asia (18J%) Nos I7,I#f &23*
/Foreign Office that General Loroafcin had demanded the submission 
of the Atrafc tribes on the Persian frontier. Lord Loftus the 
British charged 'affaires at St Petersburg however, - 
informed of the inaccuracy of this news in November
4
Towards the and of that year, Beneral Kauftfiann Issued 
a warning to the Turkoman nomads against harrying the border- 
lands of Russian territory. This was regardot by the new anti- 
Russian Cabinet of Disraeli as only a ne / pretext for further 
Muscovite encroachments. Groat alarm was raised by the 
supporters cf the H forward policy* under the leadership of sir 
Bartle Prere. At his instance the famous "Bartle Frere Note" 
advising precautionary measures in Afghanistan was presented to
pthe Oovernraent on January Ilth I#75. It was proposed to send 
Lritlsh Military agents to Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. In 
addition the occupation of Quetta by British forces to overawe 
the chief conmrunloations between Central Asia and India was 
recommended. Fascinated by these proposals, the Government 
urged Lord Northbrook to mafce overtures to Shere All to these 
ends* on January 22ncU Tne Amir flatly refused, for owing to 
the non-fiUArantee of his line of succession, he had gradually 
leaned towards Ruesla*
1. parl. Reports No I. Central Asia (I#7S) Nos I7,Ig,& 23.
2. parl. Reports No I. Afghanistan IS7# p. 107.
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But the Russian Government hid meanwhile been watching 
these proceedings, ant on March I9th f Shuvalov called upon Lori 
Derby. The Russian ambassador sounded the Pordign Secretary 
as to whether England would advance through Afghanistan "in the 
direction of the Russian possessions." Lord Darby deprecated 
such a movement as bringing "only increased cost anl trouble 
without advantage." It win only probable "in the event of any 
Russian movement tending to the occupation of Merv.» England, 
he further asserted, only desired "the maintenance of the status 
QUO, and certainly would not be thf» first to take aggressive 
steps." Finally, Lord Eerb?/ conclusively denied the rumoured 
exportation of British firearms to the Chinese provinces of
Kashgar and Yarkard for uso againat Russia, to the satisfaction
i 2^ of Count Shuvalov*. '
Reports of more expeditions by Russian scientists to 
Kokand near the Afghan frontier again caitosed tho British 
Foreign Minister to negotiate with St Petersburg. But Oorchakov 
hastened to reassure him by a despatch dated April 5th, "His 
Imperial Majesty has no Intention of extending the frontiers 
of Russia either on the side of Bokhara or Krosnovodsk and the 
Atrak*... on the contrary the Emperor deems any extension*..* 
in those psivts to be opposed to our interests. But we shall
(1) pirl.Reroort* NO 1. Central Asia (!&]$) Nos 12, llf. 16.
(2) Ibid No 26.
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cause those frontiers to be respected.... and punish any acts
  1) 
of violence in such a manner as to prevent their re-ocaurenoe."
But ratAer suggestive hints were uttered by Baron Jomlni in St 
Petersburg to a British official in June, Regarding the 
possibility of the English and Russian dominions becoming 
contiguous, he spoKe to this effoot.«lf Russia lived at peace 
with her frontiers reaching to Austria and Germany, why should 
the fact of her territory touching....India be a reason for 
warfare?"' 2 ) Again ho expressed a &onth later these sentiments. 
»If England found it to her interest to annex Afghanistan,... 
the Russian Government would not regard it as a menace to them, 
nor would they endeavour to prevent it. Therefore they cannot 
comprehend why the future absorption of Bokhara and Kokand 
should raise such alarm In the minds of Englishmen."(3)
These statements were intended to prepare the British 
Government for a Russian punitive expedition to Xo&and, of which 
the »Invalide Rus^o" of Au£uat 27th gave notloo.( ^ Baron 
Jomini confirmed itti aesertlonn osrly In September and a Russian 
force* was despatched under S&obelev and Kaufwann, Successful 
ridsiilta onsued, wheroby all except the southern portion of 
Kokand waa annexed to Russia. In Gotobeyaeneral Kaufmann made
(1) Ibid No 28.
(243) P&r1 - Heports. Central Asia No 1. (1#7#) Nos 33 ftj.) ditto No 39,
the following proclamation to the Inhabitants. "A war against 
the White Tsar, the dispenser of peace and prosperity of all 
his subjects Is a aIn, and God will always be against those 
who take up arms against the Russians. 1^ ^
Meanwhile the concealed correspondence between 
General Kaufiiann ani She"e All which began three years 
previously became very amicable. »The friendship of Russia and
Afghanistan will increase and become firm* wrote the Russian
' P ) to the Anir in September X#75/ * The alienation of Shere All
from England for reasons previously stated, moreover helped 
Russia in her Central Asian policy9 because that ruler no 
longer conplalnad to th© Indian ftovernraent. British opposition 
to Russia in European affairs further caused that Power to seek 
revenge elsewhere. To ^hln endf and In order to impress the 
Amir of the invincibility of the Oraat tfhlte Tsar, an 
opportunity was found by Kiaaoovlto of^ioera In Kokand.
For In jamuiry 1^76 ? a significant despatch foreboding 
future operations wa? publish©:?.. ?Ms «.tatad ^,hat the Russians 
11 apprehending another attack from the xmannexed portion of 
Kokand are preparing: to cross the Jaxartea..., Tho carrpaign 
will probably o-orttwnce about t.ne middle of January and .... is 
likely to reault in the annexation of Souther:. Koiar.ci ^f
(1) parl. Reports. Central Asia No 1. (ISJ8) no. 52,(2) Parl, Reports. Central Asia No 1. (1378) no 5*. inolosure
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which Russia an« Afghanistan will be neighbours."* ' This 
campaign was brought to a successful is^u© by General Kaufteann, 
and achieved the ostensible object of reinstating the Khan of 
Bokhara after a "revolt." Immediately this waa done however, a 
convenient deputation of natives arrive! announcing they "pre- 
ferred the rule of the Tsar." Accordingly all Kokand was 
annexed to the Russian Empire under its ancient name of Farghana
2 on February 15th 1^76. Moat significant is Kauftsan^s self-
laudatory report of the campaign in a letter to Shore All, which 
waa found in 1381.
Excepting those parts south of Khiva, all Central Asia 
north of Afghanistan up to the Chinese frontier was now under 
the power of the Russian Emperor. Russia held the pivoted 
position of Asia, and the necessity for a definite arrangement 
with Afghanistan became more evident to the British Government. 
On February 25th, Lord fcytton the new Viceroy offered the Amir 
an increased yearly subsidy of money and arms, and a recognition 
of a de faoto but nojfcJB^de Jure order of succession. Military aid 
wan also promised against foreign invaders in a clear case of 
unprovoked attack." In return, "undisputed access" was demanded 
to certain strategic points in Afghanistan for English officers.
(1) Ann. Rer. 1^76. :>P 239 -$B) parl. Reports. Central Asia No 1. (1818) Nos 62, 6*f, 65.(3) parl. Reports. Central Asia No 1. (1S#1) py 13 - jV
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This one-sided offer was scornfully rejected by Shere All* 
Meanwhile, Kaufmann*s intimacy increased as the gulf between 
the Amir and the British Government widened, on October I2th, 
Lord Derby remonstrated with Shuvalov regarding Kauftnann's 
negotiations with Shere Ali and objected to the reported 
presence of t*» Russian agents at Kabul. Shuvalov w,a3 further 
reminded of Russia 1 a previous assurances th°t Afghanistan was 
not within her political sphere. Such reports were repudiated 
strongly by Count 8huvalov})for it subsequently app»«aed that 
Kaufmann's overtures to Shere Ali were not officially known 
at St Petersburg. Later on November IJth however, when 
questioned by the British ambassador at St Petersburg, M. de 
Qiers made the following semi-admission. There was "no question 
of General Kaufmann entering into political communication with 
the Amir of Afghanis tab, nor,., the remotest idea of any treaty 
engagements 11 In that general*s letters, The»e were »simply a 
matter of courtesy.". Further reports of a airnilar nature 
were likewise clenledC 2 ^
But In December, Shere All 1 * chagrin and irritation 
were further increased. For on December #th Lytton concluded 
the Treaty of Jacobabad with the Khan of Khelat in Balukistan.
(1) parl. Reports. Central Asia No 1. (1&7S) NOS 71 - 7lf, 76.
(2) Parl. Reports Central A*la No 1, (1373) Nos 27, 91 - 93.
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Suffioe it to say that Britain thereby obtainet military access 
to various strategic points, Including Quetta^*^whlch out- 
flanfcel the Amir 1 a dominions. More reports came to hand of 
the presence of Russian envoys at Kabul, and on February Jth
1#77 the India Office reject©! the previous "explanations 11 of
(2.\ M. de Glers; ' Lord Iiytton in addition brought matters to a
crisis by refusing any further subsidies unless Shore Ali 
immediately aoquised in the demands made twelve months 
previously. That ruler's rejoinder caise in the precipitation 
of a small rising of the tribes on the north-west frontier 
of India; but it was easily suppressed.
Meanwhile in Europe English politicians were still 
opposing Russia's policy with regard to the ottoman dominions. 
To provide a cpuntar-provooation, General Lomafcin was despatched 
in the early spring of 18JJ against the Akfcal Tefcfces near the 
Persian boundary. Already by March 22ni their submission to 
the Russian leader was reported*, ^ / but their conquest was not 
quite completed. Rumours that Merv was endangered, necessitated 
a despatch from Lord Derby to the St Petersburg Government on 
June l^th. He hoped that fcomafcin would not unnecessarily 
menace that region, nor r,he state of Afghanistan. "Whatever
(3) parl. Reports. Afghanistan No 1. (18J8) No 5# p.225 and 
Central Jsia and Quetta No 2. (13TJ9).
(2) Parl. Reports. Central Asia No 1.(1SJ8) Nos 95,97,99.
(3) parl. Reports, Central Asia(No 1) laryaf NO 106.
may be the ultimate destiny of Russia in Central Asia, it la 
impossible not to see.,, that each successive alva toe of the 
Russian frontier towards Afghanistan may involve complications 
whloh it is equally that Interest of both England an;l Russia 
to avoid. This Is an object to whloh Her Majesty's Government 
attach the highest importance and reserve... complete liberty 
of action under all future contingencies... to secure it. 1^ 1 ) 
The Russian forces however, kept within short distance of the
Caspian Sea, and on July 19thf Mr Thomson the British agent
( 2} in Persia reported their capture of Kizil Arvad.
The year l&JZ was truly "a tumultuous year* as Mr 
Gladstone called It; and events in Central Asia were almost as 
critical a* those which toofc place in Europe. Russians and 
British were at this time facing en/»h other in battle-array on 
either side the Golden Horn with hesitant expectancy, war 
appeared imminent and the crafty Kaufmann and the discontented 
Shere All were not slow in taking mutual advantage of the
situation. For the Amir wholly threw himself into the arms of
(3) Russia, and on March £th f tt» first definite reports of a
Russian mission to Kabul were received in London, Next month 
came Beaconfield«s raomentovis etrc&e in ordering tho Indian 
regiments to proceed to Malta. But while Britain thus
(1) ibid No 112.(2) ibid No 117.(3) parl. Reports No 1, Central Asia (18J8) No 129.
brandished India in the face of Rifcssia as a means of offence, 
it was natural for Rusr>ia in anticipation of further ooraplloa- 
tions in Europe, to endeavour to procure their return. On May 
29th, the Russian journal «Mir" suggested the occupation of 
Merv and Herat the "key of India,» in the event of war with 
England. Again on June 2^th, the presence of Muscovite officials 
in the Amir*s dominions was reported to the British Foreign 
Office. ' During the same month a letter, of which the following 
formed part, was sent by Kaufmann to Shere Ali. "In these days 
the relationn between the British Government and ours with 
regard to your kingdom require your deep consideration.... I 
have deputed ray agent Major-General stolietev..., to inform 
you of all that is hidden in my mind..,. The advantages of a 
close alliance with the Russian Government will be permanently 
evident. "( 2 *
In response to the British ambassador^ inquiries at 
St Petersburg, M. da Gisrs oa July j>i»d denied that any "mission 
had been or was i7ittindect to be sent to Kabul either by the 
Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann."(3) Nevertheless, 
on June 13th previously,while the Berlin Congress was first 
meeting to restore peace to Europe, Stolietev had left Samar- 
kand at the head of a Russian mission to the Amir. It appears
(1) ibid. Wo. 136.(2) Parl, Reports No 1. Central Asia (1#&1) No 1 inolosure
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(3) parl. Re-oorts No 1. Central Asia (1*7?) No
moreover that it was supported by three columns of Muscovite 
troops who were to maXe a military demonstration against India 
in accordance with Skobelev«s plans which appeared in the 
"Journal de St Petersburg" the same month. Each column was to 
march respectively from Tashkent to Kabul, Kojend to the Punjab: 
and Bokhara to Merv and Herat; 1 ' on July 22nd Stolletev and his 
eaoort arrived at Kabul^ 2 )where they remained till the end of 
August. Although nothing is officially Known, nevertheless 
there are very good grounds for believing that a treaty was 
signed between Sl:ere All and the Russian envoyi^) Its chief 
terms ccmxriaod the "permanent and perpetual friendship" of 
Russia for the Amir, who was guaranteed the Tsar's recognition 
of any heir apparent he chose, Russia promised to assist Shere 
All in repelling any foreign invader, while he in return 
undertook to inform Kaufmann of all important matters and not 
mafce war without his consent. But as the Berlin Treaty had 
sln^e been signed, the scheme for invading India was frustrated, 
and Stolietev was warned to "abstain from any proceeding un- 
friendly to England."'  
In reply to British inquiries, M. de Oiers told the 
English ambassador on August 13th as follows. "Everything has
(1)Parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (Itf/g) No I*f2 and
(2)Parl. Reports No 1. Afghanistan (18J8) Nos 39 - i|
(3)See Parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (1SS1) pt> 17 -
also Ann. Reg. IStfl pp 163 - ^» 
(if)Parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (1831) No 5.
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been stopped - the political as well as t,h© military precautions
f i * which we thought ourselves Justified in taking against you." 1 ;
Comparing these words with his "assurances" given the previous 
month, the duplicity of M. da Olers was revealed. This was 
rendered all the more glaring, as telegraphic communications 
were already open between St Petersburg and Samarkand. It is 
difficult to understand why definite orders were not sent to 
Kaufraann to prevent Stolletev'a departure, and canoel the 
proposed Russo-Afghan alliance. The "Oolos" on August 13th 
contained the following significant passage. "It is thought 
that the first object (of the mission) is to elucidate the 
question whether the Anilr will or will not give his adhesion 
to Russian policy. In the first oase, the Russians will
steadily advance on the gates of India; in the second case,
(2) General Kauftoann will proceed to subdue Afghanistan."
*
Oreat consternation was felt at London on the receipt 
of this news, for Kaufmann*a advance towards Afghanistan as a 
friend or otherwise was in Itself most serious, bord Salisbury 
in a despatch to St Petersburg on August 19th recapitulated in 
strong terms Russia 1 s assurances previously given as to 
Afghanistan bein^ outside hor sphere. He stated that Britain 
could not loo* with inditre.~enee upon recent Muscovite activity
(1)Parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (1&J8) No 150,(2)Parl. Reports NO 1. Oentral Asia (187$) No 151.
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in Central Asia and demanded the withdrawal of the Russian 
envoy from Kabul! 1 ^ It now beoarne a question of British friction 
with either Russia or Afghanistan, but in view of the recent 
"peace with honour11 the latter seoniod preferable. But a 
further attempt to regain Shore All's confidence in Britain was 
made. His feelings were tested by sending a British mission 
to Kabul as a retort to that of Stolletev; 2 '
Meanwhile early in Saptenber, further news of a were 
official nature reached England, concerning StolieteiMs 
misslom*' But a more reasonable view wa^now entertained by 
Lord Salisbury, as his 'lespatoh of September 13th to the Russian 
capital shows. Ka recognised that "the dispositions of the 
Imperial Government in Central Asia were affected by the
political conditions in which Russia was placed by....England 
during the late crisis in the East." But Salisbury also held
that the fonner Russian pledges touching Afghanistan were atill
(**•) 
valid. This was later admitted by the Russian ambassador in
London, but he denied allegations that the Tsar himself( '•*) 
corresponded with Shere All.' ' An interesting conversation
( l)parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia(lS7#) No 1^2 air.« Ann.Reg. 
( 2)?arl, Reports Mo I. Afghanistan (137S)Nos^5 - ^7, (1373 p 
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took place at Baden on September 27th between Gorchafcov and 
Lord Loftus who was on his way to St Petersburg. The Russian 
Chancellor professed ignorance of current events anl stated 
that Stolibetev's errand was "purely one of courtesy and of a 
provisional nature, which the Tsar was unwilling to forego. 
»Bo not forget,* aald he, "that the Emperor is independent 
Sovereign Ruler over eighty million subjects.* "Our Gracious 
Sovereign the Queen,* replied Iioftus, »is ruler over nore than 
two hundred million subjects.* »Ye«s« retorted Gorchafcov, 
"but --.hey are dispersed and scattered - the Russian Empire is 
orje and unltt>ti»* Tfl© Russian statesman nevertheless, admitted 
irilltary preparations had been made in view of a possible 
Anglo-Russian var,
Meanwhile the British Government learned the true 
attitude of Shere All* for tiie British mission under Sir 
Kevill* Oharaberialn was turned back from the Khyber Pass on 
Sept ember 22nd by the Amir's cffloe»a. Shore All's son had
meanwhile died, and a month's mourning was observed in which
(2) all Afghan affairs of state were suspended. Although the
Russian emissaries were received within that tliae, those of
C Britain wero refused even Mien the days of mourning were over.
This deliberate rebuff left no other alternative but the recall 
of Lord Lytton or the invasion of Afghanistan. The Calcutta
(1)parl. Reports No 1. Afghanistan (1575) Nos ^9,52,& 5^.(2)Parl. Reports No 1. Afghanistan (1X7*) No 50.(3)Parl. Reports No !  Afghanistan (Iff/af) Noo 55,5^1*59.
correspondent of the "Tiiree" wrote as follows. "War would be 
an evil of infinitely less gravity than Russian influence in 
Kabul..., The Amir is but the puppet, while Russia stands 
behind as the deus ex maohina. . . . . To do nothing would be to 
surrender Afghanistan to Russia,.,, and to allow the gateway 
of India to. pass into the hands of a rival, and possibly 
unfriendly Power..... Russia may extend herself as she pleases 
in another direction, but she must leave Afghanistan alone. 
i: -he Au'lr is not *«isll;le ef the danger which he is courting
by his intifcvisy wit:/ .au*sif. f y$ must be wise for him and for
\ \
''ft3 r*?anwhile were abroad that England wished 
to come 1,0 amicable terraB with the Moslem Amir of Afghanistan 
through the mediation of the friendly Porte. Kwfmann 
extended the following advice to She re All regarding this 
subject on October tfth. "The enerrr/ c? your famous religion 
v/ants to ma&e» ^aee with you through the Sultan..,. Be wise 
as * *er>ent ^nc' haiiAe - :;r> ae a love... Ma&e peace openly and 
in searesi- i^i^rai'^ for v-vr, :.rd vl?en God reveala His order to 
you, declare yourself. T7h6n the envoy of your enemy wants to 
enter the country, ... send an able emissary. . . full of deceit 
... to perplex the enen^s mind and induce hira to give up the 
intention of fighting with ycu.»^ e ' Truly the very Devil can
1)Ann. Heg. 1#7# p. 136 - 8.
2)Parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (1581) No 1. inclosure
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quote Scripture for his purpose! At onoe Shore Ali wrote to 
Kaufmann telling him to expect before long a war between 
Britain and Afghanistan, and asked for Russian assistance in 
that eventuality. Later in October, the Russian general 
advised the Amir to immediately come to terms with Britain, 
but this counsel was unheeded! 1 ^
Different views on the Afghan crisis appeared in 
both British and Russian newspapers. The "St Petersburg News? 
believed Russia would not be Involved In the war that; #as now 
imminent. "Owr Government will probably not interfere in the 
struggle between Shore Ali and England. An alliance between 
Afghanistan ani Russia is indispensable to Shere All who 
desires to feel secure as regards ?i.v*ftia in his war with 
England. Such an alliance by no i^eans compromises the relations
( 0\between Britain and Russl?. 11 * ' A letter from St Petersburg 
to the Berlin "Kreuszeitimg" donie l that Russian officers were 
periodically "commissioned to set Afghanistan against England." 
Their object was solely in the interests of "friendship and 
commerce. 11 Moreover the Russian mission was "too small to 
inspire fear," while that of Britain was "far too numerous for 
friendly purposes. 8 In the ovent of war, Russia 1 s attitude 
was further defined. "As England supplied Turkey in the last
1)parl. hearts No 1. Central Asia (l£#l)No l.inolosure 35
2)Ann. Reg. ISIS p. 1*K>. page^ 18 - 19.
Eastern \var f so Ruanln will throw no obstacles fcn the way of 
Russian foreign traders who may wish to sell rifles or cannons 
to the Afghans. Russia will do nothing against England unless 
indeed, she should be attacked by her, when energetic reprisals 
may be expected, "f 1 * In a letter to the "Daily Newsf Lord 
Lawrence refuted the idea of Russia's purely cojmnercial dealings 
at Kabul, and explained Muscovite policy thus. "Doubtless in 
contracting the alliance with Turkey, in occupying Cyprus, 
and in telling the whole world that we were ready to bar the 
way of Russia to the Armenian border, we did a good deal to
aggravate the Russians, They are now paying us off... by
/ ?\ irritating us in Afghanistan."* '
An ultimatum was sent to Shore Ali, and war was 
declared on November 20th as no satisfactory reply was returned.. 
Ueanwliile Lord Beaoonsfield at the Guildhall Banquet of 
November 9th had asserted that the Government entertain© l no 
apprehensions as to a possible invasion of the north-west 
frontier of India. Nevertheless It was a "hap-hazari ;n.nd not 
a scientific frontier." But, the Government had made 
"arrangerrents by which when completed,.., all anxiety of the
( IMnorth-west frontier of India will be remove!." v ' The Premieres 
critics eagerly siezed upon the phrase "scientific frontier."
(1)Ann. Reg, 18JS page
(2)Ann. Reg. Iff/ST page
(3)parl. Reports No 1. Afghanistan (1£7#) Nos 65,66 & 88.
(4)Ann. Reg. 181$ page 156.
Iti
Mr Gladstone especially expressed himself puzzled - as to how 
a frontier could be "hap^hazaayd and not scientific" if an 
invasion therefrom were not practicable. Besides the necessity 
of «a scientific frontier" was not of exceptional importance 
until the possibility of a Russ6**Afghan invasion was conceivable 
For when Shere Ali as England*s friendf and showed no 
Inclinations towards Russia, the question was of far less 
importance. Had the oladstone Government given a de jure and 
not merely a de facto recognition of Shore Ali*s succession, 
Afghanistan might still have been a bulwark instead of an 
enemy, against Russian encroachments. If the Beaconsfleld 
Ministry on the other hand, had credited Russia with better 
intentions in Eastern Europe, the situation which precipitated 
the Afghan war need not have arisen.
Mr Gladstone strongly criticised the Governments 
action in declaring war on the Amir. This was due, he asserted, 
to Russia 1 8 desire for revenge on England while Afghanistan 
was merely the shipping boy. "The Amir was under no covenant 
not to receive a Russian missionj we were under a covenant 
not to force on him a British mission. Russia was under a 
covenant with us to axercise no influence in Afghanistan.... 
The offence if any, was committed by the great and powerful 
Emperor of the North with his eighty millions of people."
(l)Ann. Register 1875. page
Strangely enough, Lord Beaeonsfield on the contrary 
did not oondemn Russian policy in Afghanistan, as his speech 
of December loth in the Upper House indicated. "Eight months 
ago, v/ar was more than probable between this country and Russia, 
...The expeditions which Russia was preparing in Central Asia 
at the time,,, were justifiable,,. Had we been in the position 
of Russia,,, we might hava undertaken some enterprise of a 
similar kind.» (1)
In the actual campaign the British forces were
/ P \
successful; 'while Shere Ali fled from Kabul on December 13th
to Russian Turkestan hoping to receive aid from the Tsar, on 
that same day, Count Shuvalov the Russian ambassador visited
Lord Salisbury, The latter expressed great surprise on
(5) laar&ing that although Stoliatev had returned to Tashkent,
the rest of the Russian mission tarried at Kabul, Salisbury 
asserted that their "continued presence.., was entirely at 
variance with the engagements... still in force between England 
and Russia, 11 These he declared, were still binding but he
 could not admit.,, the maintenance of the independence of
(** ) 
Afghanistan a matter of engagement on our pafct towards Russia."
Six days later Shuvalov offered to withdraw the entire mission
(1)parl. Reports No I, Central Asia (l$#l) NO 6.
(2)See parl. Reports No 8. Afghanistan 1#79.
No 3. Afghanistan 
No 3. Afghanistan
mparl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (lagl) page 22, parl. Reports No 1, Central Asm ?J#79) NO 7.
whioh Salisbury stated was "the sole obstacle to a full revival 
of an understanding between the two Powers." This was 
accordingly done/ '
Shore Ali was soon undeceived, after he left Kabul, 
for he had been nothing but a tool in the hands of Kaufmann. 
Nevertheless the latter ntili. plied him dth vain promises of 
a European Centres» to check England,"or else events will end
(2}in a mighty and important war." 1 *' The "Journal de St 
Petersburg11 described this aa a "generous illusion". Finally
Kaufmann advised the Amir to mafce peace, but death overtook
( 3 } him in February 1#79 before he could do so;*' Immediately,
Ya&ub Khan his successor to the Afghan throne raade peace with 
Britain, which was* signed at Qandaak in uayi^) This authorised
A
a British reeldent at Kabul, 'he construction of communications 
from tndia to that city anl the cession of the frontier distr- 
icts of Kurrairt,Pishin and Slbi to England. An increased 
annual subsidy, and a guarantee for protection against foreign 
aggression were granted in erturn to the new Amir. Although 
Kauft&ann attempted to make overtures to Yafcub Khan whom he 
recognised as "lawful heir f tt that ruler entirely disregarded 
them! 5
(l)parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (1S79) No« #,9,10. 
(2i3)Parl. Reports NO 1. Central Asia (1##1) pp.2^ - 25,
and No 1. Central Asia (1#79) No 1^, 
(iMparl. Reports No 6. Afghanistan (1579) (5)parl. Reports NO 9-fAfghanistan)1S79. also Parl. Reports 
No 1. Central Asia (1881) pp. 26 - 28. And No l.Afghanlston
(1880) pp.10,12,169-
But the murder of the British agent at Kabul in 
September necessitated the entry of Sir Frederick Roberts in 
the following month. Conclusive evidence met his eyes, of the 
extensive Influence the Russians had obtained in Afghanistan. 
Russian coinage was current, - Russian wares were displayed at 
the bazaars, while the Afghan officers were Russian tunics. 
A teapot too,belonging to Shere Al^s brother was found with 
this Inscription. "Given to Sirdar Nek Muharoad by the Russian 
Oovern?;ent for Services Rendered 1^79. **' Copious corresponded
and other documentary evidence was found which revealed the
(2) persistence of Russian intrigue with Kabul since 1#73. During
the next two years, theae papers were brought under the notice 
of the Tsar and M. de Oiers. Their genuineness was however
strongly denied on the score that they did not tally with the
( 3) 
official duplicates of General Kaufmann's correspondence.
No doubt notwithstanding, can be entertained as to the 
authenticity of these discoveries which was not without the 
confirmation of Yafcub Khan.
The holy war consequent upon the latter a abdication, 
the British disaster at Malwand, and Robert's march from Kabul 
to Kandahar followed in succession*. ' These events culminate 1 
In the accession of Abdurrahman to the Afghan throne. Despite
(1)Ann. Register 1879 page 273.
(2)Parl. Reports Mo 1. Central Asia (157 8)Appendix II alleged 
oorrespondenoe confirmed by No 1.Central Asla( l#$l)Nosl,3 f 5,
(6& inolosures. ( 3)parl.Reports No 1.Central Asia( 1331)Mo 2.also Ho 2.Central
(ij.)parl.Reports No l*Ai'ghani3tan( 14Jl)Nosl-5.( Asia( l,«l)NoslA5.
his previous Russian training, the new Arolr distrusted the 
Tsar 1 s officers because of their desertion of Shere All. (The 
British evacuation of the occupied parts of Afghanistan further 
strengthened Abdurrahman»s leanings toward England. His country 
too, became a far more reliable bulwark to British India and 
muoh less pervious to Russian intrigue. The results of the war 
dealt a severe blow to Russian prestige. For the Tsar strongly 
reprimanded Kaufmann, forbidding him to hold any further 
intercourse with tho Afghan rulert 3-) But for Alexander 11's 
restraint on his Asiatic commanders on the Russian side and 
the timely change of frontier policy on the British side, 
Afghanistan might conceivably have become a Muscovite province.
Russia in nhe meantime had been preparing for fresh 
activity in Central Asia. By the agreement with Britain in 
1^73, the Tsar had been left to deal with the Turcoman tribes 
as occasion demanded. For their country " ras acknowledged to 
be within the Russian sphere of Influence. But by the abolition 
of the slave trade after the reduction of Khiva and Bokhara, 
the Tekke Turkomans of the J*Akkal and Merv oases had been 
deprived of lucrative markets. Their activities th refore were 
mainly direotdd to raiding the Trans-Caspian provinces of Russia; 
and their suppression became a political necessity. Lomafcln aB 
was seen above had punished them in 1#77 and 1373, but not with
(l)parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (isfgl) Kos 3&*J- page 29.
Permanent results. A third expedition in August 1#79 under t!iat 
general again failed before the Akfcal TeKfce stronghold of 
Danjll Tepe. Reparation was naturally demanded by the Russians 
for their country 's prestige was considerably lowered in Asia.
Accordingly u. de Giers Informed Lord Dufferln the 
British ambassador to the Tsar on December 31st 1&79 that 
"with the greatest repugnance 11 Russia was forced to resume the 
offensive^ 1 ' Sfcobelev was appointed commander of the Ruasian 
forces which set out from Krasnovodsfc in the early summer of
1##0\ 2 ' After n preliminary repulse, the Russian commander
( 3 } facilitated Operations by using a railway from the Caspian;^ '
In response to the inquires of Lord Dufferin on August 21st, 
M. de Olers denied all rumours that Sfcobelev would march on 
Merv; ' But Skobelev reached Oeok Tepe, the Tefcfce stronghold 
which feftl after an indiscriminate slaughter on January 13th
Some yeaors later at the end of 1&&5, a remarkable 
letter appeared in t.ne "Kord" the Russian semi-official orgnnaf 
Brussels. It alleged aid had been afforded by English officers 
to the Turcomans. "These pioneers of English policy rendered 
a great service to Russia by teaching the Turcomans the art of
(1)parl. Reports No 3. Central Asia (1##1) No 1.
(2)porl. Reports No 3. Central Asia (1S#1) Nos 3 - lo.
(3) Ibid Nos 12-16.
(M Ibid No 11.
(5) Ibid Nos IS * 30 and 33 - 35.
fortification. If they had not concentrated and entrenched 
themselves at Geok Tepe, the Russian troops would have been 
obliged to carry on incessant and fruitless campaigns against
n>these enemies who can disperse in the desert like birds."
Another outbreak of "nervousness" in England caused 
Lord Dufferin to seefc assurances at St Petersburg. But on 
February 1st he could write horne no more encouraging words 
than these. "The future movements of the Rusian army in the
Turkestan country are more in the hands of General SKobelev
( 2}than in thdae of the Goverhment at St Petersburg. 1** ' prince
Lobanov a week later *old Lord Oranviile at London that "the 
importance of Merv was nuch exaggerated.' The Russian 
Government, he said had "no desire to push as far as Merv," 
but they "could not pledge themselves as to the ©xaot limits 
within which their military operations would be confined." 
The extension of the Trans-Oaspian Railway beyond Geok Tepe
( '*+}
and the Russian occupation of Asfcabadv 'again required 
explanations. Continued assurances were afforded by M. de 
Giers on March #th as to the exclusion of Merv from operations, 
but he claimed that "English intrigue... had complicated the 
situation" there. Immediately Dufferin said he hoped these
(1)Ann. Register 1##5 P-2© 262.
(2) Ibid No. 32.
)parl. Reports No 3 Central Asia (1881) No 31. 
r Ibid Nos 36 - 38f.
obeervations were not intended "to pave the way for the 
announcement that Skobelev was about to march on Merv." 
Although the Russian answered that previous assurances "rarely 
applied at the tine given, 11 he was authorised throe days later 
by the Tsar to say these words, "Not only do we not want to 
go there, but happily there is nothing which can require us 
to go there^^
Tidings reached London however next momh of the 
submission of the Turkoman chiefs to Russian officers who 
had arrived at Merv. But happily this was soon explained to
imply "nothing more than an undertaking to abstain from
/ p \ harsssln* ... ctistaicta under Russian domination. 1 ' A little
while afterwards the "Novoe Vrsirya" cf St Petersburg announced 
the annexation^* the land 3 oooupled by t>is Afcfcal Tefcfces* 
These tribes it remarked ,"will no longer coino under the v>cino- 
ful Influence of Ehgllsh einissaries."^^ But tho St Petersburg:: 
 Herald" In the follov/ing August proved prophetio fcn a 
significant » anner. "The ajinexatlon of the AfcHal TsKke ranee 
has been accomplished without the leave of England or any 
other Power. Similarly the annexation of a protectorate 
Merv will be a matter only concerning Russia and the
(%\ Ibid No
(2)parl. Reports No *f. Central Asia (1551) Nos 1 - .
(3)parl. reports No >. Central Asln (1551) Mos 6,7,& 5.
It will be announced to the world as a fait accompli... 
Nevertheless Russia will not now refuse England*s wishes, but
will merely postpone the question until she considers It/ % \
ripe for solution." x Consequent upon these acquisitions was 
the need for fixing afresh the Russo-Persian frontier. The 
St Petersburg Government refused to allow English interference
but the boundary was finally fixed south of Asfcabad and the
12} 
Kopet Dagh range; '
On the death of Alexander 11 in 1£&1, a much freer 
hand in Central Asian affairs was afforded Russian commanders. 
A strong forward policy wae now employed in tliese regions. 
In the following year recourse was again tafcen to the favourite 
expedient of wending scientific expeditions as a prelude to 
further annexations. For early in 1#32, Allfchanov a 
Russified Muhammad^n soldier, actually reached Herv under 
disguise and obtained valuable information regarding its
defences. A second expedition unda:? ^. Lessar a Russian
/ IL\ 
engineer aoon followed*. ' This w.* nominally sent for
scientific purposes, but actually, it was aftorwardn admitted, 
for considering th© practicability of continuing ft railway
-^ Hlnt-s were -riven ^* de aierw to S?.:? Edward
(1) Ibid ^o J>6.(2)Parl. Reports !To ^.Central Asia (13S1) Nos 15 - -
nlao No l,^o?n.p«:». A^l». {.Ifif.-?-') 
and No 1.Central Asia (138ft-) No 6.
(3)1 .a, Ali-Khan-(ov),
(4)Parl.ReportsVNo 1.Central Asia(l^3)and No l.Cen.Asia(
( ( 5 )Parl.Reports No 1. Central Jlsla (iaf^)pp.26,36,39.
Thornton the new British ambassador at St Petersburg in April 
l##2 f whioh indicated Russia's ambitions. He did not object 
to »a British occupation of Kandahar or even to the control 
of Herat." But he wanted i;he right "to expect Russian 
influence to prevail in the countries north of Persia and 
Afghanistan."* ' The appointment of Oenerai Ghernaiev to 
succeed Kaufmann in June, and the Tsar 1 a acceptance of the
title »Sovereign of Turfcestantt in December, were of further
(£) 
significance as to Russian intentions. An excellent opportunity
for the furtherance of her influence was also afforded by 
England's preoccupation in Egyptian affairs. In the coranierolal 
field besides, Russia succeeded largely in extruding the 
British merchant from tne territories oi the Oxus and Jaxartes. 
This was done by the imposition of prohibitive duties on 
imported English goods.
But events of the next three years speedily falsified 
the assurances given to Lord Diafferin regarding Merv. For 
the mover** nts of Russian forces near tne river Tajand in 
that country occaloned an interview between Sir Edward Thornton 
and M. de Oiers in October. All Russian control to the east 
of the Tsg&nd was dlaolalnied. But the Tsar  a minister admitted 
General Chernaiev had M & certain moral Influence in the
MlParl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (1S#O No 29. 
/2) md Nos 36 ant 62.
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interests of peace," and had advised them "to submit to T 'e 
Khan of Khiva to prevent quarrels."* ^ But there happenings 
were closely watohed by Q'Donovan a British adventurer and 
correspondent to the "Daily News." He had reached Merv, and 
sent home warnings of Mus^fevite intrigue; but owing to his 
unofficial capacity they remained unheeded! 2 ; The "Novce 
VX«emya» of November 20th, accusing him of exciting the Merv 
Turkomans against Russia made these comments. "If o»Donovan 
incited the Mervis against Russia, he did so from motives of 
nis own and not by authority,,... England's prestige in Central 
Asia has not gained tv-orefrori. . . . If t-^.e English consider the 
occupation of Merv by Russia detrimental to their interests, 
they should... stave off such an occupation as lont' as possible.
TTI October, Afghan ^^rcoe c-r^ui-icd the district of 
9hi£nan lr BadaJfefcar, whicJ? Russia hn;l pr^v lovely elaimd, 
But the Tsar on De-cwnber 33 st ho^od "Her Majesty is GoverrBTient 
would exeroiee their influence over t %:e Atnlr.., to induce him 
to withlraw. ,. from Shignan." Ot^rwi3e (Jarcr?.! Charnaiev
/ l>would find it necessary to "invite their withdrswal^ ; This
threat ho'^v^^ was» not t?.^?ri into ef >>?-?** i« arinville held 
Shignan an part of Afghanis tnr.. But ir: ?^(5«»bor, Allkhanov 
reappeared in the Merv district at the hea<l of a Ruasian
(1)parl. Ra^^t-* v o 1.
(2)See O^onovirn 1 ?! "Th(^)pa5?l, Rerorti Nc .1. central Asia (1<7^) No 156.
(i».)Parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia (Iff**)-) Nos 1 and 22.
military expedition. Its ostensible object was the protection 
of Persia against the raids of the Tefcfces, But in the light 
of the political theory of oonpenoation,this was a retaliatory 
movement on the part of Russia to the continued British 
occupation of Egypt, Then the startling news reached the London
Foreign Office in February lff#*. of the submission of the Merv
/ P \ chieftains to the Tsar; ' The "Journal ds st Petersburg" of
February 15th explained the submission of Merv in the following 
manner. «The Msrvis... belr^ ^onelous of their inability to 
govern themselves, ars convinced that *?ie powerful Imperial 
Government alone is capablo of sstablishing,.. order and 
prosperity in Merv.** 3) More Impartial information however,
*ii<T^33 fchp.t Alifc^ariov e^erwi'.l *hr KMns of Morv p.t Asfcabad 
lirfco rn -jn^c'.'-.lltlo:^"1. surr^^'V^i1 unl^v thrr^t cf Invasion. 
In this v>:iy the r»wr,?ti^i -^Tonti^r in Asia WSTJ extended some l£f> 
miles :>iarDr H.rat »« v,l:e x*.y of Ir-i.ir." Tn the opinion of the 
nev!jr.?.por ^K.ir'.tas 11 of Tiflla, »"hlfl r,^? Muo^or'lte acquisition 
allowed :ms»ir?, »at any tine to strike n blow ^* England. The
•^oat a:iT^Pt.a£reoiu:- po].l.?y --'Vr \xs to -p^r^je ?.n rsgard to India,
jr. not that <v? conquest, but, of ft?aelnM *ha Hindoos from thei
British rate.... Jt is nov eaeiei* for us to invade Afghanistan
by yny of !->:•:•»t t than for tho En^Msh to do so by way of Quetta,
. ReportB No \. Central Af5ia (l^«i|.) No 163.
2)Parl« Reports No 2. General Asia (13#f) Mos 170 -
3)?arl. Reports No 1. Oentpal Aala ( 188* ) Nos 2 and 3.
773
...The subsidies therefore paid by the English to the Afghans 
are merely so much money thrown away. Owing to its natural 
position, Afghanistan must now inevitably take sides with a 
powerful array advancing upon India."' Suoh an invasion however 
was far from Tsar Alexander Ill's intentions, for General 
Ohernaiev was dismissed almost immediately after communicating 
to him plans to that end.
Although public atfa&fcson in England was mainly 
directed towards Egypt, the annexation of Merv produced some 
©xcitemsnt. Lord fcranville to.ld the Russian ambassador at 
London on February ,?gfth th ,t t.ie news was »nos received with 
indifference" considering previous assurances given to Lord 
Dufferin. But the Tsar's reprosentative asserted there waa »no 
hostile combination against England, nor any intention to tafce 
advantage off the present embarrassments of Her Majesty's 
Ooverniinent elsewhere  » Granvill* fulxy admitted there were 
Qualifications to Russia's -previous aBKur&n«ea y.ul that she 
"did not feive up her liberty of action in regard to Merv for 
all time and under ail circumstances.* Kovortiieioss there was 
some occasion for surprise ft ;riion two aoverraaEint^ had long been 
exchanging explanations, if one 01* them suadoniy .cted In a 
sense opposif.8 tc its assurances without any previous oomnruni- 
catlon to the other, 1* Next day he warned li. de Giers to
(3 'Arr. Reclster 3,?^ rage
"provide against the complications to which this further 
extension of Russian sovereignty towtrds., .Afghanistan may give
To thes© mild protests f the Russian Foreign Minister 
replied as follows on April 1st. "The Imperial cabinet . .. 
have abstained from any observation on,., the transaction*.
owcludod by England with neighbouring states along her Indian
\ 
frontier. They.,.axpeot the same consideration for the freecioi
«
of the decisions demanded by the Interests of Russia. The 
resolution of the Merv chiefs co prefer submission to fighting 
...is cortalnly the coat., .t:;. -an -w/old iidve been <tanlred9 both 
foi* ;is, for tnom,anJL ->I1 o>iair neighbours. It was InipoFi 
for us to refuse... If ihe two Opwernmants are sincerely 
with the deslro of nalntiklning their j'rl.on^T^ ocnne^tlon f they 
may easily avoid all M:>mp3ioat:U<r)*.* V, de o-ler^ finally
proposes the dellrcltatltm ct; r.ne A-.f°;>ia.': f>ontl^r fron Khoja
t p }Saleh to Sarakha. Thl« was t.o be --$^ttl^d by a Joint,
Ooiaraicslon of RUB si an ^^'1 British offloars, anBis^od by a 
special Afghan envoy on the AHitv's behalf* .1^. «•»«* v-ln;;- 
proposals, I*ord Granvill^ 9xpros«ed a oo'** T hat current 
of Russian agon«^ being sent to M^lnerm tuid T^mj'.ill'. ^^?*fi not 
truet^ on April aafth M. els olera inforr^.l 3?.r rkT.wi ^ornton 
at St Petersburg *hat no ?.gent 1'ad v'5sitel M^imemA, bv.t adinitted
(l)Prrl. Reports No «!. Ceir r-ai Acjia -.12^) NOB 5
{c-)?--irl. ^epcr^a i4c 2. o'ontral Aa.ta (1^) ilo 13.
(3) Ibid Nee 20 - 23.
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the presence of one at panjdlh « solely for establishing peaceful 
relations between the different neighbouring tribes and Merv." 
Soon afterwards however, Mr Thomson the British agent in Persia, 
reported the return of the Russian agent to Merv from Panjdlh, 
whose inhabitants had informed him they were "subject to HeraW
Meanwhile Russia too* advantage of the vague definition 
of the frontier laid down in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 
1#73» to further extend her dominions. For the official map 
at St Petersburg indicated the position of the Russo-Afghan 
frontier very unfavourably to Afghanistan near Herat. 
Accordingly, Lord Granville Informed the Russian Foreign Office 
that if such a map were held valid, "the success of the
negotiations about to be entered upon by the two Goverhments, *
(3) 
would tee endangered. But the authenticity of the map was
repudiated by the Russian Government. Further, in compliance 
with their wishes, Granville agreed that the Afghan officer
accompany Ing the proposed Ooramiasion for delimiting the frontier
((1H should have only advisory and not judioatlve powers. '
<= Disquieting reports reached London in June, of the 
submission of the SariX Turkomans north of Panjdlh to the 
Russian Governor-General of Turkestan. Lieutenant Alifchanov
(1) Ibid No 25-
(2)parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (1S#5) No 37 Inolosure 2.
(3) Ibid Nos 39-^2.
Ibid No
was also said to be leading a smll expedition to Panjdih, 
which was inhabited by the Sal or Turkomans! X ^  "It reste with 
these... either to join Afghanistan or follow the example of 
their (Sarik) compatriots by coming under Russian rule," said 
the »Karkaz« of Tlflis on June 13thl 2 * The Amir Aburrahtnan 
Immediately sent troops to hold Panjdlh, whereupon the Russian 
Government threatened to challenge his rights to Shlgnan before 
the Joint Commission. Si» Edward Thornton however informed 
M. de Olers his Government«s opinion on June 21f-th. They 
believed Abdurrahman was within his rights in despatching a 
foroe to Panjdih which they considered within Afghan territory. 
Shignan as a part of Badaiiehan, they similarly held as part 
of the Amir 1 s dominions as laid down in 1#73. Nevertheless,
the British Cabinet were willing to refer the question of
(3) Shignan to the Commission.
Prolongued correspondence now took place as to 
whether the Commission should begin the process of dellnitatlon 
from near Sarakhs towards KhoJa-Saleh or vice versa. But it 
was finally decided in deference to British sentiments to 
start from Sarakhsi 1*') On August llth, the Russian Government 
signified tos claims to the territories of both the Sarlk and
/1\ Ibid Nos iJ-5 & 
(2) y Ibid No lJ-9.
Reports No 2. Central Asia (188$) Nos 51 ft 52.
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Salor Turkomans. Nine days later however, oranville replied 
that Britain oould not "anticipate the decisions of the 
Commission with regard to the exact line of fr*nti»r.« Neither 
oould she "alienate from the Amir without his consent, territories 
to which he has laid claim.• * 1 ' Meanwhile Sir Peter Lumsden 
and General Zelenol were appointed to represent the interests 
of England and Russia respectively on the Commisaion. 
Originally their first meeting was fiaed for October, but 
Zelenol delayed his arrival on the score of sickness.
On November tyth, M. de Staal the Tsar^s ambassador 
in London proposed the definition of zone within which the 
Commission were to prosecute their enquires and exploration 
regarding the Afghan frontier, This was considered "most 
material to the success of the negotiations and to avoid delay. 1 
The northern limit of the zone was to be nearly a straight 
line from the river Herl-Rud a little south of Sara&hs to Khoja 
Sftleh. Its southern boundary was to begin from the Heri-Rud,
follow the mountains between pan^dlh and Herat and continue past
(2) Bala HurghaO? to Khoja Saleh. Meanwhile Cossaofc forces had
pressed on to pul-i-Khatun ten miles nearer Herat, while the 
Afghans replied by advancing to Sarl-Yazi past Panjdlh. 
Ali&hanov objected strongly to this movement of the Amlr»s 
troopa. But Lumsden pointed out that they had not overstepped
(1) Ibid Nos 78 and 51.
(2)Parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (188$) Nos 123 ?nd 1J5( see 
Map).The frontier from Khoja-Saleh to Wafchan had already been
vaguely fixed in 1373.
17%
the Sarakha-Khoja-saleh boundary hitherto accepted, whereas 
the Russians did so in occupying Pul-i-lthatun. A compromise 
was suggested by Qranville offering to persuade the Afghans to 
withdraw from Sari-Yaai, if Russia would similarly retire fro; 
Pul-i-Khatum2 ' This arrangement was successively refused by 
M. de Oiers on December 9th and 17th f on the grounds that the 
Cossack advance to Pul-i-Khatun was "to take steps against 
disorder." Further "in consequence off considerable military 
preparations in Afghanistan,« Russia was "bound in honour not 
to abandon the 3arik Jurfcomane."^'
After duly considering the "zone" suggestion of the 
Russian Government, Oranville accepted the proposed northern 
boundary, but rejected the southern one. For he considered
(lL\Panjdih and pul-i-Khatun within the limits of Afghanistan/ ; 
Russia 3 B opinion regarding the matter appeared in the «No»oe 
Vremja* on Vae saroe day (December 23rd). "fhe annexation of 
the Sarlk Turkoman territory from which Russia cannot abstain,.. 
would not possess any threatening character... against 
Afghanistan and India. The English attach undue importance to 
Herat... It is very possible that the impressionable Asiatic 
will now look &t it in the English light... Russia cannot admit
M\ Ibid Noe 120,127>12aT. /2i Ifcid- No 132. 
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any other boundary than that based on ethnography."^ 1 ' 
Owing to the continued delay of the Russian 
representative on the Commission, Sir Peter Lutnsden and his 
staff had to wait in the bleak regions of Northern Afghanistan,
Russian troops also moved further south along the Murghab
(2) River. Accordingly the Russian Foreign office learned from
London on January l£fch 1##5 of the "urgent importance,,, of 
hastening General Zelenoi*s departure." M.de GHers was further 
urged to * absolutely prohibit any further military movements" 
on the part of the Russian soldiers. Regretting Zelenoi's 
delay, the Russian Foreign Minister considered it "absolute!- 
indispensable that a definite zone should be decided upon before 
the Corsmlssloners could begin their operation?*.* In view of 
Qranville 1 ® objections to *he one ??-odiously proposed, he sent 
M« Lessar to London on January 2$fth to fix another in conjunction 
ttlth the British Ministers* ' The lattor were further informed 
that Rusaia was * compelled to demand the Inclusion of the 
whfcle tribes of the Sarifc and Salor T ir^.oraans "within her 
sphere, \7ith regard to Panjldlh, "the quite* recent occupation 
by the Afghans would not constitute a title to r>o8geaslon
(h.\in their fwour.» v ;
(1) Tfclft NO 155.
(2)The Afghan MurghaX. There Is another river of thn saine n :rj 
in the Pamirs.
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On his arrival In February, M. Lessar suggested a new 
Afghan boundary from the Heri-Rud south of Zulfikar and panjdili, 
and continuing north of the Kaisor stream to Kheja Salehl 1 ^ 
For the Russian envoy maintained that such a frontier besides 
being "drawn on economical grounds," would give Afghanistan 
"all the strategic points required for its defence." But this 
line allowed the Amir little more territory than the southern 
boundary of the zone suggested by M. de Giers. Besides in 
Qranville'a eyes the whole matter was not a question of defence 
but of Abdurrahman's actual possession. At the same time it 
must be taken into account that hitherto ownership and Juris- 
diction had been incessantly ahifting in this part of the 
world. For while every man had been Intent 6n moving his 
neighbour's landmark, no Asiatic ruler h ri.d willingly consented 
to a permanent limitation of his frontier. The British 
Government therefore was unwilling to fully agree with Lessar's 
suggestion, which practically implied their acquiescence in 
the Russian appropriation of Panjdlh without inquiry on the spot
Events now came rapidly to a crisis near Panjdih. 
Hearing of unusual activity in the Russian camp at Pul-i-Khatun, 
Colonel Ridgeway a member of the British staff asked Allfchanov 
on February l#th to come to some arrangement. But a haughty 
reply name from the Russian commander, "If you will recall
IbAd No 132.
the (Afghan) outposts.,. no difficulty will arise; if not, I 
have been ordered to make them retire. 11 Next day Sir Peter 
Lumsden expressed his surprise in a letter to Alikhanov in 
which he wrote these words. «I have exhausted all means of 
restraining the Afghans any longer from adopting Measures t 
may deem necessary for the defense of their rights... It will 
be impossible for then... to make any further concessions. . . I 
trust you will hesitate before entering on a course which, 
besides embroiling Russia with Afghanistan, may o^uua a rupture 
between tne present friendly Powers of England and Russia,* 
Heedless of this warning, the Russian troops the same day pushed 
forward three miles to the Zulfifcar Pass, thus cutting off ths 
Afghans at Sari--Yazi. Again Lord aranville interceded with M. 
do G&tons proposing a mutual retirement of both Russian and
/ r> \
Afghan armies; But tfftila he? admitted the occupation of the 
Euiriiiar par^s f the Russian fttatesiaan on February 24-th stolidly 
refused to withdraw Vne Tsar 1 ^ troops even if" those of the
retired! At the same time he j^romised to keep the Mus^o-
(3)
viteo from crossing the frontier suggested b:' M.Lss^ar in London
Pour- aays la^er Acrobat was seised by the Russian 
forces, and Colonel Ridgeway again forwarded a protest and
2 ) 
(3)
l. Roporta Nu 2. 
' * Ibid
Avi-i.a No 264 i report), 
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warning to Alifchanov. A reply equally overbearing as on 
previous remonstrations reached the British oamp. "Whether 
you approve of it or not, ray orders are that Russian troops 
should occupy country as far as Pal-i-Khisti; once established 
tnero, they should neither go nor fight; I must carry out my
orders. * "' on March 2nd Sir Edward Thornton indicated at st 
Petersburg the "very great danger.,, in provoking a conflict 
which might lead to the most disastrous consequences,* through 
the new Russian advance. Without denying the danger, M. cle 
Giers said »iaost stringent orders 1' had been issued to the
r, officers to avoid ** confliot with the Aruir'e forces.
would oak© place unless the Afghans actually attach the
( vRussians, and thus oblige them to defend themselves. 
Meanwhile rumours of a far from complimentary nature to Russia 
wera broadcast in England, to which the "Moscow Gazette" 
replied. "There is no truth in the accusation of the English 
that the Russian Govermuent is only looking for an excellent 
pretext for refusing the aaliiaitation^and at the same time ma 
advance towards Afghanistan... Russia has more essential 
jprobleias to solve.... It will be very r/nr.ortant for ner. . . to
Finish once and for all .vith the conquests in Central Asia,
( and create a persaaaentiy solid frontier there.*
/I) Ibid ' T ^ 202 and 205.}2\Parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (1885) Mo 20»5.
/jj loin ko 20o.
Events now rapidly tended towards a crisis which Lo:*d 
Northbrook had even in February laafQ feared wight arise Ivor 
the increased proximity of Russia and Britain in Asia. With 
regard to the f&tufre, he said in February of that year. »we 
shall be so placed a owe day, that the indiscretion of HOK» 
officer or the caprice of some Asiatic chief may produce a 
situation in which one of two high-spirited nations may have 
either to submit to ...a rebuff... or appeal to arms... There 
is something appalling in the position of the British and 
Russian jtoplrea with regard *c india. These two gigantic forces 
...appear to i>e impelled Dy sousa fatal attraction to meet in 
deadly conflict. It is the privilege of statesmen at the head
of affairs to foresee and avert such calamities. M% "* ' Distinct
the 
instructions were now sent on March 5r-i to Kabul i*r o; a A London
Foreign Office. "Her Majesty's Governwanli f>armot advise the 
Afghans to attack the Husaian troops in order to dislodge the 
from the positions they now occupy. But Her &ajear,y<s
consider &hat the further .advr-uvje of the Russians, 
, subject DO nilitar? oor^lderationa, toe reeiet-ed by the
/ n \ But notwithstanding the protests c:-. the A>T^h 
and the members of the British Oamalfc^ion, the Atusoovites 
continued their march to pul-i-Khisti the next
. Regiotor 15SO 'JH^O 19. 
{&) Parl. Reports No 2i Central A8la(l^*>)No s.l~.. also Colquh
tt Ru»«ia aj^lnit Inclla* page 
Ibid No« 21* and 219.
Public indignation in England rose to a very high 
pitch on the receipt of this news. Nevertheless M. de Staal 
the TAar«s ambassador told Lord Grranville on March 9th he 
"could not believe the present dispute would cause war
V
between the two Errpirea. If England made it a national 
question, it was the same in Russia, but that did not exclude- 
the possibility of a friendly understanding. 11 ' ^ Further 
disquieting news reached London on March 13th of General 
Komarov who hart now superseded Colonel Allfchonov. He was 
al.Te^ed to have sent this massage to 3t Petersburg. "For the
safety of the Husaian troops on the Afghan border, it is
( p\ 
absolute?. * yH»iM*a«3»y that Pan^dlh should be taken. 11 * ' The sarne
St p^teritarr 3o*'«imni3Mt ;'in the
strongest manner* that " orders should be I .. .immediately given
(3) to prevent the proposed attaofc." He also interviewed M. de
Staai \Rte:? In th« d^y t »nd finally redacted the line proposed 
by M. TjQ^sar fo?: t^.e A^iian rentier on January 2Sth. For
wae ex^V'i*^ I from the Aw.lr f s dominions. This
d^> flared, • formed a ^art of Afghanistan ever 
It «}eoac*» a 5clag«io.i, a It had further forwerl a part of 
Altl's po«^»3«8lonf and paid tribute to Herat. Besides
a.
rcis'Q ilalnw Vaer^to could not ^e "vitiated by the
f !' \
within *l* -.D/o^tler of a tribe1, ^'t^ie other parv, of
«^l. Reports No 2. Contra! As.La i'JL3of>) no ^
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( ij.)i.e. Sarlk Turkoinins.
which la in territory claimed by Russia." In plaoe of the 
frontier proposed by Lessar however, he proposed an alternative. 
This began from the south of Zulfikar on the Heri-Rud, followed 
the right bank of the Kushk,and continued to the noeth of 
Panjdih, Meruchak and the Kaisor stream to Khoja-Saleh. 
Granvllle further suggested that the Commission* a inquiries 
shoull be restricted to the smaller zone between this line and 
that proposed by M. Lessar in January.
On March l^th M. de Glers refuted the idea of 
Komarov seeking to attack Panjdih, while the previous day Mr 
Gladstone had Informed the House of Commons of an understanding 
between the English and Russian Governments, Thereby Russia 
pledged herself not to advance her troops, and England likewise
e 
promised not to sanction an Afghan advance; ' But three days
afterwards, M.de Glers added this condition; "provided the 
Afghans do not advance or attack, or unless there should be some 
extraordinary reason for (Russia's) advancing, such as a 
disturbance at panjdih."' * ' Assurances were given again and 
again by the Russian Foreign Minister, but reports were twice 
received in London from Sir Peter Lumsden of Muscovite attempts 
to aggravate the Afghans!^ But the Russian Cabinet in turn
(1)parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (1SS5) No 226.
(2) Ifcid No 230.
(3) Ibid No 235.
Ibid Nos 240 -
on March 2**-th, complained of the presence of English officers 
across the oxus at Khoja-Saleh. Granville denied this, but 
admitted they had inspected the Afghan defences and given 
advice, which they had "a perfect right" to do.
But while the Russian Foreign Office was profuse in 
its conciliatory pledges, the Russian War Office ins suspioio is- 
ly active. For troops were massed at Merv, while attempts 
were recorded on March 27th to cut off the Afghans left at
Yuiatan and Kizil Tepe. There were indications too of an
(2) intended advance on Afc Tepe and Panjdih. Military preparations
were by no means neglected however, on the part of Britain. 
Unusual activity was shown in the English arsenals and dockyards, 
while three days previously the mobilisation of two Indian army 
corps under Sir Frederick Roberta had been ordered ^.fter a 
hasty Cabinet meeting. An announcement too had been read on 
March 26th in Parliament, stating that »a tiro of emergency 
had arrived,* and the Queen Intended calling out. the reserves 
for service with the colours. Another warning notwithstanding, 
was sent to the Russian capital on March 2yth by Earl oranville. 
Her Majestyis Government are strongly impressed with the 
desirability of putting an end to the excitement with regard to 
the Afghan frontier, consequent upon the rumours... increasing
(1)Parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (I$af5) Nos 253 - ^ and No 5.
Central Asia (1SS5) No 25.
(2) Ibid Nos 255»25S-261,265-6.
both in thi^} country ani in Russia, some true and some 
as to preparations on either side. The importance of coming... 
to a speedy as well as a friendly settlement cannot be over­ 
rated. Nothing savouring of a menace from either Bower would 
be worthy or Judicious on the part of two great and spirited 
nations.... Her Majesty^ Government regard as a hostile act, 
any aggression upon Afghan territory of which Herat is a snlien 
point.* More explicit assurances against advancing towards or 
attacking the Amir's forces were askeci in conclusion. ' The 
same day M. de aiers rejected aranville's frontier counter­ 
proposals of March 13th, but expressed a willingness to refer 
the matter on the apot to the Con lisa ion. But en March
( 2 ) he acquiesed entirely in the demands of Granville's despatch
of the previous day,
While Ministers and arubas aiders were exchanging 
despatches in Europe, British, R ;ssian f and Afghan officers 
kept up an incessant cross-fire of acrimonious messages on 
the disputed territory. Arguments became especially heated 
in situations of tiie kind in which Cossack now faced Ai\ :,iiaru 
Such people could split heads xr.ore neatly than hairs and both 
sides v/ere soon handling their muskets. Provocations and 
oounter-pr evocations wore committed by Ruosiansand Afghans, 
but the latter refused to be drawn into a fight. Finally
(1)parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (1555) flos 256 - 7.
(2) Xblrt Hos 262 and 267.
General Komarov issued an ultimatum on Maroh 29th to the Amir's 
foroes, ordering them to *etlre beyond Pan;Jdlh. Despite the 
request of a British staff-offloer Captain Yate, the Russian 
commander refused to reconsider it. Meeting with refusal, 
he led his twelve hundred men against the mob of ^0,000 
Afghans and completely routed them at Ak-Tepe in a battle 
that recalls Plassey; 1 ' Panjdih fell into the hands of the 
Tsar's troops, who, after organising a "temporary administration 
to prevent anarchy11 returned to their ttoaAtfy position. 
Abdurrahma^s forces thereupon retired towards Herat and 
Iiumsden's escort withdrew In the same direction.
Russian conduct in the Panjdih affair constituted 
a flagrant disregard of the common law of nations. Mean 
advantage was taXen of the pacific temperament of the Gladstone 
Administration to magnify the prestige of the Great White 
Tsar. This was done in a manner impressionable upon orientals, 
at the expense of Britain^ reputation. It had the effect 
however, of establishing the "Forward Policy" more firmly 
than ever. The constant discussion of plans for the invasion 
of India by Muscovite officers, although unauthorised by the 
st Petersburg Government was also conducive to the adoption 
of such views. Further, the construction of the Quetta
(l)Parl. Reports No 1. Central Asia
ttq
railway was hastened as an immediate result of the episode.
News of the Panjdih incident reached Lord Dufferln 
the Viceroy soon after the Amir Abdurrahman had joined him 
at the Rawal Pindi Durbar. The Afghan ruler received the 
report of this affair which almost fcindled a great war, with 
astonishing equanimity. He merely regarded it as one of 
those not intolerable irregularities which occasionally happen 
on an unsettled frontier. For little store was set on 
Panjdlh as an outpost by Abdurrahman, who was far more bent 
on recovering the Zulfifcar Pass. A British offer of military 
aid was as indifferently refused by the Amir f on the ground 
that an English army of occupation was hardly less distasteful 
than a Muscovite invasion. He was determined, he said that 
Afghanistan should not become a battlefield of several 
nationst 1 )
A week elapsed before the British public learned 
the story of the Afghan rout f but in the meantime negotiation^ 
continued at London. H. de staal assured Lord Granville on 
April 3rd that no intention was entertained by his Government 
of threatening Herat at any time. He further deplored the 
feverish inoreaae of war-preparations in England'. 2 ^ But the 
following day, the English Foreign Minister reproached the
(1)P*rl. Reports No ^. Central Asia (1##5) Nos 3 and 9. 
also Lyall 1 * "Life of Lord Dufferin" pagea *7R - 332(2)Farl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (1##5) No £70.
Russian ambassador. Russia he said in effect, stubbornly 
held to the proposed southern limits of the zone, but 
persistently refused to consider the northern bounds placed 
by Britain. Hence the British Government could not possibly 
^proceed on a basis which substantially denied the equal 
footing of the two Powers.•(*)
Intense indignation was felt in England when 
intelligence of the Russian outrage arrived on April yth. 
War with Russia seemed inevitable and the fcopes of those who 
believed in a speedy settlement through German mediation, 
were rudely dispelled. Foe the most part, the press believed 
the iong-defforced conflict would only be averted by Russia^ 
» disavowal of her agents, their condign dls^raoti, and the 
recall of her troops.»(2) Consols and Russian stoo&a fell 
heavily, and the worst rumours soon obtained credence. 
Fortunately the House of Conations met the next afternoon 
after their vacation,and Mr Gladstone made an official 
statement on the general Situation. He thought events poin^e 
to a breach of faith on the part of Rifcasla, In spite of her 
repeated pledges. For according to Sir Peter Luniaden's 
despatch of iCarch 29th, General Komarov denied having orders
(1) Ibid No 271.
(2)Daily Telegraph, ffth April
'9'
not to advance and moreover refused to give any assurances 
to that effect; ' An to the actual selsure of Panjdlh, Mr 
Gladstone said the St Petersburg; Government expressed a hope 
to Sir Edward Thornton^hat "the regrettable Incident would 
not Interrupt negotiations." Finally, with measured words 
of gravity he added, "This attack bears the appearance of 
an unprovoked aggress 1 on. "^ -Although distinctly warlike 9 
the tone of public opinion showed on the whole a willingness 
to await Russian explanations.
But the exolt«K»nt in both countries was not yet 
abated, for M. de Giers on April 9th angrily alleged the 
Afghans at A* Tepe were led by English officers. Tlie Russian 
account in the "Official Gazette" of the following day however, 
greatly modified this assertion. For wiill© it laid emphasis
upon their presence, it did not charge the British officersi ... .
with taxing any part in the actual engagement^ Both Russian 
and British Governznents called for an explanation of the 
incident, and on April 13th General Komarov's account reached 
England. The Russian leader accused the AfgJmna of beglning 
the struggle by advancing In violation of the nutu&l pledges 
of the two Powers, whereupon his troops only acted in self-
(1)parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (Io6'5) No 263.
(2)Ann. Register 138$ page 69.
(3)parl. Reports No 5. Central Asia (15S5) Kos 23,25 am 30.
defence. British opinion failed to be convinced of this, 
beaause Sir Peter Lumsden's notes on Komarov«a excuses wholly 
supported the Afghans, who did everything possible to avfcid 
collision^ 1 ) No improvement in Anglo-Rusalan relations oairse 
from the news of Russian reinforcements at Zulfifcar, although 
li. de Olers promised no further advanced 2 ^ Pour days later 
the Tsar^ Foreign Minister declared the military character 
of the British section of the Commission, was the actual cause 
cl the fight. Lord Granville however,replied on April 19th 
that the escort was *not larger than,,*, strictly necessary 
to a Coinmission travelling long distances through uncivilized 
district.-s. If tn« Russian Commission had been present according 
to the agreement f any suon risk would, have been obviated."(3) 
Explanations were further demanded at St Petersburg, of ugly 
ru&oura accusing Aiii&h&ncv of setting a price on the heads 
of oertain English officers at 9*njdlh. This imputation the 
Imperial dabinet regretted "with lndignation.«^^^ But 
English p&tlence was once inoro aggravated by tidings of the 
Musoovita oocrupation of Maruchafc on April 23rd
(1)Farl. Reports No 5. Central Asia (l#Sp) Nos 16 and 27.
(2) I^iA Nos 15 and 31.
(3) Ibid NOS ^o arid 55.
(ty) Ibivi No 56.
(5) Ibid No 70.
War preparations were feverishly hastened both in 
Britain and India consequent upon this new aggression. 
Transatlantic lines and other shifcs from tho merchant service 
were chartered by the Government. These were fitted out as 
auxiliary cruisers in readiness for attaching Russian convoys, 
Troops destined for the Sudan were stopped on the matn route 
to India, and munitions of war were speeded up in all military 
factories. On April 2?th Mr Gladstone moved a vote of credit 
for £11,000,000 in Parliament; "It is not a case for wsr t *. * 
it 1» a case for preparation 11 said the Premier who still put 
forth every effort to honourably preserve the peace. At *he 
same time, his method of procedure was determined, cautious 
and clear, as his apeeoh Indicated. «i will have no fore- 
gone conclusion and I will not anticipate that we are in 
the right. Although I have perfect confidence in the honour 
and Intelligence of o\ir officers, I will not now assume 
they may not have been misled,,,. I will not «ay that we are 
even nsw in possession of all the fa* to of the case* But
I will prepare myself for the Issue and will abide by it
( O \far as I can, in the spirit of impartiality. » * ' Fortunately 
war was ultimately averted, but it is very doubtful whether 
any other statesman but Mr Ctlaoatona could have steered the
(1 n.t 2) Arm. Register I£oj5 i<«gea 76 and 77.
English ship of State past the clanger zone.
Although if. de Giers denied the Russian advance 
on r.n.ruehak, sir Peter Lumsien confirmed the truth of the 
report on April 29th. ' Nevertheless in accordance with his 
chief »u views, Lord Granvllle again approached the Government 
at St Petersburg. In the presence of the Russian ambassador, 
the Sngllsli Foreign Minister at the Royal Academy dinner on 
May 2nd .expressed his belief that the peace of Europe and Asia 
would yet be preserved. The same day the Tsar held an Imperial 
Council at the Winter palace and decided to continue negotia- 
tions in London. An official statement oarne from the lips 
of Mr Olaclr'tone on May kth. "Tho British Sovernment agree
Tit,;a tr.e ftoverrrte^t of Russia.,.. to refer to the judgment 
of the) sovereign of a friandly Power, any difference... in 
iirA to the Interp^^t^tlon cf tho agreement between the two
f o \
of H^rwh 17V-/, (They) aro prepared.*, to resume
once Vntjii? ooit'ran'J.op.-ilon^ in London on tho wain points of the 
Xlr;3 f-,T tha dellJrlt?tlon of the Af&hnn froritter - the details
to 1:c : neM *oy a joint Co":i3nlsaion on the spot."
attitudeBut i-rrao-u^llr A'^-« f^Hrrnffr^^ of the 31ad*5tons Oabinat tec
weaker, einct S.U* Peter Luj^adan WRP ^©-rri'iel to England. This 
fact together with the? Hu^aian oocup.itIon of tne disputed
(l)Parl. Re-pcrtn Mo 5. 
(-} 3a« Pbo-c p. (l?7> 
(3) Ann. Register 13*5 r
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districts pending final settlement somewhat disturbed the 
public satisfaction which the Premier 1 ® statement might other- 
wise have given. This »surrender" of the British Ministry to 
Russia was strongly opposed by dissentient politicians and 
particularly by Lord Randolph Ohurohill. It mattered little 
to Lord Salisbury whether Russia understood the agreement of 
March IJth rightly or not. But he objected to the Russian 
"right to attack our allies or hunt our officers like hares. 11 
He cynically added these words »I do not attribute to the 
Russian Government an intention to deceive.... But if a man 
does not keep his promise in commercial matters, and does It 
intentionally, you say he is a swindler; if he fails to keep 
his promise because he cannot keep It, you say he Is a bankrupt 
But whether swindler or bankrupt, you are very careful about 
trusting him next time. 0 ' 1 '
Although negotiations were resumed in London for 
the forthcoming demarcation of the Afghan frontier, the Tsar 
showed no Intention of relinquishing Panjdlh. He angrily 
declared he would brook no further enquiry into the conduct 
of General Komarov. on the contrary,Alexander 111 presented 
that contentious leader with a golden sword studded with 
diamonds. This was "in recognition of the excellent measures 
taken... and of the equal foresight and decision exhibited...
>j .
(l)Ann. Register 188$ page 80,
In the action of Afc Tope against the Afghans. 1^ 1 ) This in 
itself set a dangerous example for future Russian commanders 
in Asia, as it tended to encourage them in setting international 
law at naught.
Despite a rumour that the Klnr of Denmark had been 
appointed to supervise the promised arbitration in the Anglo- 
Russian dispute, that idea was never oarrie I out. Besides, the 
greater part of the Tsar's attention was too absorbed in his 
desire for revenge upon the unfortunate Prince Alexander of 
Bulgaria. Meanwhile the Russian and British Governments 
endeavoured to corse to some understanding in the main, regarding 
the future boundary of Northern Afghanistan. As Abdurrahman 
hafl no great objection, Panjdlh wan surrendered to Russia. But
in defeneaoe to the Anlr^ wishes, the Afghans were to retain
/ 
the Zulfi&ar Pass1. ' Mutual exchanges of territory between
Russia and Afghanistan were also agreed upon regarding the 
districts of Ankoi and Maruohafcl^) ^ difficulty however arose 
on May 29th, for M. Iiensar announced an objection to the Afghan 
possession of Zuififcar. Russia, he declared, could not thereby 
sacrifice her communications with Akrobat to Afghan Interests. 
Oranvllle however reminded the Russian Government th°t they 
had already renounced that position in exchenge for Panjdih. 
Nevertheless he expressed a willingness to refer the whole
(l)Ann. Register 188$ page SO.
(2i3)Parl. Reports No H-. Central Asia (13*5) Nos 11,16,29,3^
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affair before the Conn mission. '
But on June 9th the Gladstone Ministry resigned aftsr 
defeat over the Budget question. Lord Dufferln urgently 
requested the new Salisbury Government not to countenance 
any concession whatever to Russia regarding Zulfifcar. 
an act of complaisance, he thought, would "discredit our 
character of constancy and good fr»lth in the eyes of the 
Further "the surrender of Pan^dih entitles us to vindicate *t 
all hazards the line already accorded. 1^ 2 ^ Lord Salisbury 
vigorously contested RuAsimg claims, pointing out that without 
the possession of certain tracts overawing it, the Zulfikar 
Pass would be strategically worthless to the Afghans'.*' M. de 
Staal wished to refer the question to the Commission, but 
the British statesman remained obdurate. He contended that 
unless the two Governments could agree upon a "formula of 
reference* with regard to the frontier, the joint Commission 
was equally sure to fall* Such a state of thinga, Salisbury 
maintained would cause another Panjdlh episode by the contact 
of the escorts of the Commission*. ' The annoyance caused by 
Salisbury 1 ** obstinacy in Russian circles was seen in thej
fallowing extract from the "Moscow Gazette" of July 25th.
(1) Ibid Nos 11.3,1*4.53 -
(2'ParI. Reports No ^. Central Asia (1555) No 63.
/ 3 ; Ibid No 67.
(^ iDid Nos 75 and 79.
"Zulflkar for Panjdihl Whet does this wean? I* it trade or
4. barter? Barginlng may perhaps be natural to England, which
is a country engaged principally in trade. Russia is an 
agricultural country, and it must not be for got ton that it is 
a military one too. The Zulflkar Pass is the gate to the 
territories of the Sarik Turkomans and others annexed by 
Russia. No one acquires a house in a notoriously unsafe 
locality on condition of keeping its door open. Moreover the 
principle of right is more applicable to the present case than 
the principle of commerce. The rights of Russia to the 
Turkoman territory were fully acknowledged by the London press. 
The right of England to intefere in the Afghan boundary question 
was always , #.nd still is subject, to much doubt. 11 ' 1 )
Negotiations fc«i*e wearily prolonged, throughout August 
1S#5 with great stubbornness on both side®. But the difficulty 
was finally settled by ft ootftprutniae on the suggestion of M. de 
(Hers, on September 10th a protocol was signed by the two 
Governments. The southern outlet of Zulfikar <pass was given
to Afghanistan, wftlle the northern outlet went into the hands
to)
of Russia. An agreement was also reached with regard to the 
main points of the Afghan frontier from north of Zulflkar to 
to Xhoja-Sfileh. Thi* line differed only slightly from that
(1)parl. Reports No b. Central Asia (188$) No(2) Ibid NOH
ultimately settled by the Commission. Certain reservations 
were however made by the Russian Government^ 1 )
Commissioners were duly appointed to actually fix 
the boundary between Afghanistan and the Russian Empire. ?:>e a 
included Colonel Kuhlberg and M. Lessor for the Tsar's Govern­ 
ment, while Colnel Sir West Ridgeway represented Britain! 2 ' 
In defatfinoe to the wishes of M.de Giers, the escort of each 
party was limited to a hundred. After holdinf a preliminary 
meeting at Sara&hs, the first formal meeting of the 
took place on November 12th at the mouth of the Zulfifcar 
Here the first boundary pillara v/ere set up, and the process of 
delimitation went on smoothly until the cultivated districts 
of Maruchafc were reached. Discussions row began as to the 
possession and control of the heaii-^atera of the various can^-fl 
by which alone thoae tracts are fertilised, M'itnal concessions 
were made between tiie Kussiana r,nci /-fghsins^ bu^ on the whole
( the former proved the gainers. ' Per tlxey ^:iun obtained a
continuous chain of liabitablo stations across an otherwise 
impassable dosert. vrnon tl'^ae jnattai^a were settled the 
Commission retired into winter-Q'aj^tai'^ .
in the spring cf 13#6 haw«vsr t they rssttRsad their 
labours. Little strife r©cuit€Kl untji t*n CJon-nlToion arrived 
at the regions of DuKoiii. Lore the? Ku^.cUi of the
(1) Ibid voz 105 - 107.
(2) Parl. Reports No 2. Central Asia (Itfffy) Nos 1 and
(3) Ibid Nos 15 rnd 17.
Ibid MCS 25 -
again came into dispute, but as a rule were settled this time 
in favour of Afghanistan^ 1 ) For the Amir»s subjects could prove 
uninterrupted usage and possession. But between Dukohl and the 
Oxus the British and Russian representatives could come to no 
agreement. According to the protocol under which the Commission 
was originally appointed, the frontier was to be drawn as far 
as "Khoja Saleh on the Oxus.« But untrustworthy maps had beer, 
used at London and st Petersburg, and the members of the 
Commission found no plaoe of that nans. The appelation "Khoj;   
Saleh,» however was assigned by the Afghans to a considerable 
tract lying up the Oxus. This fertile land had hoen for many 
years in the undisputed possession of the Amir, and had been 
thus recognised by the agreement of 1273. But although the 
Bokharan officials concurred in this view, the HUBSIsm envoys 
claimed that the frontier should be orawn to Kllif, the south- 
eastern extremity of the district1.' This region would thereby 
have been totally removed from Afghanis ban, and viie British 
representatives urged the termination of the frontier at Khai iab 
on the north-western limit of the regiont^) As the diroct rou e 
from Russian territory to BaiiOi was coimu&ricled *by the Khoja- 
Saleh district, it was naturally of aon» importance to the
(l)Parl. Reports No 2. Central Jtsife (1S#7) No 61.
Ibid No 123.
(3) Ibid Nos 15^ and 162.
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Afghans, owing to the disagreement of the Rusaian and British 
members therefore, the final boundary pillars were erected as 
far as Dufcohi onlyt 1 ) The question was submitted in detail for 
the decision of the two Cabinets, and the Anglo-Russian 
Commission came to an end on September 25th l£#6l 2 ^
In the course of the delimitation, an attempt seems 
to have been mnde to further extend the process In the direction 
of Wakhan and Badaliehan. For the Russian Government raised 
doubts regarding the Ami^s possession of lands near the upper 
waters of the oxusi^' But the British authorities refused to 
continue the demarcation beyond the originally prescribed limits
Negotiations continued between London and St Peters- 
burg regarding the Khoja-Saleh question, but the British 
Government proposed a joint-conference to consider its 
dtiffioultiesl^) objection was made by M.de Olers to Its meeting 
at London, but he invited the disputants to meet at the Russian 
oapltall^) His plea for this course of action, was tne inability 
of the Russian officials to travel to England owing to indis- 
position. This was accepted and the first meeting accordingly 
sea eat St Petersburg on April 23rd 18&J. The differences on 
the point seemed unsurmountable, but after some months a
(l)pu*l. Reporte No 2. Central Asia (13$1) No
Ibld N° 207.
Ibid No HP and
Ibid NOB 160,161 - 167.
Ibid No
Ibid NO 230
conpromlse was finally reached. Russia thereby acknowledged 
the Khoja-Saleh district as pafct of Afghanistan, but she 
received a favourable modification of the boundary near Khusfc. 
For Russia's subjects, the Sarlfc Turkomans ; had been forced 
through drought to drive their flocfcs to this region for water 
and pasturage, Future strife between these tribes and the 
Afghans was thereby obtiated. But although the territory of 
Khusfc had belonged to the Amir by the protocols of September 
l##5 f its acquisition by Russia brought Muscovite influence
«
nesrer Herat. The final settlement of this section of the
i\
frontier vms recorded in a protocol signed on July 22nd
'by the British and Rursian 'Wemiaents
( P\accepted the decision In the following month1. ' The remarks
of Colonel Yf.te f r member of 8?.r Vest Birt^evf.yw stuff on the 
net results rf t^e flelJMtatlor. are rirnlfl^fin*-. *It ha« 
be^n su:op".!?e«ft t'rat wr lest territory for the Amir In giving 
\:T' Par.jd3^.» 'nit the tribe STBSR to^: « very different view. 
According to tlvir, nl/.on «nd r?.le e» of lane?. ?lo.ng the Herat 
frontier rtoioh ron» of their had sver scan or heard of before, 
had been recoveroA for them by tlio
)?.-^, peportn ! ro 2* Central Affle (1X31} NOR ^63 - 267.
also Ann. Register pages 262 - 3, 1SS7.
rnd contrnl ,*ffl» ^o 1. (15«7) No 1.
(2)Parl.Reports No 1. Central Asia (1885) Nos ^> f ^,12. also 
r^i^. «r^».-;.ian Affairs" race 51V.
In the Meantime General Annenfcov had since 
been busy cons tract Ing a rsiTvay from the Caspian to Merv. 
A further section of the Trims-Caspian Railway from that place 
to Samarkand was opened In Msy lg#S, This formed the occasion 
for some striding art.tolos* respecting Anglo-Russian relations 
in Central Asia, which appeared in the Russian press. Among 
them the following «icnlfi'?*rvt observations were made by 
M. Vetzli&, a personal acquaintance of General Annenfcov. 
"No one knowt* better than the English do, that the Russian 
Colossus &t present dr<sircllr.g central Asia with one arm, 
if he wished to stretch th*+ 9vn a little further, could reach 
the historical routes to Trdia - nwnely the BamiRn and Bolan 
?»»^es^ itrd. ^ith tl•? t?t.Ti«*r arr, or^lycle the v/hole of Eastern 
Asife....... Thi^' err-eri'^TO FPlres i\pon the vital threads
of the power of T?7i£3*nd<•.».., J'and being) nailed into
ifttanctf.. • by ml^j'^ ^ pep.i^.3?oiaRnts.,«. necures for Russia 
oi In A?*l&. I'- «l»o ?*rfor^a the weanw of rapidly 
-^-^ns Runs PI." Vocma into the heart of Central Asia, 
in oa*e our 7itil A.-iV-r^^t^ *ire ?nen*oe<i. Russia must,....
bring abouv :.t» ev'/vnftrtt.lrr- ^It.h the Indian railway lines. 
If this? is not '.lone, ^^^lan5 win exert every misole to 
V'sJL-'V-lyt-e 5 -he exeev/t'on c* t^e rroje«t, its existence will 
in the futvire ex^r^r.^e r beneficial infl\*nce on the political
condition of Bokhara, Afghanistan, Persia and India. There
is henoeforth no reason to fear any attempt at hostilities
g fron that side*,,.,,* It *>s however, neoesary that the Russian
/v
Government should taXe erwrgetlo treasures to proteot the 
railway j^osi the pretensions of the English. They are doin& 
all in their power to extend their commercial relations in 
the possessions of fhe> Shah under pretext of exploiting the 
mineral wealth of Iran. But the roal object is tto obtain 
the tfonoee»ion for the oon«truotton of ?.n extensive railway 
«y»tesr In Persia* They wlf»h udtimately to establish a 
Xwerful ?ompctitior a^.inet the Trans-Caspian P;&llway and 
o frhs Frt.-lir1' »iie f the Inhabitants of Kiiorassan. 11
At *-h« «f.r^ tirne ir t ^p "Riisskayr, Starlnaf M 
l Sol:c.lcv ^ac:rented the v'f)«eibillty of a »Ruaso- 
Kl.ui? Erpirr.4* He foretold the Hindu Rush as being the
frontier cf p^rsit's Central Asian possessions, while
ci-l ^Ir.o tc Ir. Muscovite hanto. A oorre«pondlng 
^'lM?31 " ^e1?:i«r«i cf f^u?- r.rd Krnrt.«ihRr oulmlnating in the 
»,tp.l eolM^^or? of the two tflvuls was also prophesied. 
r>: f-.uo?.*? r?nf?jLtifs future ^l.p^toiwt?inoss t Sobolev advised
tc t?» 'llfflmaty a definite Anglo-
(I)Ann. register Iffsraf pages 300 - 301.
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Russian understanding. Russia would pledge not 'w attach 
England in India, if she were in turn allowed a free hand in 
Sag tern Europe*. '
A counter-move to Russia 1 e railway policy in 
Central Asis was secured by British diplomacy in Persia, 
dtrrlng 1888 ~ 9. Anglo-Russian antagonism in Persia however, 
did not beoorsa acute till the early years of the Twentieth 
Century. Early in l#af# f Sir E. Bnonnond 'Wolff was appointed 
British ambassador to the Stab* In the Russian journals this 
was regarded as evidence on the part of t?ie English Government 
to obtain predominant influence in Persia to the detriment- 
cf Russia. Lord Salisbury however in a despatch dated 
February gist, jrsive 'strftnre&t assurances ' to the Russian 
Ccvernrerf of Britain's "continued desire*... to inspect and 
pr caret* tie integrity and independence of perslr.."f 2 ) on 
, the piwstan Foreign Office .^av« & guarded and
of these sledges. But v/olff ffoon succeeded 
?p. -porftii^-iTfr th« Shah to or^en the Karum river in the Persian 
:^ British Tf»rfl}i»?itH»?; only and to refuse admittance to
Meshed. All Persia, it was. confessed in
(l)Ann. .ejister luJJ page/or- ^)Dr^.^ "Pu^nian Afftlrs" Stste Papers A"op^;idlx p^ge 691.
St Petersburg circles had succumbed to the British ministers 
power.
Russian pride and prestige were greatly touched by 
this stroke. Nevertheless M.de Giers took vigorous measures 
at Teheran to retrieve this diplomatic defeat. For early in 
1^99, he sent Prince Dolgoruki to Persia, who soon prevailed 
upon the Shah to grant admittance to the Russian consul. At 
his instance, the Karutn river was further opened to merchant 
ships of all nationalities. The construction of a number 
of high roads between the various towns of strategic importance 
in Persia was at the same time demanded by Dolgoruki. 
Russia•s political aim thereby was undoubtedly to push her 
influence nearer the Persian Oulf, which more recent history 
has proved to be correct. More important still perhaps, 
was the following stipulation which Russia laid down. "All 
contracts made with foreigners for the construction of 
railways in Persia during the next five years, shall be 
communicated to the Russian Government before they are 
concluded; and if anji Russian contractors should be disposed 
to contract on favourable terms, they should be given the 
priority,"^ ^ The Russians failed nevertheless, to obtain 
the fortress of Kelat-i-Nadir the key of Persia, which is 
said to have been the chief object of their negotiations.
(l)Ann.Register iar8T9.page 32^. also Stuart "The Struggle for
Persia."
In consequence of his acceptance of the Muscovite denands, 
Shah visited the Tsar at St Petersburg at the end of May 
Alexander 111 is said to have warned the Persian monarch on 
hie departure, against allowing himself to be persuaded by 
English agents, were concessions made to Britain which were 
unfavourable to Russia, the Tsar reminded him a single 
telegram would easily set 100,000 Russian bayonets in motion 
on the Persian frontier.
In an address at Hull on October 29th 1##9, Mr 
aosohen the Pin&nce Minister of Britain referred to events 
in Persia; ' British trade, he declared, had been opened up 
there by no "drifty policy." There was no fear moreover, 
of offending the susceptibilities of "some foreign Power" even 
if the Government struck for their own interests. But Mr 
Gosohen waa persuaded that a policy of conciliation with 
Russia was the best to pursue in Persia. For the interests 
of both countries could not be best served by Jealous 
competition. The extension of the Tr&ns-C&spian Railway 
trow Samarkand to Tashkent was completed in 1S90. But in the 
following year a British rejoinder as it were, came by t 
cutting of the Khojafc tunnel near the Afghan frontier in
(1) Ann. Register
20%
advance of Quetta. This was supported by an armed camp. It 
was freely rumoured that Abdurrahman was irritated by this 
action and contemplated sending an envoy to the Tsar to 
conclude a commercial treaty. But nothing cair» of this 
sensation, and no occasion was experienced for doubting 
the Amir 1 s good faith.
Nevertheless troubles between Russia and Britain 
now began in the Pamir regions, where the boundaries were 
but vaguely defined. For a Russian exploring expedition 
led by Colonel Yonov in 188$ crossed the Pamirs and the Hindu 
Kush into British Indian territory. In the neighbourhood 
a British officer ,Captain Younghusband ?was on special duty, 
who was at first courteously treated by the Russian leader. 
But subsequently Yonov informed Younghusband that he had 
orders from the Governor-General of Turfcestun to arrest him, 
unless he immediately quitted the "newly acquired Russian 
territory." Accordingly that British officer left the Little 
Pamir, and his colleague Lieutenant Davidson whom Yonov had 
similarly apprehended on the Allohur Pamir; was also released. 
Both were well entertained by the Tsar's officials and were 
escorted to the limits of the disputed district. A report 
was duly furnished to the British Government but no determined
me as vires were yet tafcen.
A second expedition under Colonel Yonov left 
the capital of the Russian capital of Farghana for the Pamirs 
In June 1#92. Although this was ostensibly scientific in 
nature, its real object undoubtedly was annexation. For the 
capital of Farghana was moved from Marghilan to osoh within 
striking distance of the Pamirs. According to the "Turfcestan 
Gazette" however, Yonov«s expedition was conducted for the 
sole purpose of forestalling th© division of the country 
between China and Afghanistan. This was alleged to be "In 
accordance with the plan of Indian defence, or rather attack 
against Russia framed by General Macgregor in 1##J-. M ' ' Colonel 
Yonov encountered the Afghans at Roma Tas&t ?/hich the san» 
newspaper declared was "beyond doubt on Russian territory. 11 
After a short sfclrmlsh, the Ajnlr«s troops retired. Again 
Colonel Younghusband and Lieutenant Davidson were ordered to 
retire when met by the Russians. Throughout the year the 
matter was the subject of negotiations between the Russian 
and British Cabinets, but no definite conclusion was even 
yet reached. At the same tlme f assurances were giwen at 
St Petersburg that no thoughts were entertained of aggressive 
measures against British interests, in sending Yonov to the
(l)Ann. Register Ifff2 page
Pamirs. Abdurrahman too, declared his readiness to abide by 
any measures taken by Britain against Russian encroachments.
Nevertheless in 1S93, English policy in Central 
Asia was still the object of attaofc in the Russian journals, 
among which the»Mosoow Gazette" in July expressed theee 
sentiments. "Russia in the future will never bind herself 
by treaties to any Power, and will thus retain the proud 
position she holds as the leading Power of the world..... 
The English undoubtedly tream of the hegemony of the world, . . 
favoured by underhand intrigue® to which Russia is offering 
an unceremonious opposition. It is precisely this firmness 
of Russia whioli is causing ea^eedins alarm to Englishmen 
smarting under their ill succor in. . . , . *he Pamirs and 
trembling for India. Not that Russia covets India, .... but 
labile England pursue A a policy calculated to injure Russian 
interests v Russia will avail iierself or the first convenient 
opportunity uo assist India in throwing off the snglish
Repeating his via it or the previous ye see, Yonov
for the fourth time entered the Pamir district in August
(2)After crossing the Murghab River, he demanded Oiia evacuation
of all the territory north of the Panjali River. Shuts were
(1)Ann. Register 1*93 P^ge 372(2)l.e. the Panir Murghab.
exchanged with the Amir«s advance guards, but Abdurrhman 
recalled his troops in a conciliatory manner beyond that 
river. Unwilling to impede negotiations with England as to 
the boundary settlement, the Russian Government likewise 
withdrew Yonov's forces to the right banfc of the Murghab,
Negotiations between London and St Petersbttrg were 
now more vigorously resumed for a speedy settlement of the 
qtiestlon. Britain considered the Afghan boundary at the 
Murghab, a tributary of the Upper Oxus, while the Tsar's 
Government claimed possession of Roshan, Shignan and wafcfcan 
to the south of that river. For it wae contended that these 
districts were tributary to Kokand before its annexation. 
Notwithstanding these differences, Lord Rosebery forecasted 
their early termination in his speech at the Guildhall 
Banquet on November 9th 1^9^« !;" rhs >,c p:;;-/erfj ^culd.act 
together in Asia with cordiality,-ch* Premier felt «ure that 
•a great step would have been tar.e* tc^ris ti:e geraral peace 
of the world. tt ^ X '
Finally an agreer-ent v/as reached betveen Britain 
and Bussia on March llth i#9i? f whi.h fixed the boundary 
between Afghanistan fcnd Bo^ara in the rar.ln. it 
for the Appointment of FU> A2
(l)Ann. Register 1*9** page 16$.
by Afghan delegates to actually fix the frontier In detail. 
The two Powers also undertook to abstain by exercising any 
political influence on their respective sides of the line 
of demarcation. Negotiations were commenced at the appointed, 
rendezvous Lake Victoria, and were satisfactorily completed
tnn^evef?by July. A small dlsputeA arose over a few riles of unimportant 
territory, and the matter was referred to London. Fortunately 
the views of the British Government coincided with those of 
the St Petersburg Cabinet. Finally Afghanistan received a 
st»J»p of WakHan which separated the Russian &nl British sjjhei*er?, 
This was strangely reminiscent of the "buffer principle" 
which had been so characteristic of 6orohakov«s Asiatic polirr . 
Thus since 1&#5 V the northern frontier of Afghanistan was 
now finally determined fron Zulfikar to the Pamirs. In the 
main, the line followed the course adopted by the Anglo- 
Russian agreement of 1#73. Mention must be made of the 
banquet of the delegates of the two Powers, on the completion 
of their labours, for a noteworthy friendship sprang up 
between them. Hopes were expressed by the ohief Russian 
envoy that "the agreement just concluded would be the
)D3W* "Russian Affaire" appendix page 6S6. 
also Krauswe.   pu»sia in Aaia« ap;ix»n,itx i>?ge 573. 
and Ann Register 1*95 P»e« 2*0.
beginning of more oordial relations between the two countries,
and of a better understanding of their national aims and
U) desires.*
Between 1S95 and 1^97 criticism 1.1 k,he Muscovite 
newspaper^ wofcld were provoked by the frontier disturbances 
near Ohitral, Peshawur,and the north west provinces of India. 
But on the ^hcle, far from being of a hostile character they 
tended towards conciliation. Especially encouraging were the 
remarfcs of the official "Turkestan (Musette" during 1S97- 
"The creation of the buffer state of Afghanistan obscured 
the plain issue especially to the English prees and people. 
On the other hand at id time for the Russian press to abandon 
entirely ^ts unreserved, and for the most part wholly unfounded 
criticism of English policy. It should consider seriously 
what Mne of demcxoaticn In Asi?5 .... would test satisfy the 
patriotic etmo of the two ns.tiers. Such t. treatasrt... would 
be readily ap^r-:oist©d by Enclishititr:.., mnd would remove the 
r irritation t« toe: :9bus&...» poured uj-o?' theaa by 
to tb: ;;rs^j51:'c of friendly relations." 
i^tnce whl^:h ncA: ^.,7 np betv/san Britain 
and Fusei* in centre! *^i« was yefl^ofteJi ir, the concilatory
(l)Sfcrine "Expansion of Russia" page 333 
2; Ann. Perls+evr Ic'oy. page
statements which General Kuropatfcln made to a party of English 
travellers at As&abad in November 5.097. w ^a policy of our 
Government in Central Asia.... h.^.fj been eminently one n- peace, 
and reooureo has never been inade tc arrc*s until every other 
msans of attaining a given object had tailed..,. Generals 
Chornaier and J&obelev undertook expeditions into foreign 
territory without reference to St Petersburg..... Ho ©iterations 
llfcely to produce serious consoQueneea can now be taken with­ 
out the specific sanction of His Majesty ^tho Tsar),...,. 
Efforts are made to prevent the mischief resulting from the 
powers of evil which luri: :,ri p•-?;;::-::?.^-iitir.s do lately alrttted 
within the pale or clvilisa-ticn. rJht malvts :iave been 
disarmed and no pains Have i;oon cpyrsd tc i.iviu^c ^l^r?. to 
adopt peaceful pursuits. T.& fruits v£ t?\l« ;.".»T5erA are already 
visible. Profound tranquillity rsx£;i' i;: Otii.'\r;l Asia... 
Betweon 1^35 ;w.na 156"^ wo «3Br 'r;b'il^,ho:l ai* ivA'lul&i;!^ frontier 
with the aid or are at ; r j.^i:.i. '£r b:,:i. t.^lv^ r^ru'e ^j-h have 
since elapses tnei'e "idve ^-een no e>.i^e.-.H,:.(^iL, .^hvcv^hout the 
length of the 6cO niiee bwrlcriJii; 01: ?s.".:Jla ai \ tiir *!00 -;.v i 
Afghanistan. i'V:© Iat»yej.- 'jcoiv;ry ^Mta.'/.v; i;:nh irflawroable 
material, but the explicit orders or Vi\> t:>j^... nre th*t tv;er- 
shall be no dleturDb/ues c-i. tnd Axaii^n frontier..... I arr led
to be explicit on these points by a sincere wish that the 
public nay be convinced that we have a settled Asiatic policy 
which is in no way inimical to Great Britain; and that we 
are perfectly satisfied with our present boundaries."
These friendly assurances were reciprocated on 
February Sth 1S9# by Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords 
during a debate on Indian frontier affairs. The Governraent 
he declared, had no wlah to occupy a single position which 
was not "absolutely necessary in the ^udgjaent of the most 
expert authorities for the security of* the Indian Empire, 
and the fulfilment of Brltain f s treaty obiigations.«^ 2 ^ In 
short, both Governments had learned the truth of Be aeons field 
declaration;- "there Jbs roojr for both Russia w:i England in 
Asla."^' Meanwhile the Par Eastern Question was claiming 
the attention of "^oth Russian anci British Governs nts.
irvi, ?,e;i:tsV::: lcJ>?' >?-20o 30^ - 6, also  Historians 1 History 
of the World" Russia page 620.
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THE FAR EASTERN QUESTION.
•Every port, every town, and every village 
that passes into Russian hands, is an outlet lost to 
Manchester, Bradford or Bombay •- Lord Curaon. "Problem 
of the Far East.* p.i&6.
Especially In the closing years of the nineteenth 
Century, the Far East forc»d the third great storm-oeatre In 
Anglo-Russian relations. For In the breafc-up of an Empire 
of some four-hundred millions of people, the modern world 
witnessed an event without a parallel in history* In many 
respects similar to the deol ne of the Ottoman Empire in 
Europe, China had become the "siofc man of Asia* 11 As the 
weakening of the former led to the Eastern Question of Europe, 
so the decay of the Celestial Umpire gave rise to the Eastern 
Question of Asia* Being the greatest Powers in that continent 
and also neighbours of China, both Russia and Britain were 
naturally concerned. Considerable trade was transacted in 
China by both Powers, and by Britain in particular. But 
while Russia's commerce was for the most part carried on by 
means of overland communications, that of Britain was almost 
exclusively prosecuted by sea. As an Asiatic race the 
Russians had a particular interest in the Far Eastern Question, 
and the more so as their int»course with the lands bordering
the Paoifio ooean Increased. British interests in these 
regions were almost purely commercial, and surpassed those of 
all other Powers. In the year 1#92 for example, 65 per oent 
of the Chinese foreign trade was carried by British shipping. 
Naturally, with the growth of Russian power in the Par East, 
British trade tended to be diminished and displaced by 
Muscovite oeramerce. Hence by opposing Russian aggrandisement 
in the Pacific regions, Britain sought to protect her Chinese 
trade.
To better appreciate the significance of the Anglo- 
Russian atruggle, it is well to rapidly recapitulate the 
relations In the main, of both Powers with China. Russian 
overland expansion in northern Asia tegai^at a comparatively 
early date, although it was not actively prosecuted till some 
sixty or seventy years ago. The exploits of the Cossack 
tfawaak against the Tartars In the Sixteenth Century marks its 
beginning, when Russian influence was pushed towards the Pacific 
About the saine tine, It is interesting to note, the Elizabethan 
seamen were laying the foundations for future British 
dominions in the New World, and Drake even reached the Paoifio. 
The ultimate meeting of these simultaneous expansive movements 
was destined to take place In Alaska about the middle of the 
Eighteenth Century. But the sale of Alaska to the United
Zlt)
States in 1*67 ended the contiguity of the two Empires.
Meanwhile like other nations, Russia sought to open 
up trade in Kathay and Zipanyu. To this end two Cossacks 
Petrov and Yallyshev reaohed Peking in 1567, and fifty years 
later another Russian found his way there f but both visits were 
without result. By 16JO, the Russians: had conquered the 
Tartar tribes as far as the River Lena, while six years later 
a few invading Cossacks descended the Amur and reached the 
Pacific. The following year, hearin of the wealth of 
Ohinese tradev a fleet of five English ships set sail for the 
Celestial Empire. After a successful skirmish with the 
Ohinese at Canton, the Bngl sh adventurers were allowed to 
embark cargoes and return hone. But after such experience, a 
further attempt to barter with this exclusive nation was not 
made till l&ft. For nearly two centuries afterward, English 
Conneroe with China was wholly undertaken by the East India 
Company.
Meanwhile Russia, after further futile attempts to 
open diplomatic and commercial relations at Peking, expended 
all her energies In quietly pushing eastwards. Russian 
influence had extended to the Amur River by 16#*., whjers hostile 
oontaot with the Chinese began. After a five years I war, t e 
Russians were checked and f creed to sign the Treaty of
ZLQ
Nerchinsk.' This was the first treaty China ever 
concluded with a European Power and the precursor of many 
conventions which were subsegiaently concluded between the two 
Empires, fhe boundary was thereby fixed between China and 
Russian Siberia at the Amur. Russian influence was thus kept 
north of that river, and not for a century and a half was t\\e 
Muscovite march resumed south of its valley,
fhe first British war with China in 12&0-2 resulted 
in the cession of Hon®-Kong and the opening of five »treaty 
ports* to English trade. In this way, Britain championed the 
»©pen door policy* in Cflina; for where her oomroerce was supreme, 
foreign intercourse could be easily tolerated, this policy was 
opposed to that of exclusive "spheres of influence* which 
England did not wish Russia or Prance to adopt. For thereby 
British trade would have been excluded from foreign spheres, 
whereas it was desirable for open trade to apply throughout 
the Chinese Empire, Territorial acquisitions other than 
commercial factories, were also considered burdensome to 
Englafcdl But the British concessions following the war of 
roused Russia's Far Eastern aspirations which had been
(1) Drage. "Russian Affairs." Appendix, p.656.
praotloally dormant since 16$9« These were rendered more &een 
by the growth of English oppsltion to Muscovite policy in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The visit of Commodore Perry 
to Japan also forced Russia to seek a corresponding compensation. 
Russia therefore took advantage of China's injured feelings by 
posing as the propeotresa of the Celestial Empire. But this 
served merely as a oioafc for the furtherance of her own 
interests, and for having revenge upon England.
Accordingly in 13ft6 f a foorward policy of gradual 
encroachment waa begun in the Par Base under t'.e competent 
ICuraviev, tho (tovernor Oeneral of Siberia. Employment was 
made of a process of land expansion by neans of settlements 
J2nown as »stanitaas.« These differed from the fortress and
factory installations of the colon! JL «ysteir« of fie Western 
wartime Powers. fho superiority of the »$tanitaa» is revealed 
by the Clroaslan simile, *A fort is like a stone oast upon the 
field; rain and wind may carry it away or sever it with ea$th; 
but a *stan4taa« resembles a plant which, fintily rooted In the 
soil, gradually spreads over the whole field."^ 1 ^ In 185*1 
Russia established the station of tfl&olaevsfc at the nouth of tne 
Amur, while during tfte Crimean War of the sai e year a Joint 
Anglo-French attack on the pacific ports was frustrated.
(1) ColQuhoun *0hina in Transformation," p.^0.
The second Anglo-Chinese war of 1^56 ijave RUSQ .a 
another opportunity of further advancing In Northern Asia, 
fafcing advantage of her abaorptlon in the c^onfiiot, Maraviev 
pa?auaded China to sign the Treaty Cf Aigun on May 15th f 1#5#, 
Possession was thereby tafcen of the Armr rovinoe, while in 
addition the rivers Amur and ussuri were exclusively to be 
navigated by Russian and Chinese vessels* More Russian 
concessions ware obtained ffccaa China in I860 on the renewal of; 
hostilities with Britain and France, For Count Ignatiev 
succeeded in obtaining from the terrified Governrat at Pefcing 
the priiaorafc :orovinoo oast of the usauri, oon*alning the 
important harbour of Vladivostok* Valuable conoos? ims were 
thus easily and cleverly won,anl Russian influenoe reached the 
Tiumen Hiver and tho oonfines of Xoraa. The following year a 
Russian warship, th- "Paaaadnifc11 ossu^ied the Tsuahirm Isles 
between Korea a,id japan. But on tha protest of Adriaal 
Sir Jr. Hope, in snarge of a neighbour in:; British squadron, tic 
Huflsia.1 oo,a laaer withdrew. In the same frear (12f6l) a body 
&novra aa the Taungli Yamen was established by Imperial decree 
at Peking, This v/as a board ^cxapoaad of elgiit Chinese and 
Manohu lueiaibers who solely dealt with foreign affairs in China.
The year isyo found Huscia disputing wit-i the 
o^ CMfta ov^r the oosnion of t^o Kulja drr.ttrlot in
Chinese Turfceatan. Eleven year^later, this wa; restored to 
the Celestial Empire but Russia soon sought revenge and 
compensation elewhere. For designs were soon afterwards 
revealed for the Russian seigure of Port Lasarev on Wonsan, in 
Korea. This was employed as a diplomatic menace to China and 
plans for carrying it into effect were freely rumoured in 1882. 
fwo years later, the probability of war with Japan caused Herr 
von Moliendorff, tLa Vice-Minister of Korean Foreign Affairs, 
to advocate Russian help. He drew up a secret treaty with that 
Power glvlRff h^r practically a rot-eotorate over Korea and 
providing lier with Pert Laaarev. Fortunately when Li Hung 
Chsng, the Chief Foreign Minister of Korea, laarned 'o^ese 
tdBs.'i.gna in 18#f> f they were ii^uaaiateiy oiiocied and Mdliendorff
was 3!.swissdvi,(!)
But Brltal.1 di i aot iii eaiat^iy lose hsr suapioions
of Raaaia, r ;jr her int rosts in Korea wore oonsiderabxe in 
vie ^  -)t a xv*r?ant ooJ i..3i»eial treaty witn i^a aoverrma/it^ 2 5 
Ru»'Jla «t-itijnoa at For?: Las are v ^/ouia have proved a formidable 
rival in tlie Pta? 23«t, while i-ie 2?eporta of Oonaui-Geiierai 
ialijn at Seoul wer-3 by no ii-oais or a reassuring oharauter. On 
April l^ta, l<Tsr$ f therefore, Vioo-Admiral Dowell was ordered
(1) Ann. Reg.
(2) Parl. Reports. No.2. Korea,
to occupy a group of islands known as Port Hamilton, off
U) 
the southern coast of Korea. This was a precautionary
measure against Russia's schemes on Port LafcareV, ana also 
a reply to her aggression at Panjdih. However the British 
ensign was not to be hoisted unless Russian warships 
attempted to enter the harbour. Two days later, lord 
Granville informed the Chinese legation at London that his 
Government had "deemed it necessary:1 .... to occupy
temporarily Port Hamilton, in view of the probable occupatio-
U) 
of these islands by another Power" On the visit of the
Russian cruiser "Vladivostok" on May l#th., Admiral Dowell(3) 
unfurled the Union Jack. Inrreply to Chinese and Korean
protests* lord d&lisbury, the new Foreign Secretary, on
July 7th. pledged Britain to reapect the integrity of Korea 
At the same time Dowell repeatedly warned the British
Government of the unsuitability of Port Hamilton as an
efficient naval base against Russia without great expenditure
(5)
on fortifications.
Meanwhile, Russian designs on Korea disappeared 
for the time being and li hung Chang on October 14th. 
demanded Britain's future intentions. For if Britain
remain dec! much longer at Port Hamilton on any terms* he felt•»
(l) Part. Reports No. 1 China (1881) Nos. 3 & 4. (2) Ibid 
No. 5. (3) Ibid No. 14. (4) Ibid No. 32. (5) Ic 
Nos. 15, 33, 42, & 54.
cure " a demand would be presented from another (Russian)
quarter within ten dsye, for the evasion of other territory
W
on the oame term, a
But despite Salisbury's offers to withdraw if the 
integrity of Port Hamilton agtinst foreign occupation were
guaranteed» the Tsungti Yemen refused compliance on January
(2) 
7th., 1886 A report that "the Russian ambassador at
Peking often urged the Chinese Government to obtain the 
withdrawal of England" was received at the Foreign Office 
in April. To this the ti re^t was added that if the British- 
occupation continued, "Russia wouldfeel obliged to occupy
U)
some place in Korea 1* In reply lord Ro&ebery, who had
since succeeded Salisbury* denied all intentions of prolong- 
ing the British occupation of Port Hamilton. nevertheless 
it seemed "against the interests both of China and England 
if it were occupied by another European Power" Britain 
however* was willing to wi their aw from Port Hamilton "if any 
suitable arrangement could be made which would ensure that
neither it nor Port lasarev should pass into hostile (i.e.
(4)
Russian; hands."
While negotiations lingered on during the summer 
of 1886, an interesting event took place in the North Pacific 
For on August 21st. a British squadron on its summer cruise 
retched Vladivostok while all the Russian ships were away.
(l) Parl. Reports No. 1 China (1887) No. 46. (2) Ibid NOB. 
47 & 52. . (3) Ibid No. t>o. (4) Ibid No. 56.
Bight English warships entered the port in a thick fog and 
were not discovered by the Russians on shore until anchor 
was cropped in faultless order, within the inner harbour. 
This brilliant but equally indiscreet piece of British 
seamanship would never have been attemptea by the Russians. 
But the Tsar*s authorities fearing Russia's position on the 
Pacific would be at the mercy of & naval enemy, took panic 
A regulation was therefore formed, which only allowed two 
foreign vessels at a time to anchor in Vladivostok harbour. 
Meanwhile, after considerable delay, the Chinese 
Government had obtained a definite promise from Ruasia 
to respect Korean integrity. On November 9th., therefore,
assent was given to lord Roaetoery's demands, together with
00
the necessary guanantees . Russia was the more willing
to furnish these au the Trans-Siberian Railway was as yet 
uncompleted. Besides, Korea wea too densely populated to 
allow of an easy Russian assimilation and in Japan the 
Muscovite Empire h&o a very pugnacious neighbour. On the 
receipt of these assurances ana after due arrangements,
Vice v
Admiral Doweil entirely withdrew his forces from Port
GO
Hamilton on February 27th. lt3V7. This action showed
China that while Britain wished to keep Russia from this
(l) See Roman's "Peoples and Politics of the Far Bast" p. 
155. (2) P&rl Reports, Ho. 1 China (1887) Nos. 67 db 74.
/ rm \ T V. 4 ~a «T<» ,, (I O .. M 9
. Z Jfari ue 
(3) Ibid No*. 69 -
Haaoth's vineyard, she did not wish to make encroachments 
nerself. But nevertheless the Russian Government succeeded 
in persuading China during the same year to allow the Tulmen 
river to be navigated under no other flags but those of 
China, Korea, or Russia.
During the ensuing years till 1895, circumstances 
in Baetern Asia tended to make Russia the natural enemy of 
China, am Britain her natural friend. For the Northern 
Power coveted the Korean ports tnd aiso Y&rkund, Kaahgar 
anal the Pamifcrs. Russia too set her syss on Tibet on wh«<lh 
China laid some value. Britain, on the other hand* 
endeavoured to avoid contiguity with Muscovite influence 
at the Hindu Kush and KarSkorum. The growth of Russia's 
great railway system too menaced Chinese territorial integrity 
and generated competition with Dritain's Asiatic trade. 
There was room, tJerefore, for a, Chino-British friendship 
against Russian encroachments.
But before the great conflict between the two 
Buropesn Powers took place, a few minor incidents occurred 
retiring the ut taut ion of both. For during 1893, the 
Russian charge d'affaires at Peking persuaded the Director of 
the Chine a* Bureau or teieg"u;;ha to 'sign & mutual convention. 
This provided for the junction of Jtiussiau and C:*in0je 
telegraphs, thus giving the St. Petersburg Government an
(l) Ann. Reg. 1867 p. 320
additional and oonvenlent grasp in tfnr Eastern a?^ irs, Tn 
spite of the protests of the British consul at Tientsin, the 
Tsungll Yamen permitted the ratlfic tlon of the agreement and 
further aoquieased in the introduction of more Russian 
-*onsulates.'*' Following R&ssia's example, the British Govern 
npnt entered Into an agreement with China In September 1894, 
to ^onnest the telegraphs or both c*oi;rtries at the Burmese 
frontier, Thio arrangement however proved of little advantage.
In 1893, complaints of the seizure By Russia of 
Chilian sealinic-veeseli without the three-mile limit in the 
Bering sea wer* -received in London,(3) In reply to Lord 
Rosebery's reraonstrations the St. Petersburg Government explained 
that t^'s was don* owing to the inareosed destruction of seals 
off the Vj.ssian /joast tnroi^h tv.-; disturbing nuovBrents of British 
sealars. s/ A sytoatinatl? rip I; was eent from the London 
?or«lrn Office on Vnreh l^th, ^.I.T t?/o months latar Rosebery 
forwards! a fraft agre^ant eonseminp the qu«stion.t*) On 
ths ooiuplation cf ths l boat's if a Com-'isrdon representing tn-j 
t^o OovrtmT-^rta in Eeotmber, a final s^tteiwwttt was reraohed ir. 
January 1894. Thle forbade any ship, misss specially
(a) Parl. Reports. No.l. Russia. (1893) NOB. 1,
(3) Ibli Ko. 10.
(4) Ibid. Ko. 18.
Asiatic
authorised, to hunt seals within ten miles of the Russian /yeoast,
and the terras of the settlement were more fully extended in 1895
The accession of Nioholas II to the Russian throne in 
1894 marked the beginning of a policy of #reat railway expansion 
In the Far East. The ambitions of the new Tsar corresponded 
with the words of Puofc -
•I'll put a gird?^ abunct about the earth
In forty minutes -•{£)
For many years th« idea of a Trans-Siberian Railway had been 
discussed in Russian circles. Even in 1858 the construction of 
a fcorse-tramway from Perm to the Pacific was proposed by a 
British engineer, while an American made a similar offer for s 
steam railway from irfrfetsfc to th* Amir. A line from Perm to a 
tributary o? t^.o Ob was fSnnll.y be«*n by the Russian Govewvwit 
In 1875, bi?t by 1880 thru w?-? eTtsnded no farther than Tiumen on 
the Tobol. Lack of fiandfi hp.a tsi>a:>roarl?.y nur-^resaad tJrs orA ter- 
prisa but *he JMoatlng o r" Frencii loans ^onoequsnt upon the 
Franco-Russian raprroohement Ir. thr- latir eirhtlast supplied 
Russia's rasde. in spring 1891 t an imperial Ukas granted the
of the Tr an a-Siberian llns joiriinp' Europe with the 
Nicholas II t then heir-appar«nt $ was appointed
(!) Parl. Reports No.l. Russia. 1895.
A Midsummer Nirr;t»s Dream. Act.II. So.II.
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president of a commission carrying thlr? in' o effect. Turing 
a tow in the Far Baat he inaugurated the construction of the l 
railway at Vladivostok, its Intended terminus on the Pacific.
But in the possession of Vladivostok, Russian 
ambitions were only half realised, because that part is ioe- 
bound during four months of the year.d) It was unlikely 
therefore that Russia would build the longest railway in the 
world some ?ive thousand miles long and costing some £50^000,000, 
to end in such 3 harbor. Nsv^^fcelaiw the precipitation of 
the Chino-Japanese war in 1894 •"-rovi-J-rd V-.-e Pus si an Government 
wit*. 9*^5 1 "on t possibilities. The fcttsr -^efaat of the Chinese 
forces was followed by the Treaty of shiraonoaeXl signed on 
A rll 17th", 189?. it'? t«TT!8 included the s^irrender of the
Peningula with t.>e Ice-free *r??bot!r •?£" P-rt Arthur, 
to J3pan.^ a ) But t^ ins: ?f the trea ry was hardly dry, when
'i by ?i?ana? ?nd oerm^n/ ordered her to renounce 
claims to t?rs P*rin?ul£. FT t^s St. Pet*»«b'irf Government 
considered ty^ Ja^^r:^ae -rt ^o?t A^thxcr would unnecaasa 'ily 
threaten Pacing *r. i t >?;.;? h* »R ^err»tual obstacle to ^.he peace 
oi% the Far Saw*." AciordAngiy Ja^n g vve way, bu?-, TeceTved an 
in-Yrsasscr. w.?:?' indemnity. Srit^iii 1 ^ refusal to ^eck Japan 
of -fended Hrr^ila, wiio in revenge dy-llned to ?c^p3y with Eng 
** i-o-rcce th« o'ultsii in
Si? II. Norman however nake-3 mention of an
(1) ic6-bi»e Mar which cleared the port in a few days 
•People and Politics of Via Par East. p. 158.
(2) ttrage «Kuoslan Affaire* AppenciT. pp.857-661.
But the inslboerlty of the Powersin fcrbldding 
Japanese spoliation was soon jto be revealed. Russia was able 
to point out to China that British non-intervention praotloally 
meant a concealed Anglo-Japanese understanding. under the 
pretext therefore of preserving China from further designs of 
these Powers, Russia soon seoured nor pound of flesh. For 
although the faots are not yet definitely Known, concealed 
negotiations appear to have been carried on for some time 
between LI Hung Chang the Chinese Forel^i Minister and the 
Russian Oove^nment. Rumours as to a Russo-Chinese under­ 
standing respecting the continuation of the Siberian line 
aoross Manchuria and the future status of Port Afthur were 
broadcast. But with the Rus ian embassy's denial of any such 
arrangemant on November 1895, I*ord Salisbury remained satisfied. 
Nevertheless the Russian Government guaranteed to China a loan 
of 400,000,000 francs mo inly subscribed In Paris, in order to 
pay off half her war indemnity to Japan. in ~eturn for this 
financial assis anoe, Russia demanded the establishment of a 
Russo-Chinese BanK, This was to superintend the oelection of 
taxes, the control of finances and the construction of any 
railways and telegraphs whi *h the Chinese authorities might 
concede. The 3ommero-'al predominance of Britain in the Oelestia 
Empire was thu; rudely menaced and henceforth Russian influence 
eas greatly in the ascendant. For British engineers and
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oocutpants of other important posts in Northern China were no; 
liable to displacement by the Russian authorities.
But Russian influence was further extended in China 
in March 1896. ?or Li Hunp Chang appears to have secretly 
concluded what amounted to a defensive alliance with China's 
northern neighbour. .1 ussia was thereby allowed to use any 
Chinese port and raise Chinese troops inthe event of war with 
any Asiatic power. Port Arthur in particular was to be at 
Russia's disposal in time of peace, and under certain conditions 
the harbour of Kiao-chau. Free access to Manchuria was further 
granted Rus ian officers and t l e completion of the Trans-Siberian 
railway to the Llao-jlung Peninsula was generally agreed upon.
More liberal and detailed concessions still, were 
alleged to have been granted by the Casslni Convention of 
September •1896.'*' This agreement was named after tlie Russian 
Mirister at Peking who was siid to have been instrumental in 
concluding it. Tin terms and very existence even o 40 the 
Cassini Convention have been brought into muah dispute, and 
nothing official as to its nature is absolutely Known yet. 
Notwithstanding, some agreement was evidently reached whereby 
the Siberian railway was to be definitely continued aoross 
Manchuria to Vladivostok. This avoided the long and dtifflouli
(1) Ann. Reg. 1896, pp.289 and 347. Also Drage • Russian Affairs* appendix, p
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northern route down the Amur valley, while a branch line was to
run through Kharbln to Port Arthur or Talienwan. An assooiationj
called the "Eastern Chinese Railway company* composed exclusively 
of Russian and Chinese shareholders was to construct and work 
the railway.^) Further, as it was "difficult for the Russian 
Fleets.... to move about freely and at pleasure" in the Pacific 
in time of war, Kiao-Ohau harbour was to be "leased" to Russia 
for fifteen years. But "in order to obviate.... the jealousy 
and suspicion of the other Powers," immediate possession was not 
to be taken/ 2 ' Port Arthur and Talienwan were declared 
•important strategic points," which China engaged to "properly 
fortify... and repair with all haste." Russia also promised 
to assist in protecting them and refused to "permit any foreign 
Power to encroach upon then*.» On the other hand China under­ 
took "never to cede them to another Power, but to allow Russia 
£B in tiras of war to temporarily concentrate her sea and land 
forces" in them.^ 3 ) Under such secret terms Manchuria 
virtually became a Russian province and was filled with Muscovite 
soldiers. But the British Government seem to have discredited 
all reports of the Casslni convention and exhibited remarkable
(1) O'auaes 1-5. Also Parl Reports Russia No.l (1898) 
for full agreement of the Eastern Chinese Rly.co
(2) Clause 9,(3) Clause 10.
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But the completeness of Russian influence in Nortrerr. 
China was later n-mifested in several ways disagreeable to Great 
Britain. on October 19th, 1897, M, Pavlov the Russian Minister 
at Pefcinjr objected to the employment of an English engineer on 
the railways north of Tientsin, -not for being an Englishman, 
but because he was not a Russian." Pavlov further stated his 
(Jovemment's anxiety that "the provinces bordering on the 
Russian frontier must not come under tic influence af any 
natioa except Russia."' 1 ' The German occupation of Klao-chau 
in November consequent upon the murder of two missionaries 
called for the following remarKs of the journal "lovlsti" of 
St. Petersburg. "Russia especially can learn a lesson by the 
occupation of Kiao-Chau,... as she stands greatly in need of a 
port free from ice... if Germany declines to evacuate Kiao- 
Chau, Russia... will have every right to occupy in retailiatio:. 
sjome portion of Chinese territory." '
This sugrestior was soon fulfilled, for on December 
18th, H.M.s. "Daphne" reported the entry of three Russian 
warships into Port Arthur.* 5 ' Three days later, Count Muraviev 
the Tsar's Foreign Minister, explained this movement to Mr.
, as merely to give the ships hospitality and convenience" 
the winter season. Notwithstanding this assurance,
(1) Parl. Reports No.l. china (1898) No.is.
(2) ibid. No. 16.
(3) Ibid. NOB. 22 and 25.
_ owe; ».~ fi«~> • I
Admiral Buller proceeded wit^i a British squadron to the Yellow 
sea while H.M. ships "iphiganla" and "Immortalite" repaired to 
Port Arthur on December 29th, (1) to watoh events.
The Russian Government had meanwhile offered China 
a further loan to pay off the other half of tha Indemnity to 
Japan. NO+. to be outdone, Lord Salisbury on December 30th, 
offered a direct and guaranteed loan of £12,000,000 to the 
PeldnitGofcreninent on tho fulfilment of certain conditions. These 
stlpi&lated Talienwan to be a "treaty-port" and required a 
guarantee of the non-cession of the Yaigtaee territory where 
British sommorcse was all-Important, to any other foreign Power; 3 ) 
Although tha Tstaiffli Yunen indto^teci their ^^soval of these
terms OH January 16th, 1898, * hey f e xred the Husnian Ministers 
protest that th$ opening of Talleawan as a treaty port "would 
incur the hostility of Russia. ** 5 ^ With r®in«rfcable defereno© 
to these sentimenta, Lord SaHobury withdrew his insistence with 
regard to Talienwan on ths following day. Two days later 
II. da Staal the Tsar's ambassador at London repeated his 
Oovsrnment'o objeotions. The op^nin^ of Tallenwan, he aald, 
would b a tha equivalent of "encroaching on the RUSJ! an sphere 
or influence, and denying; her in future that rleht to use Port 
Arthur, to which the progress of svents had given her a claim."4 • 
Stli3bunf replied however, that Russia haviofflolally no more
(1) Ko.31.(g) Parl. Reports No.i.Ohlna (1898) Nos.30 and 33.
S) Ibid. No. 51.
Tbld.
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favourable claims to Port Arthur than any other treaty Power. 
But on January 25th. fl.Pavlov at Peking finally denounced the 
terms of the British loan whloh would "disturb the balance of 
influence in China.•* 1 ' Althogh the Tsungli Yamen assur^ed 
Britain of the non-cession of the Yangtssse valley to any other 
Powe»> they decided in their dilemma to refuse both Russian and 
British loans: 2 ' But later an Anglo-Oerman loan was finally 
adopted and an assurance was given that the in spec tor-General 
of Chinese Customs should be an Engllsftnan so long as British 
trade predominated/ 5 '
On January 19th Muravlev informed the British 
ambassador at St. Petersburg* that the presence of the English 
warships at Port Arthur was "so unfriendly as to set afloat 
rumours of war with Britain. •(*) Eight days later the Russian 
Authorities requested tl» British vessels to quit Port Arthur.(5) 
To the great astonishment of the English public and of tfce 
Russian officials themselves, the war vessels steamed away. 
Not a word of protest was lodged by the Salisbury Government , 
whose attitude at this stage was inexplicably feeble. For 
officially at least, British ships had as much right at Port 
Arthur as those of Russia. However on February 2nd, M.de Staal
(1) Ibid. No.85.
Parl. Reports No.l. china (1898) Nos.62,75,85.
Ibid. No.88.
Ibid. No.61.
Ibid. NO.67.
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informed Lord Salisbury that if his Government secured any port 
on the Pacific, it should be "open to the oommeroe of all the 
world... and England would share in the advantages.^ 1 ' On 
Maroh 7th, sir Claude Maodonald reported rumours from Pefcing of 
a Russian understanding with China, to acquire Port Arthur and 
Tallenwan on the same terms as Germany held Kiao-Chau. He 
further urged it was "desirable for us to make some counter- 
move at weihaiwai after the Japanese evacuation of tha.t position 
Such a movement was not immediately favoured by Lord Salisbury, - 
as "the existing position was not y«t materially altered by the 
action of other Powers."
The Taungli Yamen officially informed Macdonald on 
March 9th of ths Russian overtures for th« cession of Port 
Arthur and Talienwan. This was intended by the Russian Govem-
ct
ment "to assist in protefing Manchuria against the aggression
A
of other Powers."* 3 ' Next day, Salisbury hastened to assure 
Russia through the Tsungli Yamen that Britain had no designs on 
Manchuria.^ 4 ' But If he hoped thereby to prevent the Tsar's 
Government from seizing their prey, he was greatly mistaken. 
'For Maravlev still insisted on the necessity of holding the 
Liaotung ports, but promised on Maroh 16th free access to
(1) Ibid No.76.
(2) Ibid. NOB.90 and 95.
(3) Ibid Mos.100-101.
(4) Ibid. No.103.
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Talienwan for foreign countries. six days later Salisbury mor® 
explicitly stated his views on ths matter. He did not object 
at all to Russia obtaining a purely commercial port on the 
Pacific to form a suitable terminus for the Trans-Siberian 
Railway. But h° viewed a military occupation of Port Arthur 
or any other port on the Oulf of Peohili as a standing menace 
to Peking/ 1 ^ Muraviev in reply resolutely declared that his 
Government could not under any circus stances modify their 
claims/ 8 )
More serious news reached the Foreign Offl -e on 
March 24th. For the Tsungii Yaiaen reported Russia's insistence 
on obtaining Talienwan and Port Arthur by the 27th of the same 
month, failing whioh hostile measures were threatened/ 5 ' 
Mr. Balfour, temporarily replacing Lord Salisbury who was taKen 
ill,saw M. de Staal at the Russian embassy the same day. He 
reproached the St. Petersburg Government with aiding in the 
dismemberment of China and setting a bad example to the Powers. 
But M. de Staal asserted Tallenwaft to be most essential for 
Russian commerce. As Port Arthur further overshadowed that 
port, it could not be left in the hands of another Power/ 4 )
(1) Ibid. No. 123.
(2
(5 
(4
Ibid. Ho.125.
Pa?l. Reports No.l. Ohina (1898) No.126.
Ibid. No.128.
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The persistence of th^ Muscovite claims in the Gulf of Pachtli 
forced Britain to make a departure from her usual policy in 
China and afcek^a similarjaoquisition. Accordingly Sir Claude 
Maedonald was instructed on March 25th at Peking to obtain «in 
a manner aiost efficacious and speedy the refusal of ureihaihai" 
on the departure of the Japanese forces. For "the balance of 
power in the (half o£ Pechill 1* was "materially altered by the 
surrender of Port Arthur,• arid a British fleet was despatched to 
those waters.d)
The RussL an Government $ook formal lease of Port 
Arthur znd the Liaotung Peninsula on Marroh 27th. The period 
of control was fixed at twenty-five years, subject to renewal 
*by mutual agreement." Port Arthur was reserved for the use of 
Russian and Chinese warships only, while if she thought fit, 
Russia was enabled to erect fortifications. A part of Talienwan 
was also set apart for the sole use of the naval forces of both 
Empires, but the other part was to be "a commercial port freely 
open to the merchant vessels of all countries."* 2 ' Indubitably 
the acquisition of Port Arthur was a diplomatic triumph for 
Russia. For China to all intents and purposes really bought 
back the Liaotung Peninsula, in order to present it to that
ii
(3]
Ibid. 110.129.
Farl. Reports Ho.i. china (1899) No.188,Parl Reports tto.l. China (1898) Noa.133-4
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Power. On March 28th Lord Salisbury reeated hla objections 
to the Russian occupation, which he thought "most unfortunate." 
1C. de staal presented him the same day with a detailed note 
respecting the territories ceded to Russia "en usufruct" by the 
Chinese Government.^) But as "assurances of a more 
comprehensive character" regarding the Liaotung ports had been 
already given by Russia, Salisbury accepted the nots as "not 
intended In aiy way to derogate from or restrict thei*."* 2 ' Two 
days afterwards he telegraphed to St. Psoarsburg that he viewed 
•without jealousy^the demands for tho Siberian railway oonoession 
and Tzlienwan." But in protesting against the occupationof 
Port Arthur he reserved "full liberty of action... for the 
protection of British interests. 8 ' 5 ' However M. de Staal state 
on Afril 4th that "British ships of war and commerce would be 
admitted to Port Arthur" on certain conditions. But Russia 
» could not abuse the right of use accorded her by China for.... 
arbitrarily transforming a closed military port Into an ordinary 
commer ci al harfc * 4 '
The *ewarfcs of the Russian journal "Novlsti" early in 
April 18»9 upon Anglo-Russian rivalry In the Par East are 
aignificant. "England, who has always opposed Russia f s lawful
(1) Parl. Reports No.l. Ohina (1898) Nos.135-4.
(!) Parl. Reports No.l. China.(1898) Nos.135-4.
(8) Ifclci. No. 138. r
(4) Parl. Reports No.l. China (1893) No.149.
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aspirations^ would obstruct her mow f wars, she not happily 
isolated. It does not follow that because Russia has talan 
Port Arthur and falienwan British trade must suffer. Russia 
is a continental Power and cannot compete with England, who hrfs 
the J4$t largest oomnwoe fleet in the world.... The respective 
spheres of rivalry should be defined... without any Military 
collision."* 1 ' ih the course of a debate on April 5th in 
Parliament, Mr. Balfour attempted to vindicate British diplomacy 
He admitted tne Government **folt almost a a'jiook* when Hussia 
"changed her assurances* in taking Port Arthur. But he 
considered the balance of power somewhat restored by the 
guaranteed non-alienation of the Ysngtsze valley and the coning 
occupation of Veihaiwei vi-hich China had granted. the House was 
further reminded that "railway a were not made, nor millions of 
people absorbed In a day even by a Power with such powers of 
assimilation as Russia. 9 In reply Messrs. Kar court and Courtney 
deprecated the occupation of weiftslwei as "a pis a. Her* and an 
«e:rperimental Cyprus'* which 'tended to violate the » open-door* 
policy. Remsnberlrr ««Merv Bokhara, Khiva and Batuni," Lord 
Oharles Beresford Ju3ti.fled the acauisiti-m of tfeihaiwei. Ao 
for the "open door,» it was very nearly «a blind bricK wall, 
already, and might soon become an ironclad
(1) Parl. Reports, No.l. China (1890) No. 14.
(2) AXm. Reg. 1898. pp.76-78.
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speafclng later in the House, Mr Balfour pointed out 
that British diplomacy in the Far East was essentially 
• compelled to move in fetters* on account of the position of 
Russia. At the Albert Hall on May 4th Salisbury even declared 
Russia had made a great mistafce at Port Arthur! But Mr 
Chamberlain perhaps estimated Par Eastern matters better than his 
colleagues in a speech at Birmingham nine days later. He 
thought war without allies v&s the o&iy alternative to the 
Russian occupation of Port Arthur. Hevsrtheless Russia should 
be cheofcTtated, for *who sups with tho devil must have a long
Although the final agreement with China was not 
signed till July 1st the British flag was hoi a ted at Weihaiwei 
on May 24th when tne Mikado's f <r cses vrithdrew.'^' 
the respective claims of Britain, Japan and Germany to that 
station the "Moscow Qa«ette» showed an unfcsual preference rte? 
England, For Germany would have bean a more formidable rival 
o f Russia if she held both Kiao-ohau and Weihaiwei, while Japan 
was already very near and practically oomrnanded the Yellow sea. 
England was thought to ba least offensive to Russia as Weihaiwei 
had no commercial future, being without a hinterland, "If the 
English ory quite we quite agree and hope a new era win begin
iil Ann. Peg, 13S8Parl. Reports No.l, Qhina (1899) Nos.131 and 211.
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for the East with the peaceful labours of civilization acting 
side by side... The English occupation of wethaiwei marks the 
termination of our strained relations sinoe the Shimonesfcki Tr 
We are now fully warranted in hoping the amour propre of the 
English la/satisfied in the Gulf of
But a rather serious struggle now took place between 
the two Powers over certain railway concessions in China. in 
1897 a Belgian syndicate had obtained a provisional concession 
for the great trunk line from Peking to Hankow. This ran 
through the heart of tft Yangtsze region which the Tsungli 
Yamen had promised Britain in January 1898 not to cede to any 
other Power. But owing to excessive burdens, the Belgian 
scheme threatened to fail. »Th« Times" o£ May 24th, 1898, 
however reported attempts of the Russian Government to oobtinu© 
the scheme by means of loans.^ g ) Alarm was naturally felt in 
Britain lest theselgian syndicate were merely a Russian agency 
aiming at the control of the Ysngtsze communications. For a 
Russo-Chinese bank was allowed to finance the southern section 
of ths Peking-Hankow railway. on July 9th therefore the 
British Government informed the Tsungli Yamen that »a concession 
of this nature... blames a political movement against British 
interests in the region of the Yangtsze/ 3 ^ At St. Petersburg
(1) Ann. Reg. 1898. p.378.
(2) Parl. Reports No.l. China. (1899) Nos.135 an 139.
(3) Ibid. No. 175.
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as to Count Muraviev declined to give any statement as^e "The * Times'*
of Russian negotiations for the Peklng-HaJaKow line.* 1 ' 
But while ths Tsungll Yamen denied all Knowledge of thejaffair 
the scheme was provisionally rushed through on June 27th. (^
Singular tardiness was exhibited by the British 
Government in attempting to counteract these measures. For 
it was not till July 16th that Salisbury Instructed the British 
minister at Peking to similarly compete for a British concession 
for the Pefcing-Hanfcow line.' 5 ' However this was now impossible; 
but Mr Balfour sought to outweigh the Russo-Belglan concessions 
in the Yangtsze basin. For he demanded the Tsungll Yamen in
proposals fo-r
August to immediately grant, all BrltishA con evasions throughout 
the Chinese Empire. Otherwise China's breach of faith would 
be considered "an act of deliberate hoitility against this 
country. "^ which would then «act accordingly". After finally 
ratifying the Russo-Balgian concessions for the PeKing-HanKow 
railway , the Tsungli Yamen submitted in September to Mr 
Balfour 1 s demands/ 5 '
But in tin meantime British financiers had not been 
idle in Northern tmina In the matter of railway extension. The 
imperial railways in that region had been constructed as far as
1) Parl Reports No.l. China (1899) Nos.189-192.
2) Ibid. Nos. 207-210.
3) Ibid. No.233.
4) Ibid. No. 500. 
(5) Ibid. No. 314.
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the Great Wall in 1894, and extensions northward were commenced. 
MuXden was meant to have been the terminus, but the lacfc of funds 
had arrested the xr ogress of the line. The necessary finance 
however was offered by a British syndicate, the Hong-Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation. A preliminary agreement was 
concluded with the Chinese Administrator - General of Railways 
on Jfely 7th, 1898, whereby a loan was floated for raaKlng a line 
from Chang-Kla-Kow In Peohili to Sing~*ain£ting in Manchuria. 
An extension from shan-hai-Kwan to Niuohwang was also to be 
made. The actual line and rolling stocfc were to ^orm the 
seourlty of the loan, and in default of payment the concern was 
to be handed over and managed by the syndicate's repBeseAtatlves 
till such payment could b« made/ 1 ' This new British influence 
in M-mchuria was naturally intolerable to Russia and M.Pavlov at 
Pefclng therefore Interfered. On August 12th he protested before 
Tsungll Yamen against the pledging; of the line to foreign 
creditors and opposed Its subjection to foreign control in oasa
(o)
o f default/ '
Corraapondence was prolonged between the British and 
Russian Oovsrnments, but a fresh agreement was reached on 
October 10th. The responsibility for the payment of both 
principal and interest was laid on the Chinese Government. But
(1) Parl Reports No.l. China. (1899) Nos.220-221.
A180 Ann. Reg. 1898-. p.379. 
Ibid. Nos. 376-277.
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until their aid had bsen requested in vain, the validity of the 
mortgage was not to be recognised. The clause of th original 
agreement whereby the chief engineer was to be a Britisher, was 
however retained. This agresment was later ratified on 
December lltlu' 1 '
Meanwhile suggestions had been mooted for a definite 
agreement.defining the limits or Russian and British railway 
concessions in Ohina. For on the one hand, British interests 
in the Nluohwang extension clashed with Russian aspirations in 
Manchuria. On the other hand, the scarcely concealed Rfcasian
4
Influence ovar the Belgian syndicatarunning the Pe&lng-Hanfcow 
railway tended to b^ Injurious to British trade in the Yangtsze 
valley. As Mr chamberlain sals, "An agreement... if possible, 
is a desirable thing*.. But aftar ths experience we have had, 
we must remember no agreement between England and Russia can be 
perfectly vfclid unless... both parties willingly maintain that 
agreement, or unless one party is strong enough to »n£ar oe it*
Again in March 1899, if.Pavlov made mention of the 
undesitabillty of British railway emaroachBents upon Russian 
claims In Manchuria north of the Great Wall. He further 
advocated a better understanding on the matter between the two
(1) Pari. Hipoi'ta.No.l.Oiiina. (1899) No.418.
(2) Ann. Reg. 1898. p.180.
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Biropean Powers.**' This sentiment was reciprocated by Sir 
Edward 0rey a few days later, at Reading. For "a distrust was
written large and very unpleasantly all over the last Blue- 
fa) Booir *' on Chinese affairs. we created that dietrtist in the
minds Of the Russian Government in past years, and to discover 
the cause we oufjit to go baofc even to the tiae of the Crimean 
War.«( 5 ) The final result of negotiations between London and 
St. Petar«burg was the exc^&ng* of irf*ntic notes of agreement 
on April 28th, 1899.
For, "animated by a ?3ln^re desire to avoid ir. China 
all cause of conflict on questions whsra their interests meat 
and taking Into con el deration the eooRomlo and geographical 
gravitation of certain j»rte of that Empire,* Great Britain and 
Russia came to this understanding. England in future engaged 
"non to geefc for ^er OTOI accoiint or on behalf of British subjects 
or others, any railway concessions to the north or the Great 
wall of China.« she mdertook in addition »not to obstruct, 
directly or indirectly applioatlons for railway conoegiions in 
that region strm3O?ted by the Tiisslan Ctovi*nment.•» 9n her part, 
ia bound herself to observe exactly the a am a conditlor.s with
(1) Part. Reports.No.1. China, (1900) No. 52
(9) 1.9. Part. Report Hoi. China (1898).
(3) Ann. Re?. 1899 p.54.
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with regard to British interests In the Yangtsze basin. An 
•Additional Note" was appended to this agreement regarding the 
existing contract of the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Banking cor­ 
poration with the Chinese Government for the construetion of 
the shan-hai-Kwan - Niuohwang extension. suoh was not to 
constitute a rl^ht of property or foreign control. But the 
line was to remain Chinese under the control of the Peking 
Government, and not, alienable to a non-Ohinese company. Bhe 
Russian right for constructing railways traversing the same 
region however, was not to be affected by this special agreement
In announcing at Westminster the oonelusion of the 
new understanding, Lord Salisbury was anxious not to attach an 
exaggerated importance to its particular stipulations. He 
was notwithstanding assured of the great Importance of tie
agreement itself, as a slgi of good fealinf betwen England and
(<*\ Eussia. '
On the whole th? part Britain played in Par Eastern 
matters was not fortunate in its results. Her commerce on the 
Asiatic coasts of th6 Pacific was considerably weakened by the 
expansion of Muscovite influence. Before the Ohino-Japanese 
conflict for example, Russia bought all her tea In London. But
(•: } ravl. FfipTr.;. Treaty Series Ko.ll. (38 r'9). 
IE) Arr-. Rr,.?. 1809. p.lCS.
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since that time, shs has obtained indirect from HanKow carrying 
fct exclusively by means of the Hussian Volunteer Pleat. Chink 
herself was not slow to recognise the decline of British 
preitlge before that of Russia. Th* Admiral of the Yantsze 
told Lord Charles Beresford during his famous Chinese tour that 
his country *had baon given away to Russia." a<sneral Li also 
made the following observation to the British sailor. «&igland 
l^ like an old man with plenty of money, t?ho rlaXs nothing to 
provofce a disturbance, toiowlaf: h® has neither the energy nor 
power to protect hio richest' 1 ' It was not till after the 
^usso-Japanese war of 1905 that Russian influence In the Par 
waa severely chested.
(1) Rereaford. "The Break-up of china." pp. 144-5.
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EPILOGUE.
"Come, Brotherhood of Nations, greet 
A Soul new found, with welcome meet; 
For Russia breaks her ancient chain* 11
- "Russia,* by "A Teacher. 
In the begining of our story, the political sky of 
was overcast with ominous war-clouds and foreboded mistrust 
and strifte between Britain and Russia. But the horizon of 
1898 - 9 was suddenly flushed with a hue which promised the 
possibility of universal peace*
particularly in the last four decades of the
Nineteenth Century, the European Powers had feverishly increased 
their stocfc of armaments. But in Tsar Nicholas 11, Russia 
had a ruler to whom an armed peaoe was abhorrent, on August 
2^th 1*95, Europe was startled by the Tsar 1 8 proposal to the 
Powers for the universal reduction of armaments, contained 
in a circular to their several capitals. "The maintenance of 
universal peaoe and a possible reduction of the excessive
armaments whioh weigh upon all nations, represent..... the
ideal aims towards whioh the efforts of all Governments should 
be directed. Being convinced (of) this high aim,... the 
Imperial Government considers the present moment a very 
favourable one for seeking by way of international discussion 
the most effective means of assuring for all peoples, the 
blessings of a real and lasting peace..... Hundreds of millions
are spent to obtain frightful weapons of destruction... .while
national culture, economical progress and the production of 
wealth are either paralysed or turned into false channels of 
development*.... The accumulation of war material renders the
armed peace of today a crushing burden...... If this situation
be prolonged, it will certainly lead to that very disaster 
whioh it is desired to avoid..... It is the supreme duty
unceasing"
therefore,... of all states to put some limit to these tnajrawtn 
armaments,... and His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to 
propose... the meeting of a conference to discuss this grane 
problem. Such a conference with God's help, would be a happy 
augury for the opening century. 1^ 1 '
This extraordinary document was entirely unexpected 
of a monarch who only a few months before had ordered 
considerable additions to his navy. Besides he had presented 
every Montenegrin soldier with a rifle and his ministers were
(l)pari. Reports.Russia No 1. (1*99) No 1. and Ann. Register
1S99 page 309.
pursuing a policy o£ continual aggression in China. Neverthe- 
less Mr Balfour warmly endorsed the Tsar^ sentiments on 
August 30th f but Lord Salisbury sent a more formal reply in 
October. British sympathy, he said wa» not confined to the 
Government, but was equally shared by popular opinion. "Her 
Majesty>s Government will gladly oo-operate in the proposed 
effort... and if in any degree it succeeds, they feel that 
the Sovereign at whose suggestion it is due, will have richly 
earned the gratitude of the world at large. (*) Nevertheless 
as tine went on, there was a decreasing inclination in England 
to be sanguine with regard to any practical results from the 
conference. For while crediting the Tsar with the best possible 
motives, any general reduction of armaments was considered 
impracticable so long as Russia threatened Britain in India 
and China. The greatest unwillingness was also evinced to 
Jeopardise the supremacy of the British navy.
Invitations were accordingly Issued by Count Muraviev 
for the delegates of the Powers to assemble in conference.
This took place at the Hague on May 20th 1399 under the
( 2 presidenoy of M.de Staal the Russian plenipotentiary at London.
The despatch of the business was greatly facilitated by the 
resolution of the assembly into thaee committees. These 
respectively considered the limitation of armaments, the
(1) Ibid Nos 2 and 3.
(2)Parl. Reports No 1. Miscellaneous (1399) Nos 3 f af » n(i ^2
Introduction of humanitarian methods into warfare, and the 
principle of international diplomacy and arbitration. Mainly 
owing to the dissension of the German representative and the 
difficulties Inherent to varying conditions in different 
countries, the proposition for reducing armaments failed. Lord 
Fisher too successfully opposed the Russian delegate's proposal
for the limitation in calibre of naval guns.
e 
But more successful results were achlved by the
A
second committee, for the propositions' tending to lessen the 
cruelties of war were for the most part aooepted. The 
application of the Geneva Convention to rules of naval warfare 
and the interdiction of dum-dutn explosive bullets were approved. 
Most valuable perhaps of all, were the results
yielded by the third committee. It was a noteworthy felicity 
that while the Russian Emperor initiated the Hague Conference, 
the creation of a machinery for the harmonious application of 
international arbitration was proposed by Sir Julian Pauncefote 
the British delegate;*' This waa to be administered by a 
permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, composed of judges 
selected from representatives of each nation. To this body, 
all cases of international dispute were to be ref&wAd in the 
hope of possibly avoiding "the last resort of fcln^a.*
On July 29th l$99t the Peaoe Conference finally
(1) Ibid Nos 20,31 and IK>.Ibid Nos 33 and ij.7.
Ibid No 59.
\ j-;in
brought its sittings to a closet 1 ) Its proceedings had been 
conducted in a spirit whioh on the whole »evealed an earnest 
desire on the part of the delegates to give practical effect 
to the dreams of its promoter. Although no intrigues or 
quarrels had marked Its assembly, nevertheless it effected less 
than the Tsar desired, but moro than his critics expected. 
The time had not yet come for men to "beat their swords into 
ploughshares and their spears into prunlng-hoofcs, u A series 
of conventions embodying the decisions of the Hague Conference 
were finally signed by the great Powers on December 31st 1#99.
During the same year M. witte the Russian Finance 
Minister expressed his anxiety to see better economic and 
financial relations between Russia and Britain. He explained 
that England was practically the only market in whioh Russia 
aould find relief for her existing agricultural depression. 
Nevertheless he recognised the dependence of oomneroial 
relations on public opinion «whioh is guided much more by 
political than by economic reasons." For when Englishmen 
»feel sjTnpathy for any particular country, they are quite 
willing to purchase Its products and place their money in Its 
funds." Wltte also recognised that resources could not be 
obtained from England wflile Russian diplomacy assumed an 
attitude of hostility to Britain. Aooordlngly he advocated
(1) I old Nos 76-79.
a policy of commercial and diplomatic izs^imaoy bevwaen the two 
nations. "We oan certainly assign suns of money, appoint 
oommeroial agents and establish oommeroial museums in London. 
But these measures will only be palliatives unless at the same 
time Russian and British merchants enter Into direct and 
personal relations. Russian firms should send to England their 
agents to study the oommeroial oustoms of that country. 
Englishmen should oome oftener to Russia In order to understand 
Russian ways and oommeroial habits. In this way publlo opinion 
in England would undoubtedly undergo the change which is so 
necessary for "ussla, and then the great English marfcet would 
be open to her products."*
Fifteen years later, an Englishman was able to pen 
these words, "The two raoes are very different, but strangely 
complementary, and In Russia the value of English Influences is 
realised. Her nascent constitutionalism loofcs to ours as its 
mother and its model; her people admire our characteristics and 
read our literature; her most carefully trained children are put 
into English hands and taught our language and our ways. We 
have something in our spirit that Russia needs. And she has 
something that will be good for
1)Ann. Register 1599 page 305.
2)oxford pamphlets 191if - 15, "Russia and Britain* by Percy 
Dearmer. also "The Nineteenth Oentury and After." Januaryl9i5
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